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Abstract 
 
For any country, including South Africa, new business development is critical for the 
sustained growth and development of the economy. In this study the impact of the 
transfer of knowledge and skills by the investor to the investee and the impact on the 
success of private equity, venture capital and angel investments, new business 
development in South Africa and internationally is researched.  
 
A literature study is firstly conducted to determine, from literature, the importance of the 
transfer of knowledge and skills by the investor to the investee of a new venture. The 
results from recent research conducted in the United States of America and Europe is also 
included to determine current global development tendencies. The research highlighted 
factors, other than merely having a good business idea, which determines the success of a 
new venture.  
 
The global research clearly demonstrates that the active involvement of the angel 
investors, venture capitalists and private equity investors in new ventures, through the 
transfer of knowledge and skills, determines the success of the investment in new 
business development.  
 
The survey that was done in the South African venture capital environment seems to 
support  this outcome  although the South African market sector is in the early stages of 
development and focuses mainly on private equity and not so much new business 
development.   
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Opsomming. 
 
Nuwe besigheidsontwikkeling is krities vir enige land, ingelsote Suid Afrika, om 
deurlopende en volhoubare groei en ontwikkeling van die land se ekonomie te verseker. 
Hierdie studie het die impak van die oordrag van kennis en vaardighede op die sukses 
van privatekapitaal- , waagkapitaal- (alternatiewelik – nuwebesigheidsbeleggings) en 
engelbeleggings in nuwebesigheidsbeleggings vir Suid Afrika en Internationaal, 
nagevors. 
 
‘n Literatuurstudie om die belangrikeid van die oordrag van kennis en vaardighede, van 
die belegger na die nuwe besighede,  in die gemelde belggingsprosesse vir 
nuwebesigheidsbeleggings te bepaal, is eerstens gedoen. Die uitkoms van navorsings wat 
onlangs in die Verenigde State van Amerika en Europa gedoen is, is ook ingesluit om die 
huidige internationale ontwikkelingstendense rakende nuwebesigheidsbeleggings te 
bepaal. Die navorsing het die klem geplaas op ander belangrike faktore anders as slegs ’n 
goeie besigheidsidee, wat die sukses van ‘n nuwe besigheid bepaal.  
 
Die internasionale navorsing het duidelik aangedui dat die aktiewe betrokkenheid van 
beleggers, engel-, waagkapitaal en privatebeleggers, deur die oordrag van kennis en 
vaardigheid aan die nuwe besigheid, die sukses van die nuwe besigheid en dus die 
belegging bepaal. 
 
Die opname wat in Suid Afrika gedoen is, ondersteun hierdie internasionale bevinding 
alhoewel die Suid Afrikaanse nuwebesigheidsbeleggings sektor in die vroeë stadium van 
ontwikkeling is en daar hoofsaaklik gekonsentreer word op privatekapitaalbeleggings, 
“private equity investments”, terwyl die werklike nuwebesigheidsbeleggings nie soveel 
aandag geniet nie.     
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CHAPTER 1  BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background. 
 
The creation of new ventures and businesses is determined for economical growth of any 
economy in the world. The entrepreneurial creativity to create new ventures and develop 
new markets enhances economical growth. Venture capital and angel investing are two of 
the most important facilitators of new business and job opportunities in the United States 
of America and the United Kingdom. David Birch established in the late 1970s that 70% 
of the job creation in the U.S. economy occurred in small business firms with fewer than 
100 employees. Small business has a major impact on the American economy where 
more than half of the major innovations occur in small firms. (Bartlett, 1988: 11) The 
venture capital market is very active in the United States where billions of dollars are 
invested on an annual basis, and according to Schetler, (2006: 49), business angels alone 
invest over $60 billion per year. Investors became cautious about the venture capital 
market after the collapse of the information technology bubble in the 1990s, but the 
subsequent withdrawal of funds were temporary and increasingly more funds are now 
available in the USA for investment.      
 
The venture capital era began in earnest in America in 1946, after World War II, when 
General Georges Doriot, Ralph Flanders, Carl Compton and others organised American 
Research and Development (ARD), the first public corporation specialising in investing 
in illiquid securities of new business. General Doriot defined venture capital by 
categorising it in the following six points (Bartlett, 1988: 2): 
 
• Involvement in new technology, new marketing concepts, and new product 
application possibilities. 
• Significant, although not necessarily controlling, participation by the 
investor in the company’s management. 
• Investment in ventures staffed by people of outstanding competence and 
integrity. 
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• Product processes that have passed at least through the early prototype stage 
and are adequately protected by patents, copyrights and trade secret 
agreements. 
• Situations which show promise to mature within a few years to the point of 
an initial public offering (IPO) or a sale of the entire company. 
• Opportunities in which the venture capitalist could make a contribution 
beyond the capital dollars invested. 
 
In Doriot’s definition – the second and last point above – it is stated that the venture 
capital investor has a further responsibility over and above the money supplied. It is quite 
clear from the above definition that the intention of General Doriot was to have a hands-
on involvement in the investments made. The venture capitalist in some instances and 
angel investors are normally wealthy individuals who have owned his own business and 
completed the venture development and investment process with success. The knowledge 
and skills thus acquired / earned in the process are essential for the success of any other 
new venture or investment made.  
 
A definition by Benjamin and Margulis (2001: 7) defines venture capital as “the business 
of building businesses”. The definition defines a commitment to contribute more than 
money to the company. Venture investment involves building and financing successful 
self-sustaining companies. Investors should transfer their knowledge and skills to the 
investments made in order to increase the success rate of venture investment and reduce 
the risk thereof.  
 
The type of venture capital investment in new enterprises changed over the years. It 
commenced some five hundred years ago when Spain's Queen Isabella financed the 
voyage of Columbus to the New World in 1496. Many new enterprises have since been 
financed by family members and friends or private investors believing in the 
entrepreneur's new venture. Venture capital was up to 1946 an investment on a personal 
basis. Doriot changed this practice with the creation of the ARD, but the element of 
personal involvement remained, as advocated by Doriot. The success of venture capital 
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investment and the high returns achieved by the investments attracted the attention of 
investment bankers in the early 1960. The investment bankers saw this as a good 
opportunity to increase their return on investments made. The amount of funds made 
available by the investment bankers removed the original venture capitalists, investing 
their own funds, from the market and replaced them with corporate investors.  
 
The commitment to contribute more than money became difficult, since investors/fund 
managers are traditionally interested in a return on their investment and not in the 
management of the company. Venture capitalists started to select only investments where 
the entrepreneur already had the management team in place, as well as all the 
entrepreneurial and marketing skills. Venture capitalists moved away from small and 
early-stage investments to investments in companies in a later stage of development 
where the investment is much larger. The early-stage venture was left in the cold and 
many good investment opportunities were left in abeyance. This movement in the 
marketplace created the opportunity for individual venture capitalists to become involved 
in the market once again. These investors called themselves “angels” and they are very 
active in the investment market in America, where over 200 000 are registered, with 
many others not registered. Angel investors will be encountered, formalised or not 
formalised, in almost every country where venture capitalists are active. The original 
venture capitalists with previous experience in venture development, management and 
investment returned in the form of angel investors. 
 
Hill and Power (2001: 1) define venture capital as follows: “Venture Capital Investing is 
all about the willingness to accept a high degree of risk in order to obtain the potential for 
an extremely high rate of return. Venture Capital Investing is all about a desire to build a 
small company into a large one, to build a company that no one has heard of into a 
company that makes headlines.” The change from Doriot’s definition to Hill and Power’s 
definition is quite clear. Venture capital changed from the business to create businesses to 
a money printing business. Capitalism does not fault the latter, but the risk profile of 
venture capital investments increased drastically. Venture capital is seen as a high-risk 
investment with very high returns if it is successful. In the South African context venture 
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capital is seen as a very risky form of investment not desirable as a normal investment 
instrument. There is, however, considerable need for these kinds of investments, since in 
the United States some 70% of all new job opportunities are created through venture 
capital or angel investment (Bartlett, 1988: 11). The near absence of this kind of 
investments and the development of these markets in South Africa shift the creation of 
job opportunities to multi-national corporations and the South African Government. The 
cost of job creation and business development is too expensive for the government and 
multi-national corporations to bear and, therefore, job creation and business development 
necessarily lag behind.  
 
The change in the venture capital market and the involvement of corporate investors are 
not the only reasons why venture capital is seen to be a high-risk business. Entrepreneurs 
seem to have a high need for autonomy and power. One of the main characteristics of a 
typical entrepreneur is the drive to be independent and autonomous. Entrepreneurs 
believe that they do not need any nurturing by a mentor, and they want to, or have to, 
dominate the situation. They strive to be independent and “I know it all” is certainly one 
of the main contributors to the level of risk experienced in venture capital. In most cases 
the entrepreneur would have been involved with the project or concept for many months, 
or even years, he knows it inside out and also believes that he is the only one who is able 
to manage the process.  Since entrepreneurs are human and only a few have the wide-
ranging skills to develop, manage and market their enterprise, they sometimes become so 
focused on one dimension of the company that they neglect keeping track with what is 
happening in their wider company or the business environment at large. In this scenario 
the investor has a specific role to play in successfully launches the new product into the 
market, and building the new business to be a lucrative enterprise. Investors can add even 
more risk to the investment. Investors normally want to have control of the investment 
made. Control is achieved by taking control of the board of directors and the management 
team of the company. Investors typically change from being venture capitalists and angel 
investors to being “vulture capitalists” once their main objective is the maximising of the 
return on their investment whilst they ignore the wellbeing of the venture. In the short 
term they may well ignore the business, the people involved and also the long-term goals 
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and opportunities that may present themselves. A balance should thus be found between 
the short-term and long-term goals of the entrepreneur on the one hand and the investors 
on the other. The entrepreneur’s creativity and drive should not be stifled, including the 
control and structure needed by the investor. 
 
Over the years, and with the steady development of venture capital, venture capitalists 
and the corporate institutions developed criteria that a venture needed to fulfil before an 
investment would be made. One of these criteria is the company’s management skills, 
which is undoubtedly one of the most important aspects of any business. Benjamin and 
Margulis (2001: 59) defined and discussed the risk aspects of a potential investment. 
According to them management is risk number one, and suggest that any investor should 
attend to the following questions before investing: 
• Can management and personnel carry out the plan they so passionately present? 
• Do they have the ability, experience, background, and track record to accomplish the 
forecast, sales and manage internal operations? 
• Are they able to form a team within the ranks? 
• Has any note of discord been struck among the members of the management team? 
 
The above are crucial questions, and it would have been a perfect world if each small and 
medium enterprise (SME) could fulfil the above ideals. Practically this is not possible, 
and there are more SMEs lacking the above skills and knowledge than those that are 
equipped with these attributes. The question then remains: “How does one approach these 
investments and what should the role of the investor be?”  
 
There are many more constraints, of which time is but one, in our modern economy and 
lifestyle, and the investor should bear these in mind. In a structured venture capital 
market the investors normally contribute to a venture capital fund, which invests in 
specific ventures after being evaluated. Bartlett (1999: 162) states that the partner in the 
venture capital pool would regard himself as someone with the expertise to add value to 
the investments under his control. He further states that: “The notion is that the typical 
founder, entrepreneur, is an incomplete businessman, with gaps in experience in matters 
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such as financial management and marketing”.  The question remains: “Does the partner 
in the venture capital pool really participate or is he merely an investor/ banker with no 
intention to participate?” As asset managers took over the role of venture capitalists as 
the investors, it could well be asked whether they are “streetwise” enough to assist the 
entrepreneur, since they may be good fund managers, but lack any real business 
experience. The wording, partner, of the sentence quoted may be a contradiction since the 
investor has no intention to be involved in the venture or its development.  
 
The need for a hands-on approach by investors is critical indeed. Carmelo Pistorio is a 
very successful Angel investor in Singapore with a hands-on approach. In the magazine, 
Red Herring of 20 April 2004, Anonymous D (2004: 1), it is stated that Singapore could 
be very fortunate that Carmelo Pistorio showed up there. “Mr Pistorio is something of a 
rare breed here; an angel investor with hand-on entrepreneurial experience to guide his 
seed companies. Money is not necessarily the hardest thing for a Singapore based start-up 
to come by, but experienced entrepreneurs to guide one along the bumpy road from 
concept to becoming a company seems rarer than hens’ teeth”. This approach made 
Pistorio a very successful investor, with a success rate much higher than that of the 
average venture capital fund. The above approach reduces the risk of venture capital or 
angel investment and can introduce venture capital and angel investment as an important 
investment vehicle in South Africa and many other countries.  
 
The need for a hands-on approach and involvement is quite self evident in South Africa. 
This assertion is supported by a study by the Business School of the University of Cape 
Town, as reported by Ueckermann in the newspaper Rapport of 4 April 2004. The article 
stated that bureaucracy, limited training and insufficient access to finance as well as a 
lack of business knowledge and experience hamper the initiative of South African 
entrepreneurs (Ueckermann 2004). The South African Government has realised that there 
is a need in the market and that SMEs are able to play an important role in the creation of 
job opportunities and economic wealth.   The South African Government consequently 
created the RED initiative (Real Enterprise Development) and introduced it to the market 
during 2004. This initiative aims at transferring management and entrepreneurial skills to 
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SMEs in order for them to create business, job opportunities and future economic growth 
(Bester, 2004), (Anonymous B, 2004) and (Anonymous C, 2004).      
 
The SME sector is a segment in the South Africa economy that is for the most part 
financed by own or family funds, and the support from the financial sector is very slim, 
although its role is advocated. The creation of new enterprises and new inventions is a 
trademark of the South African economy and its people, but the financial support, 
transferring of management and entrepreneurial skills are lacking. SMEs are a very 
important job-creating sector in the economy that is otherwise being neglected. The 
development of this sector is directly linked to finances, managerial support and the 
transfer of entrepreneurial skills. The formal financial sector, commercial and merchant 
bankers, would support the investment activities in this sector once they have sufficient 
guarantees to cover their risk. The changing role of the commercial banking sector from 
business partner to risk avoiding financier, contributed to the SME sector trailing behind. 
The development of the South African venture capital market is in its infant stage 
compared to America and Europe, and concentrates to a large extent on the larger 
enterprises, leaving the smaller enterprises, normally with fewer than 100 employees, in 
the cold. 
 
Professor William A Sahlman of the Harvard Business School summarised the 
background for his research proposal by stating that the monitoring oversight and advice 
(mentoring) that investors provide to their investee companies is an important element of 
financing of start-up companies. It is important to understand that investors provide more 
than mere capital to new firms, and that this added value is central to appreciating the 
importance of the private equity investor to our current economic development. 
(Benjamin and Margulis, 2001: 240). One should broaden this reference to private equity 
investments to include almost all new venture investments made. The risks of these 
investments could be drastically reduced, should management and entrepreneurial skills 
be transferred to the investments made. The real impact of the transfer of management 
and entrepreneurial skills to angel and venture capital investments should be researched 
to determine the effect of such a transfer on the success of these kinds of investments. 
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1.2 The Objectives of the Study. 
   
1.2.1 The main objective of the study is to determine the impact of the transfer of 
knowledge and skills by the investor to the investee on the success of the private 
equity, venture capital and angel investments, internationally and in South Africa. 
  
1.2.2 To achieve the main objective the following sub-objectives will be sought: 
 
• To gather information from literature on any previous research done, or 
practical applications that exist, regarding the transfer of knowledge and 
skills to the investee. 
• To determine by way of a survey the factors that determines the success of 
venture capital investments. 
• To determine the possible impact of such a transfer of skills and 
knowledge success rate of ventures. 
• To use the information collected to evaluate the South African situation 
regarding the transfer of knowledge and skill from the investor to the 
investee with the impact on the success of the venture capital investments 
made. 
 
1.3 The Importance of the Study. 
 
Venture capital investments and their success or lack thereof have been studied for many 
years. The USA is one of the countries where venture capital plays an important role in 
the creation of new ventures as well as providing jobs. A contradiction regarding the 
importance of the transfer of knowledge and skills by the investor to the investee was 
found in previous research results. Studies by Gorman, Sahlman, (1989: 242), Spienza, 
(1992: 22), Rosenstein, (1988: 167) as well as Maier and Walker, (1987: 209) have found 
that value is added. Some studies by Busenitz, Fiet and Moesel, (2003: 804), Macmillan 
and Kulow, (1989: 35), Rosenstein and Bruno, (1993: 99) as well as Barney, Busennitz 
and Others, (1996: 257) also found that little to no value would be added by the investor. 
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1.4 Research Methodology. 
 
In the research methodology a clear distinction is made between the investor and the 
investee. The primary research in this study will comprise a survey of all companies 
involved in new ventures in South Africa.  
 
The literature study is done to gather as much information as possible of any previous 
research done as well as any information available to satisfy the objective. The source of 
information is literature relating to the objective as well as previous research studies, 
articles written and any other available written material. The source of the literature study 
is books, magazine articles, newspapers, media reports and information available on the 
Internet. The literature study is further extended to include resent research done by 
Universities and venture capital organisations in the United States of America and 
Europe.  
  
The purpose of the questionnaires is to gather information on the transfer of knowledge 
and skills as it relates to the objective of the study. Questionnaires were sent to angel 
investors, venture capitalists and private equity entities in South Africa. The quality and 
extent of the research done as well as the limitations mentioned in 1.5 below impacted on 
the South African survey. The population was chosen on a random basis. Specific 
respondents were also identified and included on the basis of their particular experience 
regarding the objective of the study. The questionnaire was sent out via electronic mail.  
 
The purpose of the interviews was to gather qualitative information concerning the 
objective of the study. Interviews were conducted on a one to one basis, via telephone 
and the internet. 
 
All the role players, the investor, venture capitalist, venture capital firms, angel investors, 
and investees, were included in the study to arrive at fair and correct findings. The 
measuring instrument used in the research is recent surveys done in the United States of 
America and the European Union compared with the South African survey questionnaire.  
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A clear distinction between the research results in the different categories is made to 
focus and add most value to the South African venture capital and angel investor’s 
market. 
 
1.5 Limitations.  
 
The main limitation experienced relates to funding in order to do an extensive survey in 
all the countries where venture capital is practised. The study would benefit if one could 
study the transfer of skills and knowledge in each country and the specific application 
thereof. Complementary to the above limitation is the fact that all the venture capital 
organisations in all the different countries do extensive research each year in many 
different fields of the venture capital investment market, it is therefore not necessary to 
survey fields that are already thoroughly surveyed. The limitation of this approach is that 
a direct comparison between countries and their success rate in venture capital is not 
always possible.   
  
1.6 Brief Overview of the Study.  
 
1.6.1 Chapter 1. Introduction and background. The introduction and background 
provide a bird's eye view of the venture capital industry from inception to the 
current situation. Explaining the importance of the transfer of knowledge and 
skills, it concludes with the research methodology of the study as well as the 
limitations.  
  
1.6.2 Chapter 2. Overview of the venture capital process, ownership and management. 
Chapter 2 will deal with the company and management structures as follows: 
• A comprehensive background and overview of the role of the investor after the 
money has been invested; 
• The board of directors' composition and the role and place of the advisory board 
in the investee company and briefly the ownership in the investee company; 
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• The role and function of the non-executive and external directors; 
• The appointment and the role of the CEO of the investee company; 
• An in-depth study of the role and appointment of the management team.   
                      
1.6.3 Chapter 3. Overview of the characteristics of the role players involved in venture 
capital. This chapter  will deal with: 
 
• The areas in which investors want to be involved and the areas in which 
entrepreneurs wish them to be involved; 
• The reasons for success and failure of a venture, including what factors contribute 
to its failure or success; 
• The relationship between entrepreneur versus venture capitalist; 
• The role and place of the angel investors versus the venture capitalist; 
• An investigation of knowledge management practices;  
• Personality analysis of the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist with an 
indication of strong and weak points, and also areas of strength on which to build 
a relationship between the different parties, and  
• An observation on the new wave, mentor capitalism and what is occurring in the 
venture capital market.   
 
1.6.4 Chapter 4. Research in the United States of America and Europe. This chapter 
deals with: 
  
• The selection of which countries to include in the research. It includes an 
evaluation to determine which countries have the largest venture capital activities 
in the world. 
• The role of private equity and the misconception that private equity is venture 
capital and private equity investment. 
• What is the origin of private equity funds and where do venture capital investors 
by implication raise their funds?  
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• In which stages of investment and in which industry sector do angel investors, 
venture capitalist and private equity prefer to invest?  
• The performance of angel investors and venture capital investments are measured 
per stage of investment. 
• The 2000 investment market’s burst left lessons to be learned and these lessons 
are analysed, including the appearance of the funding gap in the venture funding 
process.  
  
1.6.5 Chapter 5. Research design. Chapter 5 will deal with: 
 
• The survey; 
•  The questionnaire;   
• The research sample; 
• Data collection . 
 
1.6.6 Chapter 6. Data analysis and interpretation. This chapter will deal with: 
 
• Instrumentation used; 
• Process of analysing data; 
• Analysing data; 
• Interpretation of data gathered. 
  
1.6.7 Chapter 7. Conclusions and recommendations for further reseacrh.  
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CHAPTER 2 OVERVIEW OF THE VENTURE CAPITAL PROCESS, 
OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT 
 
2.1 Introduction. 
 
The investment, capital, skills and knowledge, in an entrepreneurial venture by venture 
capitalist, angel investors/ private investors and other investors plays an important role in 
the development and success of the venture (De Noble, Ehrlich and Moore, 1994: 69).  
This is the one aspect of venture capital investment that has been researched by many 
researchers. In addition many articles and books have been written on the subject. 
Numerous questions have been asked and scores of different answers have been given on 
the subject of value adding. The question that remains is: does the investor add value to 
the entrepreneurial firm and when does he add value? 
 
There are different stages in an entrepreneurial firm’s investment history. Investors fall 
into four categories according to Hill and Power (2001: 282) being (1) the investor’s 
friends and family, (2) angel investors, vendors and professional advisors, (3) 
corporations are investing for the future and (4) venture capitalists. The commercial 
banks are not seen to be involved in the investment process, which was not always the 
case. Changes were introduced in the early 1960s when merchant bankers and corporate 
investors realised that the then venture capitalists were obtaining a higher return on their 
investment than they in turn could achieve. (Bartlett, 1988: 2) These markets became so 
interesting and lucrative that the merchant bankers and corporate investors too decided to 
become involved in venture capital financing. The involvement of these investors brought 
a great deal of capital into the venture capital market, but pushed the original venture 
capitalists (private investors) – with ample entrepreneurial and management skills derived 
from having their own companies – out of the market. The loss of these investors was 
later replaced when the “private investors” started to formalise their involvement again 
and such investment groups became known as “angel investors”. The details of the 
specific relationship between entrepreneur, angel investor and venture capitalist will be 
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detailed later in this and the next chapter.  Schematically one can explain the changes as 
follows: 
 
Figure 2.1 Historical Phase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this early phase the venture capitalists were the private investors who were or have 
been entrepreneurs with experience and knowledge, and have made a substantial amount 
of money and thereafter sold their businesses or wanted to further invest in business. 
 
Figure 2.2 Middle Phase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The merchant bankers and the corporate investors took over the role of the previous 
venture capitalist / private investor. The commercial banks also decided that this was not 
the market in which they wished to invest or lend to, because of the perceived risk and 
the unpredictability of their future. (Sorhiem, 2005: 178) 
 
Figure 2.3 Current Phase. 
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The balance was restored with the introduction of the angel investors who now fulfil the 
role of the original venture capitalists.  The angel investor plays an important role in the 
development of start-ups and small and medium enterprises. The venture capital firms 
and institutional investors do not prefer to invest in these ventures which form one of the 
most important  investment sectors and where a large amount of investments are needed.  
(Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000: 17), (Hill and Power, 2002: 222) and (Sorhiem, 
2005: 178) 
 
One of the most critical aspects in the investment process is to ensure that the venture 
capitalist, angel investor and entrepreneur evaluate and understand the implications of 
such an investment. In searching for capital, an overanxious entrepreneur may find that 
the long-term costs of the investment could far exceed the short-term benefits if there is a 
mismatch in expectations between the relevant parties. The source where the entrepreneur 
obtains his money is as important as the amount of investment funds received (De Noble, 
Ehrlich and Moore, 1994: 69). In addition to the investment the venture capitalist could 
provide a set of value added benefits that may evolve through interaction between 
investors and entrepreneurs (De Noble, Ehrlich and Moore, 1994: 70). The value adding 
concept should be evaluated from the investor's and the entrepreneur’s perspective, since 
judging it from only one source creates problems, seeing that the parties may well have 
different expectations (De Noble, Ehrlich and Moore, 1994: 70).  
 
An investigation by Macmillan and Kulow, (1989: 27), indicated that the venture 
capitalists are mainly involved in the financial management aspects of the venture and the 
lowest degree of involvement in the daily operating activities of the venture. An 
important way – other than financing and their interest in the financial aspects of the 
venture in which the venture capitalist contributes – is to serve on the board of directors 
of the venture. (Rosenstein and Bruno, 1993: 99) The three distinct levels of involvement 
adopted by venture capitalists, as identified by Macmillan and Kulow, (1989: 27), 
Rosenstein and Bruno, (1993: 101), De Noble, (1994: 70) as well as Benjamin and 
Margulis, (2001: 10), are: 
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• Laissez faire – limited involvement 
• Moderate – moderate involvement 
• Close tracker – active involvement. The venture capitalist has a very strong 
presence in all the activities of the venture. 
 
Different strategies apply for each one of the levels of involvement with certain results 
pertaining because of the selections made. The venture capitalist, angel and entrepreneur 
should be sensitive to the specific needs of the venture and how their involvement is 
constituted. A balance between involvement, contributing to the venture’s success, and 
running the company on a daily basis is an important function of the investor. Studies 
indicate that venture capitalists do not spend an inordinate amount of time directly 
involved with the management of their portfolio companies, intervening only on an ad 
hoc basis in the day to day operation of the companies. (Macmillan and Kulow, 1989: 27 
to 28). Investors could become directly involved in a venture and some of these ways are 
(Macmillan and Kulow, 1989: 36):  
 
• Assistance in finding and selecting key management team personnel 
• Seeking essential suppliers and customers 
• Strategic planning 
• Assistance in obtaining additional financing 
• Operational planning 
• Replacement of management personnel when appropriate. 
 
The specific areas of involvement and the importance of the involvement according to the 
investors and the entrepreneurs will be dealt with in detail in this research.  
   
Assistance in obtaining additional financing is an important need of the entrepreneur. 
Start-up companies normally have low or negative cash flows which prevent them from 
borrowing or issuing equity (Grifford, 1997: 459). The new venture is further limited in 
its ability to acquire finance because of the lack of a track record and no financier would 
in all probability be willing to lend money to such a venture. Angel investors/ private 
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investors play an important role, combined with the venture capitalists, to solve this 
problem for the entrepreneur (Sorhiem, 2005: 178). The low or negative cash flow also 
prevents the entrepreneur to appoint a management team that would be adequate for the 
company and its expected growth. The venture capitalist can resolve the need for a 
complete management team with their involvement in the management of the company 
(Grifford, 1997: 459).  
 
Venture capital and angel investing is popularly referred to as the business of building 
businesses where the investors will back the jockey (entrepreneur), and not the horse 
(venture/ idea). The right jockey, entrepreneur, needs to be part of the management team 
to ensure that the venture has a high probability to succeed. It is stated that it is better to 
have a good jockey and management team than an excellent idea/venture without an 
excellent jockey. Investors put money behind people, not just behind concepts or 
ventures. (Bartlett, 1999: 45 – 46), (Bartlett, 1988: 2.8), (Benjamin and Margulis, 2001: 
59), (Hill and Power, 2002: 222) as well as (Wilmerding A, 2003: 134) There are many 
aspects influencing the venture capitalist's decision to invest or not of which the jockey is 
one of the most important aspects. The relevant aspects will be discussed later.  
 
The investment in ventures goes hand in hand with the signing of contracts between the 
investor and the entrepreneur. These contracts normally have the following three main 
characteristics (Grifford, 1997: 459): 
 
• Staging the commitment of capital and preserving the option to abandon. 
• Using compensation systems directly to value creations. 
• Preserving ways to force management to distribute investment proceeds. 
 
These characteristics address three fundamental problems (Grifford, 1997: 459): 
 
• Sorting the venture capitalist among the entrepreneurial ventures. 
• Providing incentives to motivate venture capitalists to maximise the value of the 
funded ventures, and 
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• Providing incentives to motivate entrepreneurs to maximise the value of the 
ventures. 
 
The main characteristics of the funding contract emphasise the importance and the 
role that the investor needs to play. It is quite clear that the investor is not only the 
provider of funding, but should share his knowledge and expertise with the investee. 
The involvement of investors reduces the risk profile of new venture investment and 
enhances the venture’s chances of success. The success rate of entrepreneurial 
ventures is such that it is one of the main contributors to the creation of new jobs and 
the formation of new firms. (Bartlett, 1988: 11) and (Sorhiem, 2005: 178) 
 
Venture capitalists are in the business to expand companies, but more importantly, to 
grow the return on their investment to maximise the profit for their shareholders or 
fund providers. The decision to withdraw the support of the venture capitalist may be 
taken because of a range of reasons of which the maximising of profit is possibly the 
most important. The venture capitalist will also try to increase the venture's size in 
order to increase profit. The principle remains that the magnitude of the profit versus 
the input needed has to provide the maximum output. A venture capitalist and private 
investor are only able to deal with a certain number of ventures and would attempt to 
maximise their time allocated versus income derived. Although the individual 
company may be economically viable, the return on time and capital to the venture 
capitalist may be less than the opportunity cost, in which case the investment will be 
terminated. (Grifford, 1997: 460) The maximisation of profit leads to the situation 
where the venture capitalist’s main aim differs from that of the entrepreneur and will 
lead to conflict between the parties. In such an event the venture capitalist would 
merely become an “investor/ banker (finance provider)” whilst his mentoring role is 
put on the back-burner.   
 
The transfer of skills and knowledge is crucial for the long term existence of any new 
venture and even of existing ventures with later stage investment requirements. The 
success rate of new ventures where the investors play an active role is much higher 
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than where no skills and knowledge transfer take place. In the remainder of this 
chapter and the next chapter it will be pointed out that the investor plays a very 
important role in the success of the venture. Venture capitalists are in the business of 
growing business, and not in the business to exploit entrepreneurs and become vulture 
capitalists instead of mentor capitalists.    
 
2.2 The Composition of the Board of Directors and the Role of the Advisory Board. 
  
2.2.1 Ownership. 
  
Ownership in any venture is normally determined through predetermined rules and 
methods that are acceptable for the parties involved and which are most prevalent in the 
industry. The valuation of the venture/ business forms an integral part of the 
determination of the size of the investor’s ownership. Ownership is not only determined 
through capital input, but also through the value added to the venture and 
entrepreneurship.   Entrepreneurs were up to ten years ago convinced that they would 
have to relinquish control in order to obtain capital for their start-up or venture. The 
entrepreneurs never tied together the amount of capital requested, the valuation of the 
business and the amount of equity they would be giving up (Hill and Power, 2001: 39, 
214). 
 
Companies often have a number of rounds of financing during the cycle from start-up to 
a merger or initial public offering (IPO) that may be followed by a possible listing on a 
stock exchange. During this process the entrepreneur’s initial portion of the total equity 
of his venture will shrink, although the total value of the equity will soar (Hill, and 
Power, 2001: 214, 243). The entrepreneur has to discount the growth in the value of the 
total equity against his reducing equity stake. Having 100% of nothing is much less than 
having a small percentage of something large. 
 
The venture capitalist has to determine how much of the company the entrepreneur owns 
or will own after the investments are made. No entrepreneur would work hard for a 
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company where his equity stake is so small that he is virtually a hired employee. The 
investor should ensure that the entrepreneur always has a substantial stake in the 
company.   Equity buys loyalty and determination. An entrepreneur’s loyalty and 
determination normally fades if his equity stake is less than 20% in a small business and 
5% in a large business. (Gladstone and Gladstone, 2004: 56). The flip side of the above is 
also true in that the smaller the equity stake and return on investment of the investor, the 
less time and effort the investor will be prepared to spend if he invests in the venture. 
Determining the ownership split is a very important aspect of any entrepreneur’s 
preparation for negotiations with a prospective investor. Directors in venture capital 
backed companies are more involved in both strategy formation and evaluation than are 
boards where members do not have large ownership stakes. (Fried, Bruton and Hisrich, 
1998: 493)    
 
Professional investors take up ownership in ventures. Ownership is used as a method to 
discount risk through direct control and input. In order to control and monitor the 
investment, the venture capitalist typically serves on the board of directors of the venture. 
The board member representing the venture capitalist represents a major shareholder and 
should, therefore, have a significant influence on the day to day decision making. 
(Brunninge and Nordqvist, 2004: 90). The balance between ownership and the other risk 
reducing factors present is very important; the investor must allow the entrepreneur to 
maintain his drive, whilst the investor should feel comfortable that his risks have been 
covered.   
  
Ownership is a balancing act between control, equity growth and the equity stake of the 
shareholders of the company. It is critical to ensure that the relationship between 
entrepreneur and the venture capitalist culminates in a beneficial situation where the 
company will have the best opportunity to succeed and the investor obtains the highest 
return on his investment. The size of ownership has to be equitable in terms of the 
investment made. The stage of investment will also influence the size of ownership as the 
return on the investment increases. Each time an investment is made, the shareholding 
will change. The size of shareholding is normally determined through the use of different 
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methods in the market. The most common is the net present value (NPV) method. If the 
venture capitalist for example invests R500 000.00 in a venture with a net asset value of                   
R1 000 000.00, he will take up 50% of the venture if the net asset method is used. The net 
asset value will not be fair to the entrepreneur if the investor’s expectation is an internal 
rate of return of 30%. The percentage ownership for the investor is determined to 
accommodate the investor's expectation. If the investor has a 30% return on investment 
expectation the shareholding, in the example in table 2.1, will be (390.71/3907.06) = 
10%.  
 
Table 2.1  Investment Value. 
 
NPV @ 
6%
Year 0     
( X R1000)
Year 1    
( X R1000)
Year 2   
( X 
R1000)
Year 3   
( X 
R1000)
Year 4   
( X 
R1000)
Year 5    
( X R1000)
Total investment and 
cash flow after tax 3907 -1 000 500 1000 1250 1500 1750
IRR 83%
Investors cash flow 
expectation per year 391 -500 175 193 212 233 256
IRR 30%
Projected cash flow for the investment made.
   
 
The investor’s ownership percentage will, therefore, be 10%, and not 50% as determined 
on the net asset value method. Exploiting the entrepreneur’s lack of knowledge in 
negotiating and determining the correct shareholding stake for the investment made, 
could be detrimental to the success of the company when the entrepreneur realises that he 
has been deceived (Gladstone and Gladstone, 2004: 31, 39 and 56). To achieve the above, 
the venture capitalist should be prepared and be available to transfer his skills and 
knowledge to the entrepreneur and the entrepreneur needs to be open enough to accept 
these inputs in order to achieve the set goals and success. The role of the board of 
directors will be addressed next and forms a critical part in the success of any venture. 
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2.2.2  Board of Directors. 
  
The board of directors of most venture capital-backed companies is the executive body of 
the company and it needs to take the critical business decisions. The legal function of a 
board of directors is to represent shareholders in the oversight of the management of the 
company, rather than to become involved in the day-to-day management. The role and 
activities of the board of directors will vary depending on the stage of investment (Camp, 
2002: 58 to 60).  The notion of investors is that the typical entrepreneur is an incomplete 
businessman, with gaps in his experience in fields like financial management, marketing, 
etc. An active board of directors, staffed by representatives of the investors, is expected 
to fill these gaps. Entrepreneurs are per se not always schooled to be managers/ 
businessmen and it is significant, even in successful venture-backed companies, that a 
large percentage of the founders never see the company achieving maturity, since most of 
them will exit the venture beforehand (Bartlett, 1999: 23).  Investors do not always have 
the same capacity to contribute equally. It is a fact that there is a wide rage of experience 
among venture capital firms in the United States and wherever venture capital investment 
is established in terms of industry expertise, it contributes to business experience and the 
ability to contribute value. Investors can either add value beyond their money (smart 
money) or merely add money (dumb money). (Camp, Justin J. 2002: 64) It is also true 
and a golden rule that states: “He who has the gold makes the rules” (Bartlett, 1999: 96). 
The rule-making should never convert the venture capitalist into a vulture capitalist 
which would be detrimental to the venture and the investors.      
 
2.2.3 Characteristics and the Role of the Board of Directors. 
 
The board of directors should have certain characteristics to add optimum value to the 
enterprise. These characteristics are (Camp, 2002: 58 - 61):  
 
• Strong, Diverse and Balanced. The quality of the board of directors should be 
very high. Early stage boards are typically composed of company founders, 
management team members, representatives of any venture capital investors or 
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angel investors and some outside directors (usually executives from established 
complementary companies in the same or related markets). Board members 
should have diverse and balanced skills, backgrounds, personalities, perspectives, 
appropriately experienced and well-connected. The engagement of an experienced 
businessman to sit in a key board seat will add great value to the company 
(Bartlett, 1988: 23). A homogeneous board should be avoided at all costs, as no 
new or growing venture needs one dimensional thinking. Such new companies 
need perspectives in diverse areas such as operations, finance, technology, 
marketing and consulting. A heterogeneous board should be controlled and 
orchestrated to achieve the maximum input and transfer of skills and knowledge. 
 
• Independence.  The board of directors of an enterprise should function 
independently. One of the most common mistakes by entrepreneurs is to stack 
their boards with members friendly to their cause. A board with too many 
representatives from management is far less effective than one composed of 
outside members. Costly mistakes could be avoided by having an independent 
board and discussing the company’s business plan beforehand.  Why should one 
redesign the wheel? It stands to reason that one should use the knowledge and 
skills available. Venture teams become so close that they think alike. New product 
ideas, strategies and directions could emerge as if from one mind, but the venture 
may well miss an opportunity if everybody agrees. A further reason for an 
independent board is to avoid irrational, unbiased appraisals of the performance of 
management teams. Without independence the directors will not be able to 
contribute objectively and effectively.        
 
• Attention and Intensity. The directors of the company should have the ability to 
devote the appropriate time and attention to their professional duties. Too many 
companies view their board as window dressing and appoint people who may 
appear impressive on the letterhead, but who are not able to contribute much to 
the company. Early stage companies need all persons involved to pull their 
weight, directors included. A start-up company should select board members who 
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are able to spend the time necessary to learn about the company, its business, 
people, and products and to make a positive contribution to the success of the 
company and to detect danger signs as well as recognising opportunities. 
 
The characteristics of the board of directors are determined in the success of the 
company.  As intimated above, any board should be strong, diverse, balanced, and 
independent with the attention and intensity needed from the directors to achieve the 
ultimate success. Boards of directors will differ in the way they are composed to fulfil the 
variety of roles they may exercise. The different roles are: (Brunninge, Nordqvist and 
Mattias, 2004: 87) 
 
• Passive Role. Merely to fulfil the legal requirements, one could have a board 
with no active involvement in the company. Normally the owners try to avoid 
interference in their management by board members. No contribution is made by 
the board. 
 
• Control Role. Controls management on behalf of the owners, especially in 
larger firms.  
 
• Service Role. Provider of advice and expertise to top management. Board 
members can help the managers accomplishing entrepreneurial activities and 
linking the company with important stakeholders in its environment. Boards 
with a service role allow the company to control important resources that are 
critical in entrepreneurial activities. The service role allows the venture capitalist 
to become part of the company and ultimately to become a mentor capitalist. 
 
The preference of what role the board of directors should play is determined by the 
company and the shareholders of such a company. The service role complements the 
entrepreneurial activities of an early stage company the most, with the most value added. 
Value adding is a subject that has been researched substantively in the past with no 
definite finding whether in fact value is added or not. It is generally accepted that some 
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value is added, although it does not constitute an outstanding contribution (Rosenstein 
and Bruno, 1993: 100, 111) 
 
Companies differently rate the notion of value added. The chief executive officers of 
companies that received funding from the top 20 venture capital firms in the United 
States rated the value of contribution by outside directors much higher than other CEOs 
of venture capital backed companies. In the same study it was found that there is no 
significant difference between value added by venture capitalists or outside directors. 
Board members with operating experience add more value than venture capitalists with 
less experience (Rosenstein and Bruno, 1993: 100). The areas where outside members 
have been of the greatest help, or made the biggest impact, are depicted in Table 2.2 
below: 
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Table 2.2  Rating of Value Adding Activities.  
 
ACTIVITY RATING 
Serving as a sounding board to the 
entrepreneur team 
1 
Interfacing with investor group 2 
Monitoring operating performance 3 
Monitoring financial performance 4 
Recruitment and/or replacement of CEO 5 
Assistance on short-term crisis/problems 6 
Providing contacts with key customers and 
prospects 
7 
Development of new strategy to meet 
changing circumstances 
8 
Obtaining sources of debt financing 9 
Obtaining sources of equity financing 
beside venture capital 
10 
Recruitment/replacement of members of 
the management team other than the CEO 
11 
Development of original strategy 12 
Source: Rosenstein and Bruno, 1993: 106 
 
The above study was done by Rosenstein and Bruno, (1993: 99 – 112) and is supported 
by studies by Macmillan, (1989: 27 – 47) and Spaienza and Timmons in 1988. There can 
be no doubt that outside directors or members from the venture capital firms do add value 
to the venture backed company. The reluctance of the entrepreneur to allow the venture 
capitalist on his board or the unwillingness of the venture capitalist to become involved in 
the target company may well contribute to the possible failure or slow growth of the 
company. The company’s potential will be hampered by the failure of the company’s 
management to involve outside directors on the board of directors. Many reasons may be 
established for their reluctance, but possibly the most common is their fear of losing 
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control. If any of the top 20 venture capital firms in the USA would become involved in 
the financing of a company, they would eventually most likely control the board 
(Rosenstein and Bruno, 1993: 100).  In a study by Brunninge and Nordqvist, (2004: 85 
and 98), it was found that non-family firms are more likely to involve independent board 
members than family firms. The presence of venture capitalists increases the frequency of 
independent board members and ownership has an impact on board roles (Brunninge and 
Nordqvist, 2004: 85). Family firms benefit from the presence of independent directors on 
their board in having more active boards than family firms without outside involvement 
(Brunninge and Nordqvist, 2004: 88). Family members could hamper the development of 
the company because of personal interest, lack of experience and many other factors. 
Conversely, the more independent people are appointed on the board of the family firm, 
the better. People lose their independence and creativity if they are caught in a family 
structure within a company. The background and competence of independent directors 
are essential if they are to contribute positively to the venture. (Brunninge and Nordqvist, 
2004: 89) 
 
2.2.4 The Size of the Board of Directors. 
 
The size of board of directors could determine the effectiveness of the board and success 
of the company. Hence, the larger the board, the less cohesive the decision making and 
the more difficult it will be to achieve consensus in decision making. The lack of 
cohesion may occur as each board member grapples for power to maintain control of his 
own interests (Fiet and Busenitz, 1997:  352). The power game develops into a situation 
where self-interest is the most important factor that is attended to, and these actions will 
hamper the development and success of the company. Each shareholder starts to look 
after his own interests and the venture capitalist becomes a vulture-capitalist with nothing 
but the maximisation of the return of his investment as his main focus. (Rosenstein and 
Bruno, 1993: 99)  
 
The boards of venture capital backed firms tend to be small with a high outsider ratio, 
with frequent meetings and a formal agenda. The boards increase in members as the 
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company grows or further investment is required. These findings were confirmed in 
subsequent studies. (Rosenstein and Bruno, 1993: 99 and 104) as well as (Brunninge and 
Nordqvist, 2004: 90) The optimal board structure and composition affects the company’s 
performance in a positive way, such as increasing entrepreneurial capacity. Achieving the 
optimal structure and composition should be the ideal of every company’s shareholder. 
(Brunninge and Nordqvist, 2004: 86)  
 
Early stage boards are typically composed of company founders, management team 
members, representatives of venture capital and angel investors and some outside 
directors. The ideal board size is five directors, not too unwieldy that it is not 
manageable, but sizeable enough to include all the needed expertise. (Rosenstein and 
Bruno, 1993: 99) as well as (Camp, 2002: 59). The ideal board composition is (Camp, 
2002: 59): 
 
• Two investor directors 
• One or two management directors 
• One or two outside directors. 
 
In a study by Rosenstein and Bruno, (1993: p104), it was found that the board size differs 
during different stages of investment. In this study the following board sizes were 
identified for the different stages: 
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Table 2.3 Board Size by Stage of Investment. 
 
STAGE BOARD SIZE 
Seed 4 
Start-up 5 
First stage financing 6 
Second stage financing 6 
Third stage financing 6 
Fourth stage, mezzanine and bridge 
financing 
6 
  
The success of the venture capital backed company is dependent on the quality and 
composition of the company’s board of directors. In the later stages of the company’s 
development, the management team will be able to perform some of the functions 
executed by the board of directors in the early stage companies. The contribution made 
by the board of directors is essential for the success of the venture. The composition, as 
indicated above, creates the opportunity for the transfer of skills and knowledge to the 
management team and other “new” directors on the board.  
 
2.2.5 Advisory Board. 
 
The board of directors is the legal board of the company, but in recent years early stage 
companies in the United States started to recruit experienced business persons to serve on 
an advisory board to those companies.  The advisory board is not a legal entity, but a 
much looser association with no formal board meetings. The members of this board are 
individuals who agree to provide the company with a few hours consulting time per 
month (Hill and Power, 2002: 123). Darlene Mann, general partner of Onset Ventures, 
found in a study by her company that one of the major reasons why early stage 
companies fail is because of the lack of a mentor, in other words someone who has done 
it and who had been there before. Successful early stage companies usually have good 
advisory boards. These boards provide the early stage company with critical information 
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and help correct the direction of the company when needed. Angel investors and venture 
capitalists rather invest in companies with a strong advisory board than without one. 
(Camp, 2002: 62) 
 
In composing the company's advisory board one should thus first determine the 
company’s needs and management’s shortcomings.  The advisory board could help the 
company to fill in some gaps in the management team. Board members are able to 
provide any of the following, depending on the need (Hill and Power, 2002: 126): 
 
• Contacts the company may need 
• Specific competencies (financial management, marketing, etc.) 
• General business success 
• Knowledge of the industry. 
 
The advisory board should not be composed of friends and family of one of the members 
of the management team or the chief executive officer. The board of directors should 
ensure that their advisory board have experience regarding (Hill and Power, 2002: 131 as 
well as Brunninge and Nordqvist, 2004: 87): 
 
• Financing transactions 
• Information technology consulting 
• Extensive services focussed on e-commerce 
• Seed financing to IPO (initial private offer) 
• Mergers and acquisitions 
• Tax planning 
• Executive compensation strategies. 
  
The advisory board could well form a critical element in the success of a venture capital 
backed company and the entrepreneur should exercise great care in compiling and 
selecting his advisory team. The advisory board’s function is to provide the company 
with critically needed expertise and knowledge to ensure the success of the venture, and 
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the advisory board should act as a mentor to the management and board of directors of 
the company. The advisory board is an active team and not an instrument to impress 
someone else or a potential new investor. The company will reach success much earlier 
through the help of the advisory team than it would otherwise have done. (Hill and 
Power, 2002: 124 - 130) 
 
The balancing act between the financing of a venture and the composition of the 
company structure is critical in the success of any new or later stage company. The 
venture capitalist or angel investor should ensure that his investment would provide to 
him the best possible return. Both the investor and entrepreneur should ensure that the 
venture is more important than personal goals and the need to control. Balancing 
ownership in such a way that the entrepreneur will not lose interest and the venture 
capitalist has equitable return on his investment through shareholding is very important. 
The entrepreneur should ensure that the venture’s board of directors has the correct 
characteristics and understand the role it needs to play in the company. An advisory 
board should be recruited with the right skills and knowledge to empower the company’s 
management and board of directors. From literature it is quite clear that venture capital 
backed firms need the transfer of skills and knowledge at this level of the company’s 
structure. 
 
2.3 Non-Executive and External Directors. 
 
The role of non-executive directors (NED) or external directors is critical in the success 
of a new venture or start-up. A study done in the United Kingdom, the Cadbury Report 
(1992), emphasises how important the NED is and the role that the NED could play in 
any venture, especially new ventures. Since this report it became common in the UK that 
the larger firms appoint external directors to assist these companies to achieve their goals 
and ultimately help the economy grow. The Cadbury Report did not scrutinise smaller 
companies and, therefore, did not make any recommendations regarding such companies. 
(Deakins, O’Neil and Mileham, 2000: 318) The transfer of knowledge and skills is one of 
the pillars on which any venture can build its future, using the knowledge and skills 
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already earned to capitalise on and to build the enterprise. Consequently the 
recommendations and importance of NED also apply to smaller enterprises. 
Organisations never stop to learn. The firm and management team should always 
continue learning, while the capabilities of the firm and its management team and 
employees need to be increased to maintain their competitive advantage (Boussouara and 
Deakins, 2000: 210).         
 
2.3.1 The Role of the Non-Executive Director. 
 
It is generally expected that the NED will bring something to the table that would be 
valuable to the firm. Smaller firms cannot appoint all the expertise needed in their 
management team since the firm will not be able to sustain such a big cost. People with 
longstanding experience are not likely to join a firm and exclude themselves from 
becoming involved in other enterprises. The NED should bring certain skills to the table, 
for example they may be expected to bring experience, knowledge, discipline, rigour to 
strategic planning, contacts and planning skills. These are much needed knowledge and 
skills that could be transferred to the entrepreneur and his management team. (Deakins, 
O'Neill and Mileham, 2000: 317) The NED can fulfil many roles. The following are 
some of the most common roles:  
 
• Relationships. The NED should be able to build a long-term relationship with 
the key or founding entrepreneur and bring his own network of contacts to 
assist in the growth process (Deakins, O’Neill and Mileham, 2000: 317). This 
intervention is crucial in the development and learning process of the 
entrepreneur and the company. The world is built on relationships, good 
relationships. Strained relationships can cost a company dearly, to the extent 
that the company may well fail or never reach its potential. Not every 
individual has the skill of building relationships. The ability to build long 
lasting relationships is dependant on the entrepreneur and his personality. An 
introvert entrepreneur may develop the best possible product, but may not 
succeed as regards the business venture because of his personality constraints.  
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• Corporate Governance. Any company operating within a set of laws should 
comply with various requirements, but early stage companies’ management 
normally lack these skills. The NED could play an important role in assisting 
the company to comply with all these requirements without losing sight of the 
focus of the company. An entrepreneur's mind is not directed towards such 
thoughts as to whether he has completed the tax return or statutory reports that 
have to be submitted, including share transfers, appointment of directors and 
minutes of the last director's or annual general meeting of shareholders.  Any 
non-compliance will be detrimental to the company’s well-being and 
existence. Previous experience will empower the NED to assist the board of 
directors to comply with the above. (Deakins, O'Neill and Mileham, 2000: 
318 and 319) 
 
• Mentor. The NED provides advice to the entrepreneur and his team and 
through these actions becomes a mentor to the team. The concept of learning 
from experience and adjusting behaviour is important to entrepreneurship. 
(Deakins, O'Neill and Mileham, 2000: 318) One does not have to re-invent the 
wheel, with all the costs and pain involved. If the role of a NED could be 
summarised, it would be one of mentorship. This does not release the venture 
capitalist from his mentorship role, but would enhance the venture capitalist’s 
and the entrepreneur’s access to a pool of knowledge. The entrepreneur would 
prefer someone independent with entrepreneurial experience above someone 
from a large corporation with limited experience to advise him. (Boussouara 
and Deakins, 2000: 219) The entrepreneur will seek someone that has earned 
the knowledge and skills through first hand experience with the ability to 
transfer such knowledge and skills to the venture and its management team.  
Mentorship does not mean that one knows everything about everything, but 
rather that one knows a great deal about a subject or business and is prepared 
to share that knowledge and skills. A mentor should be “streetwise”, although 
academic qualifications may equip him with some important building blocks, 
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it does not give the mentor practical experience. In research by Boussouara 
and Deakins, 2000 as well as Deakins, O’Neill and Mileham, 2000 it was 
found that the role of mentor and adviser was rated the most important by 
entrepreneurs. (Boussouara and  Deakins, 2000: 215) 
 
• Credibility. The NED could improve the credibility of a firm in new markets. 
The presence of a seasoned campaigner or a person who has been involved in 
the same market sector with positive results will comfort the new markets. 
(Deakins, O’Neill and Mileham, 2000: 319) Credibility and a good name are 
earned and not bought.   
 
• Independence of the Board. Any board of directors should be independent 
and impartial, but it is a fact that most boards, especially those of family 
firms, are controlled by one or two persons, whilst the rest of the board is 
merely present in name. Historically, in the United Kingdom, an NED is 
appointed in family firms to bring some independence to the boardroom. 
(Deakins, O’Neill and Mileham, 2000: 320) The appointment of NEDs is not 
only limited to the United Kingdom, but is also prevalent in many other 
countries, such as South Africa, where this practise is often found. 
 
• Goals and Challenges. Entrepreneurs may be expected to respond to 
challenges, yet the question of how to respond and overcome such challenges 
is an important part of their development. The NED sets achievable goals and 
challenges that would support entrepreneurial development. Through further 
support and encouragement the NED could ensure that the entrepreneur would 
overcome such challenges and to learn how to accommodate these challenges. 
Setting goals and challenges could be instrumental in the development of the 
entrepreneur’s skills and knowledge. Guidance and support was rated the most 
important perceived action taken by external directors. (Table 2.4) 
(Boussouara and Deakins, 2000: 215) In the research by Deakins, O’Neill and 
Mileham, (2000: 322), an entrepreneur commented on the importance of 
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setting challenges as follows: “I think the most important thing of course is 
that it gives you somebody to challenge you, particularly in a small business 
when you are a fairly dominant part of it. It’s extremely important that 
someone challenges what you do and can actually argue with you”  
 
•  Focus.  The truly independent NED has the advantage of providing the 
additional dimensions to director meetings that help to structure and maintain 
focus of such a meeting on strategic objectives and strategic planning. 
Personal relationships and company politics could divert the focus from the 
subject at hand and the directors' meeting could easily become an official 
forum to raise grievances, and totally ignoring the importance of the meeting 
for the company company as a whole. The NED needs to remain objective and 
skilfully help the team to focus on the company and its needs, whilst 
sidestepping personal differences and grievances. (Boussouara and Deakins. 
2000: 219) 
 
Table 2.4 sets out results of a study by Boussouara and Deakins (2000: 325) as well as 
Deakins, O'Neill and Mileham (2000: 215) ranking the importance of the different roles 
from the most to the least important.  
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 Table 2.4 The External Director’s Most and Least Important Perceived Roles. 
 
ACTION RANK ORDER 
Most Important  
Guidance and support 1 
Discussing problems 2 
Constructive criticism 3 
Discussing alternative solutions to 
problems 
4 
Using benefit of previous (general) 
experience 
5 
 
Least Important  
Ethical role/action 15 
Relating concepts to practise 16 
Visionary ideas 17 
Succession planning 18 
Restructuring board 19 
Administration 20 
 
The role as a mentor and sounding board is seen to be the most important role that the 
NED can fulfil (Barrow, 2001: 34). From his perspective the entrepreneur should be open 
enough to accept the advice and input from the external directors. Changing needs and 
growth of the entrepreneur and his management team affect the role of the NED and, 
therefore, the role of the NED is seen to be temporary. Once the company has outgrown 
the field of expertise of the NED, a new NED should be appointed to assist the company 
with new challenges. (Boussouara and Deakins, 2000: 220) as well as (Sheperd, 
Zacharckise and Buron, 2008: 381) 
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2.3.2 Trust. 
 
Trust forms an integral element of any company’s management and without trust the 
strength of a team diminishes. Trust becomes important because it enables co-operation 
to take place. Trust is a moderator in the behaviour that may occur in response to a crisis 
with four dimensions: competence, openness, concern and reliability (Boussouara and 
Deakins, 2000: 205). The best practical way to explain trust is to observe a team sport. 
The team members have to trust each other to the extent that no one would ever doubt the 
other players' commitment and ability. Each player knows that the whole team can rely 
and trust him to give his best and play to his ability. The secret of trust is to also be aware 
of the shortcomings of one's team mates and to compensate for that. The NED has to earn 
the trust of the rest of the team in order to contribute fully to the team. Strategic 
challenges are sometimes the direct result of a crisis affecting the survival of the 
company. The trust in the competence of the NED is paramount. (Boussouara and 
Deakins, 2000: 206) 
 
Boussouara and Deakins (2000: 206 to 207) identified three functions of trust in 
implementing organisational learning. These functions are: 
 
• Trust as a Prerequisite. When an external consultant is used to intervene and 
resolve a specific problem or situation that occurred in the company, the 
executives of the company should trust the ability and the intentions of the NED. 
The NED will operate as a mediator between the parties involved in resolving the 
specific situation.  
 
• Trust as an Outcome. The relationship between company members should be at 
such a level that they would examine values and norms that shape behaviour, 
accepting new values to maximise the outcome.   
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• Trust as an Obstacle. Trust becomes an obstacle if an organisation’s members 
have too much trust in an interventionist’s competencies, and they become 
dependent on him.  
 
In the abovementioned research it was found that boards of directors have all the 
characteristics of open systems where relationships and trust are paramount. (Boussouara 
and Deakins, 2000: 207) The transfer of knowledge and skills are dependent on trust, and 
where trust exists one would find the transfer of skills and knowledge to be much easier. 
Without trust one would only encounter limited transfer of skills and knowledge.  
 
External directors’ role in a company could range from being an informal sounding board 
to which full time board members could turn in times of need, through to helping with 
specific executive or operational functions. (Barrow, 2001: 34) Entrepreneurs have to 
learn how to assimilate and process information and knowledge, while operating in 
complex environments. External directors could bring considerable experience, which 
may be either specialist or general business experience. The role of the external director 
would differ from company to company, depending on the need and the trust present. The 
role of the external director in smaller firms could range from counsellor, entrepreneurial 
and growth strategic approaches to marketing, problem solving, strategic planning, 
recruitment, training and staff development. Companies will eventually outgrow specific 
external directors and would replace these directors as and when needed. The one 
characteristic that summarises the role of the external director is trust; without trust 
between the parties and in the abilities of each other no transfer of knowledge and skills 
would ultimately occur.   
 
2.4 Chief Executive Officer (CEO). 
 
One of the key ingredients of success of any venture is the presence of a strong and 
lasting CEO. A study by Crosspoint Venture Partners found that the only high correlation 
with the success of a business was the quality of the CEO. (Camp, 2002: 47) According 
to Dotzler and Camp, (2002: 47) it was found that: 
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• with a good CEO a company achieves, 
• with an average CEO a company languishes, and 
• with a poor CEO a company disappears. 
 
The hiring of a CEO becomes one of the most important functions that the founders and 
the investors will perform upon inception. It is important for both the investors and for 
the founders that the company should achieve. Venture capitalists are known to get 
companies to agree to bring so-called “adult supervision” (seasoned managerial talent) 
into the company before they would invest (Camp, 2002: 31). A study by Bruton in 1997 
found that the replacement of a CEO improves the performance of the company 
(Busenitz, Fiet and Moesel, 2003: 793). This finding could be challenged and this 
occurrence would also not be applicable to all companies, as there are many other 
influencing aspects that come into play. 
 
The performance of a company will only increase if the right CEO is chosen for the 
position. The selection of the right CEO can be a time consuming and tedious process. 
The Woodside Fund treated this aspect as so important that it interviewed 22 candidates 
for a CEO position in one of its portfolio companies. Naresh Baresh, CEO of Intellefex, 
one of Woodside’s portfolio companies, said after the interviews that he was mentally 
and physically drained, but Woodside appointed the rest of the management team with 
the same care. (Anonymous A, 2005: 40 – 43) 
 
The selection process is not an easy one, since one of the major problems is that the 
typical entrepreneur has a resistance towards sharing control (Macmillan and Kulow, 
1989: 39). The battle between the investor and the entrepreneur and the investor’s need to 
have “adult supervision” and the need of the entrepreneur to keep the control of the 
company has to be addressed with insight and knowledge of the situation. The company 
always has to be more important than the individual and his needs. One of the most 
intriguing questions is whether or not the entrepreneur would be willing to step aside for 
a new CEO in order to allow the new, qualified, CEO to run his company (Hill and 
Power,  2001: 43). To step down from his position may be as painful for the entrepreneur 
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as to ask a mother to part from her new born baby. The fact of the matter is that the 
entrepreneur may, in most cases, not be equipped to be the CEO. The entrepreneur and 
the seasoned CEO should be able to treat the company as the most important entity for 
which they have ever worked. The new CEO of the company should ensure that he 
transfers his knowledge and skills to the management team to empower them.  
 
Contrary to the belief that seasoned/grey hair people add value to the company, this may 
in fact not be the case. Some retired CEOs may well have a preference for attaching 
themselves to inexperienced entrepreneurs with the aim to slowly taking over the 
business. The aim of the above described CEOs is to add value to their pockets and not to 
the business in which they are involved. This kind of selection or presence of a CEO may 
give the entrepreneur the impression that he is still in control, merely to be sidelined once 
the time is deemed right. (Hill and Power, 2001: 170) 
 
The CEO does have an important role in the success of the company. The shareholders 
and investor have to ensure that the CEO has applicable experience in the same industry 
(Camp, 2002: 43). Good CEOs come in all shapes and sizes. There is not a single model 
that fits all to select the perfect CEO, although there are essential skills that should be 
present. Theses skills are (Camp, 2002: 47 – 50): 
 
• Experience. Experience in the same industry as well as previous experience as 
a CEO has a positive effect on the success of a venture. History shows that 
experienced CEOs tend to be more successful than those with little to no 
experience in this position. It should also be said that many first time CEOs 
have been very successful. The experience of the CEO will always remain a 
critical factor in the success of a venture. 
 
• Leadership Ability. The CEO should have the ability to lead the company from 
a start-up to a listing or a merger. A start-up needs a strong leader, someone 
who has the ability to lead, manage and motivate the entire company. It takes a 
good leader to get the whole company to work together and hard enough to 
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achieve the goals of the company. The CEO should have the experience to 
know what to do when and how to handle difficult situations. Venture capitalists 
would, therefore, only back companies if the CEO has previous experience in 
running a company or division of a company. No investor would back a novice 
CEO, even if he has a great deal of leadership abilities. Often the most popular 
CEO candidates, among venture capitalists, emerge from the executive ranks of 
larger, proven companies. It is crucial that the CEO should be streetwise in 
order to add the most value to the company.  
 
• Strong Communication Skills. A CEO needs to have the ability to 
communicate. He should be a great communicator seeing that he is the face of 
and the leader of the company. The CEO must be able to communicate clearly, 
both in speech and writing to the media, customers, peers, the public and the 
employees of the company. The CEO should also be able to sell the company to 
investors, shareholders, employees and clients.  The vision of the CEO has to be 
shared with everybody involved. If everyone shares the CEO’s vision, the team 
will be cohesive in achieving the vision.  
 
• Decision Making Ability. The role of the CEO in a start-up and even in a later 
stage company is to make decisions. More and more decisions have to be taken 
as the company grows. The CEO must have the ability to asses the situation and 
the facts, weigh the facts and make the best possible decision. CEOs with the 
ability to make strategic correct decisions are very sought after. Another 
characteristic is the ability not only to assess the facts, but also to evaluate the 
impact of decisions on the company and the environment. Therefore, making 
strategic decisions is of the outmost importance. The ability to make quick 
decisions is equally important. It is stated by Ruthann Quindlen in Camp, (2002: 
49) that it is better to make the wrong decision, than no decision at all. A CEO 
who cannot make decisions will lose the trust of the owners, employees and the 
management of the company.  
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• Administrative Skills. Great CEOs are able to effectively manage their 
companies from an administrative perspective. Entrepreneurs are normally 
people that have a limited administrative ability. No company is able to exist in 
today’s competitive environment if the administration is not kept up to date. 
These skills entail personal management, statutory management, contract 
management, intellectual property management and general administration 
management. In most early stage companies the administration management is 
left for someone to sort out in future. A company without a good administrative 
base is like a house without a foundation. 
 
• People Management Skills.  A CEO has to have the ability to work and 
combine different people with different personalities, into one team. This aspect 
incorporates more than mere leadership; it is the ability to communicate 
effectively with investors, the management team and the employees of the 
company. The CEO should be involved on a level where he adds value by 
transferring his skills and knowledge to the management team to improve the 
management team’s management skills and to be able to get the entrepreneurs, 
investors and management team to work together as a team. The success of the 
venture is dependent on this ability of the CEO.    
 
In conclusion, it may be stated that the role of the CEO is critical for the success of the 
company and to ensure the highest return on the investor’s investment. The founders are 
more than likely entrepreneurs and not managers or CEOs who have to be convinced that 
a seasoned CEO or a CEO under supervision should manage the venture.  The investors/ 
venture capitalists and the founders have to ensure that they appoint someone with the 
ability to add value to the company. In the process of selecting the right CEO one should 
ensure that the CEO has the skills as specified in this section. Selecting a CEO without 
these skills will be detrimental to the venture.  
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2.5 Management.  
 
The management team is seen to be one of the most important aspects that influence the 
success of a venture. Hill and Power, (2001: 106) stated that the single most important 
action that an entrepreneur takes that would determine success, is his ability to assemble 
the right team around him. One could regard the shareholders and directors of a company 
as the head of the company, but the management team forms the heart of a company. The 
management team determines the effectiveness and quality of the execution of the 
business plan; they are the people that link with the outside world, but will also execute 
the plans inside the company.  Schematically a company’s structure could be sketched as 
in Figure 2.4: 
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 Figure 2.4 Company Structure. 
 
 
Founders (entrepreneurs) would in most cases wish  to be the Chief Executive Officer of 
the venture, since it is his idea and metaphorically speaking he gave birth to this baby.  
Control is essential for most entrepreneurs, although they would most likely not be the 
best managers. An entrepreneur is a creative person who would like to concentrate on 
new ideas and inventions, but he would typically neglect to pay attention to the detail that 
is essential for the success of the venture. Nearly all investment decisions by venture 
capitalists and angel investors are made based on the investor’s belief that the 
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management team can capably execute their business plan (Blanchard, 2006: 1 - 3). Early 
stage companies rarely have complete management teams, ready to manage from day one 
without assistance. Such companies often have to search elsewhere for management 
support at the board of directors, the board of advisors/ non-executive directors and their 
equity investors (Camp, 2002: 23). The founders should accept that they are not 
necessarily the best managers to ensure the success of the company and should 
consequently open up the process of appointing outside managers. The acceptance should 
emanate from the founders to realise that the company is more important than personal 
ego and that one should be open enough to appoint the best team in order to achieve 
success. The success of obtaining finance depends on the perceived competence of the 
management team. There is an old expression that a great management team and a run of 
the mill idea get funded more often than a great idea and an average management team. 
(Hill and Power, 2002: 134)  
 
Venture capitalists, more so than private investors or angel investors, search for 
investments with the least personal input to be made. They will look for investments with 
complete, or close to complete management teams. Many good ideas and ventures are 
ignored or discarded because the venture capitalist will go the route that is perceived as 
the safest route to take. It is clear that a good management team is more important than 
the idea. (Hill and Dee, 2001: 50) The entrepreneur who is not aware of this fact may 
well never see his ideas reach maturity. Private investors play an important role in 
assisting the entrepreneur to accept these facts. The private investor initiates the process 
and assists the entrepreneur in preparing his company for further finance. The 
entrepreneur has to be prepared to stand back and allow professional managers to manage 
the company, while the entrepreneur concentrates on the further development of his idea 
and further innovations. The different role players should focus on what they are good at, 
which in itself is a good point of departure for achieving success.        
 
Accepting the mere fact by the entrepreneur that he may not be the best manager, is a 
major achievement, simultaneously addressing the appointment and dismissal of a 
management team, as well as the role of the management team and the investors in the 
 59
management of the company. In what follows these aspects will be addressed, including 
the ability of the entrepreneur and the management team to work together as one, a 
critical aspect in achieving success. (Macmillan and Kulow, 1989: 40)  
 
2.5.1 Investment Decision. 
 
The most important factor in the investment decision is not the product, the size of the 
market, or even greed. It is people. Management has been found in several surveys to be 
the most important factor in the decision making process. The five most important factors 
influencing the venture capitalist’s decision making process to invest are (Hill and Power, 
2001: 105): 
 
• Quality of the management team 
• Size of the company’s market 
• Proprietary, uniqueness, or brand strength of the company’s product 
• Return on investment 
• The company’s potential for growth. 
 
The importance of the different factors has changed since surveys done in 1998 and in 
2000. However, the quality of the management team remained the most important factor 
in both surveys. The change in ranking is depicted in Table 2.5. 
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 Table 2.5. Change in Ranking of Investment Factors. 
 
Year of Survey 2000 2000 1998 1998 
Factors Score out of 5 Rank Score out of 5 Rank 
Management 
Quality 
 
3.4 1 4.1 1 
Growth 
Potential 
 
2.2 2 3.3 3 
Return on 
Investment 
2.0 3 3.5 2 
Size of Market 2.0 3 3.3 3 
Product 1.2 5 3 5 
Source: Hill and Power, 2001: 108 – 109. 
 
The quality of the management team and their cohesiveness and effectiveness are 
preferred by most venture capitalists. The quality of management is paramount for any 
investor. Management teams that do not work as a team and with some resulting discord 
among the members, have an excellent chance to fail at some or other stage of the 
venture’s development. Discord has been found by Camp, (2002: 33) to be the primary 
cause of venture failure.  
 
Venture capitalists prefer to invest in ventures where the management team has met some 
success before. Investors are continuously trying to reduce their risk and since, as stated 
above, the management team determines the success and failure of a venture, it is clear 
that investors prefer committed and skilled management teams.  (Hill and Power, 2001: 
224, Camp, 2002: 33 as well as Gladstone and Gladstone, 2004: 64) 
 
Venture capitalists, per definition, are in most cases money managers, whilst the angel 
investors or private investors invest their own money and are not forced to invest in a 
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number of different ventures. Venture capitalists concentrate on ventures at later stages of 
development with a well equipped venture management team (Hill and Power, 2002: 52). 
It is important that the entrepreneur should understand this fact and ensure that the right 
team supports him. It is also an indication of the lack of commitment or inability from 
venture capitalists to transfer skills and knowledge to the entrepreneur and a new 
management team. The investor cannot only concentrate on the management team and 
distance himself from the venture or the idea/concept that the entrepreneur has brought to 
the table. The investor is not only the provider of money, but based on his experience 
(knowledge) and skills, he should identify excellent ideas and concepts and structure 
them into ventures that will be successful. In the background and overview of Chapter 2, 
Figure 2.3, it was indicated under the current phase that the venture capitalists mainly 
consist of fund managers. It should be borne in mind though that the expertise of most 
fund managers is in the investment arena, and not in the entrepreneurial and creative 
arena of the entrepreneur. It could be said that the investment decision is also determined 
by the skills, knowledge and background of the investor or the investment manager.  
      
The investment decision and the role of the management and investment team is one of 
the strongest determining factors for an entrepreneur to successfully obtain finance for his 
venture. The management team is in most cases not complete and new appointments 
should be made. Many factors influence the appointment of the managers and will be 
addressed next. 
  
2.5.2 Appointment of the Management Team. 
 
Investors prefer to invest in a venture with a complete management team, but the 
involvement of the investor to appoint or dismiss parts of the management team will also 
be determined at this stage of investment. One could expect a much higher involvement if 
the investor is the lead investor in an early stage investment than where the investor is a 
non-lead investor in a later stage investment. (Macmillan and Kulow, 1989: 28) The latter 
does not exclude the investor from playing an important role in the selection of new 
members for the management team if there should be a need for this role. The 
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management team would also change as the company develops. Managers who have 
managed the company from the seed investment phase might find their services 
terminated when the venture has developed past their level of experience and knowledge.  
The investors and owners of the venture/company should stay intact with the company 
and they should identify any dead wood before the company is negatively influenced.  
 
The appointment of the management team is very important for any company and should 
incorporate the different aspects as explained below. 
 
• Evaluation. The venture capitalist or the angel investor has to evaluate the 
management team before any changes are made. An experienced investor 
would be able to identify the shortcomings of a management team and the 
team members during a proper due diligence examination of the management 
team. (Anonymous A, 2005: 43) as well as (Schefczyk and Torsten, 2001: 1) 
In the evaluation process, the investor should place a great deal of emphasis 
on the manager's functional experience and experience in the relevant 
industry. Managers need to be “streetwise” to add the best value possible to 
the venture. (Schefczyk and Gerpott, 2001: 1) During the due diligence of the 
management team, the investor will quite likely concentrate on the following: 
   
• Quality of the Management Team. The management team should be 
constituted of top quality managers. Such managers are scarce and 
determine the success of the investment. Arthur Rock says in Camp, 
(2002: 24) that: “Good ideas and good products are a dime a dozen. Good 
execution and good management – in a word, good people – are rare.”  
Venture capitalists place a great deal of emphasis on the quality of the 
management teams because the return they will obtain on their investment 
depends heavily on the quality of decisions that the management team will 
make during the time the investor holds an equity stake. Successful 
venture capitalists become good judges of people. The investor should 
have the knowledge and skills to evaluate and determine the quality of the 
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management team. A number of different tools should be used to 
determine whether the entrepreneur and his management team are 
reasonable, dependable, responsible and trustworthy people. Once the 
investor has determined the quality of the management team, the 
completeness of the management team should be determined. (Camp, 
2002: 24 -29) It is certain that the investor should play a very active role 
and should use his skills and knowledge to determine the management 
shortfalls long before they become a problem. 
  
• Completeness of the Management Team. The venture capitalist has to 
determine whether the management team is complete and functional in 
each critical area. These areas are marketing, business development, 
operations, finance, administration, logistics and any other area applicable 
to the business. In the early stage investments one may find that all these 
functions could be executed by one or two people, but ultimately the 
foundation will not be correct. This does not mean that the venture should 
necessarily have all the people in the different areas employed from day 
one, but there should be a plan and alternatives in place. The venture 
investors have an important role to play in identifying the shortcomings of 
the team and propose alternatives. The investors may even be forced to 
use their financial leverage to convince the entrepreneur of the shortfalls 
or to replace incompetent managers. (Camp and Justin, 2002: 29 - 31) 
 
• Adult Supervision. In assessing the management team the investors – 
based on their experience of previous ventures – should decide whether it 
is necessary to introduce top quality managers to the company with 
previous experience in establishing and developing ventures, to complete 
the management team. This entails replacing founding CEOs with CEOs 
who have more applicable experience. Venture capitalists find it much 
easier to invest in a venture if the CEO and management team have a good 
track record and are known to them. The venture capitalist will always try 
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to discount his risks of which management is a critical element to success. 
(Camp, 2002: 31 - 32) The entrepreneur/founder has to be willing to stand 
back on behalf of the company’s success whilst the new CEO has to 
commit himself to the company. The company, and not the position, 
should be important to both role players.  
 
• Diversity and Efficiency.  The management team should be diverse in its 
skills, background, experience, personalities and perspectives. The team 
should have the ability to differ from each other, but still co-operate to 
achieve its aim. Venture capitalists prefer to back management teams that 
are cohesive and effective in their decision making process as well as in 
their actions. (Camp, 2002: 32 - 34) The investor will be wary of a 
management team, manipulated by the founder or any other member of the 
team. Such a team will become mere followers and would support the 
dominating founder. The knowledge and skills found in the diversity of 
the members would then be lost. The biggest challenge in any diverse 
management team is the ability to work cohesively and effectively to 
achieve the venture’s aim.  
 
• Past Success of the Management Team. Venture capitalists would 
always prefer a management team with a history of success. Teams that 
have worked together and performed well in the past would have a better 
chance to be successful again than a new team. This factor should not 
prevent an investor from investing in a venture with a well-balanced team. 
If a team is assembled, combining experience with novice managers, 
which would lead to the transfer of skills and knowledge, they may even 
be more successful because of new and fresh ideas from the newcomers. 
The perfect match should be found and the process needs to be managed 
with care. (Camp, 2002: 34) as well as (Buaan and Silverman, 2004: 417) 
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• Commitment of the Management Team.  The management team should 
be committed to the long-term success of the venture. Although a new 
manager, and most likely a new CEO, will be appointed to complete the 
management team, the founders should still realise that they are the co-
owners of the business. The venture capitalist should bear the 
entrepreneur’s objectives in mind. The investor and entrepreneur/founder 
should be committed to realise the potential of the venture. As stated 
before, the venture needs to be the most important factor and not the 
personal ambitions of the individuals. (Camp, 2002: 35) 
 
• Management Team’s View of the Investor. The founders and investors 
need to have trust in each other, since without trust the venture is doomed 
to fail. The management team and the investor should share a mutual goal 
to make money, and in order to achieve this, co-operation is indispensable. 
(Camp, 2002: 35 - 36) The management team must see the investor as an 
important factor in achieving the goals they have set out for themselves 
and not as an outsider trying to hi-jack their company. On the other hand 
the investor should become an active member of the company and have 
the interests of the company at heart. He should not be a mere onlooker, 
but a participant in the venture, actively transferring his skills and 
knowledge to the management team.     
      
With the due diligence of the management team completed, and after assessing 
the personalities in the management team, the venture capitalist would now be in 
a position to appoint additional team members who would complement the 
current management team. The investor and founder should work together in 
achieving the appointment of the best management team for the specific venture 
that will work cohesively and effectively to achieve the expected outcome for the 
investors and founders. 
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In the appointment process, preferences will play an important role in the venture 
capitalist’s choice of management team. The venture capitalist with prior 
knowledge of working in start-ups or large firms would tend to prefer teams with 
individuals coming from similar backgrounds. Furthermore, venture capitalists 
with a specific background like engineering would tend to appoint teams with the 
same background. This approach could be dangerous, and thus the venture 
capitalist should be objective and appoint the best team for the specific venture. 
All the relevant factors need to be taken into account before the appointment of 
the management team is done. (Franke et.al, 2005: 2) 
 
• Characteristics of the Management Team. 
 
Certain characteristics in a management team are needed to obtain venture capital. 
Much research – for example studies by Hill and Power, (2001: 231) and Hill and 
Power, (2002: 118) as well as Gladstone and Gladstone (2004: 6) – has been done 
to determine which characteristics are the most important and would be crucial for 
the success of the venture. Venture capitalists have found that a proven 
management track record is the most important characteristic. Integrity is second, 
followed by dedication, commitment, passion, energy and others. Table 2.6 lists 
the different management characteristics and their importance. Graph 2.1 provides 
a graphical illustration of the same information.  
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Table 2.6 Required Management Characteristics and their Importance. 
 
CHARACTERISTICS IMPORTANCE OUT OF 10 
Proven track record 9.5 
Integrity 3.0 
Dedication, commitment, passion  and 
energy 
3.0 
Vision and ability to articulate vision 2.3 
Knowledge, skill level, intelligence 2.0 
Leadership ability 1.0 
Ability to build a team 0.75 
Marketing focus 0.50 
Made Investment in Company 0.50 
Winning attitude 0.50 
Industry contacts 0.50 
Good references 0.25 
Source: Hill and Power, 2001: 118. 
 68
Figure 2.5 Required Management Characteristics and their Importance. 
 
Key Components of a Quality 
Management Team
Proven Track Record
Integrity
Dedication, commitment, passion  & energy
Vision and ability to articulate vision
Knowledge, skill level, intelligence
Leadership ability
Ability to build a team
Marketing Focus
 
 
The characteristics may also be discussed under the following heading compiled from 
other literature sources. (Bartlett, 1988: 23), (Gladstone and Gladstone, 2004: 6), (Hill 
and Power, 2001: 118), (Camp, 2002: 36) as well as (Hill and Dee Power, 2002: 231): 
    
• Quality People. The venture capitalist invests in the jockey, in other words 
the people in the venture. The entrepreneur has to ensure that his profile and 
the people he has employed as his management team would meet these 
expectations. The descriptions of quality people could be further divided into 
the following general characteristics of high quality people: 
  
o Integrity. Integrity is the most important quality of great leaders. 
Venture capitalists have to trust the management of the venture in 
which they are going to invest their money. Once integrity is lost, the 
investor is sure to lose his investment. In this context the good guys 
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are the winners. The owners, investors and management need to be 
able to keep their focus on the goal without watching their backs and 
pockets. 
  
o Intellectual Honesty. The management/CEO has to have the ability to 
be honest with the owners and themselves. They should be able to 
identify problems and realise when they are in trouble. Ignoring 
problems and not addressing them, would invariably lead to financial 
losses. People tend to ignore the major issues because they know that 
it would be detrimental to the venture and their position. If a problem 
is identified in good time it could be addressed and resolved.  
 
o Intellectual Brilliance. Managers need to be smart people, smarter 
than the average man in the street. They should have the ability to 
think on their feet and give well-calculated answers that are correct 
and defendable. The managers and CEO need to have the ability to 
create clarity from confusion, ambiguity and uncertainty, all of which 
are constantly present in early stage companies. 
 
o People Smart. Venture capitalists prefer entrepreneurs and managers 
with great interpersonal skills and abilities, in other words they need to 
be people smart. Entrepreneurs, who have the ability to deal with the 
staff and management, would also encourage everybody to work 
together in achieving their goal. 
 
• Real Entrepreneurs. The members of the management team, or at least some 
of them, have to be real entrepreneurs who have the ability to identify the 
opportunities and to exploit them. The entrepreneur should have sustainable 
motivation and be willing to put in some hard work. An idea is not a venture. 
The following characteristics are important entrepreneurial characteristics 
needed and sought after by venture capitalists: 
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o Driven Intensity. The entrepreneur has to be self-motivated with the 
ability and willingness to work hard in ensuring success. 
  
o Bold Self-Confidence and Willingness to Take Risks. It is 
imperative for venture capitalists to back entrepreneurs who have the 
guts to undertake risk and fully commit themselves to achieving the 
goals set.  
 
o Sense of Vision and Ability to Execute.  The entrepreneur needs to 
have the ability to see into the future and then concentrate on the 
important objectives to remain a step ahead of the market.  
 
o Ability to Solve Problems. The nature of an early stage company is 
such that the entrepreneur should have the ability to solve problems, 
big and small. Venture capitalists tend to back entrepreneurs who have 
the ability to resolve these problems effectively. The entrepreneur 
needs to have the ability to identify key problems and to select and 
implement optimum solutions.  
 
o Ability to Adapt. The manager/entrepreneur finds himself in a market 
that is constantly changing. The manager should have the ability to 
adapt to this changing environment and situations. The inability to 
adapt will almost surely doom early stage companies to failure.  
 
o Ability to Use Resources Effectively. Managers should have the 
ability to preserve scarce resources like finance, personal and other 
resources. The managers should be able to employ the best personnel 
for the company and manage the available finances to the fullest. The 
ability to use and apply resource effectively will give the company the 
ability to be profitable much earlier in its existence.  
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• Business Judgement. Logic prevails and the managers need to be able to 
make rational decisions based on logical thought and not based on emotions or 
prejudice. Business judgement is learnt through experience, and seasoned 
managers who are “streetwise” tend to be better equipped for entrepreneurial 
success than people with relatively little experience.  
 
• Background. Members from the management team should have an 
impressive and relevant background in terms of both experience and 
education. The experience should preferably be in the same industry than the 
one the venture is pursuing. Someone who has worked in the industry would 
understand the requirements and needs of the industry much more quickly and 
easily. He will also know all the suppliers and competitors in the market, with 
their strong and weak points, and would be able to better position the 
company. Knowledge of the market, suppliers and competitors would give the 
company a competitive edge over any other newcomers in the same industry.  
 
• Motivation. The management team has to have the motivation and 
sustainability to be part of the company. A management team should work 
towards a single goal with a great deal of energy and believe in what they are 
doing. Motivation is everything in building a company. The venture capitalist 
has to assess each management team member’s motivation. With all the 
knowledge and skills gathered over the years the venture capitalist needs to 
motivate and keep the team motivated. The role of the venture capitalist is 
critical in this regard. Discerning motivation and determining whether those 
motivations are proper and healthy, is a tricky business. Motivation only 
founded on financial grounds may be detrimental to the company’s 
development. The venture capitalist has to ensure that management’s 
expectations and motivations are matched if set realistically.  
 
• The Peter Principle. It is when the manager reaches the end of his ability, 
long before the company has reached its full potential. The venture capitalist 
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should be aware of these possibilities and take the right action before the 
manager becomes dead wood and a liability to the company. It should be 
realised that everybody has his specific abilities and the venture capitalist, 
with his vast experience, has to identify managers with a limited ability or 
experience and try to assist this manager in building more capacity. It costs 
more to bring a new manager into the business than trying to correct the 
problem early enough.  
 
The selection of the right management team and managing this team is an important 
function of the venture capitalist. The venture capitalists need to use all his skills and 
knowledge to manage the management team and managers to ensure that the company 
would benefit from their knowledge and skills. The venture capitalist will help the 
management team not to reinvent the wheel. The correct selection of this team would 
enhance the company’s chances on success and future prosperity.  
 
2.5.3 Dismissal of the Management Team. 
 
The appointment of a management team may culminate in the dismissal of members or 
the whole management team. Venture capitalists may use their financial power to dismiss 
members or the whole team if they are of the opinion that the team is under-performing 
or does not live up to expectations. Replacing management is one of the most significant 
undertakings that the venture capitalist can execute. The venture capitalist has to evaluate 
the situation objectively and if necessary dismiss the team or team members. Dismissing 
a team or team member is also not proven to increase performance, and it may have a 
rather negative effect on the venture’s performance. The venture capitalist may have a 
major task restoring the confidence and team spirit in order to increase the company’s 
performance. (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989: 241) and (Busenitz, Fiet and Moesel, 2003: 
792 - 793)  
 
Dismissing a management member can strain the venture’s growth and prosperity. It is in 
the company’s and venture capitalist’s interest that dismissals are restricted to the 
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minimum. The management team should be finalised before investment takes place. 
Finalisation of the management team should be an initial requirement for investment to 
be made. (Fiet and Busenitz, 1997: 347) Changing the management team after investment 
could lead to negativity in the company. Entrepreneurs should also be wary of venture 
capitalists that are known to take over company management teams after investment has 
taken place. The interests of the company, shareholders and investors should be taken 
into account in the evaluating process determining the need to change the management 
team. “Vulture capitalists” with their egocentric and short-term approach, may well ruin 
the long-term existence of a company. In a study by Macmillan and Kulow, (1989: 39) 
the contrarily was found that they could not find a direct correlation between the 
replacement of a management team and the positive performance of a company. 
Cognisance should be taken of this research although enough research indicates the 
opposite.     
 
The four most common reasons for dismissal of a management team is the inability of 
managers to (Fiet and Busenitz, 1997: 348): 
 
• Make strategic decisions 
• Work with the board of directors 
• Motivate the employees 
• Adequately allocate resources. 
 
The performance of the management team should be evaluated in an objective manner, 
and the venture capitalists should attempt to withhold emotions and perceptions from the 
evaluation process. The mere fact that an investor and a management member cannot see 
eye to eye is not enough motivation to replace such a manager. The contribution made to 
the company should be the determining factor. The venture capitalist must be objective 
with the company’s interests at heart. When the venture capitalist demonstrates his 
willingness to treat the management fairly, more of the enthusiasm of management, after 
a dismissal, will be resumed. (Macmillan and Kulow, 1989: 348) 
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Dismissal may be viewed in four different ways (Fiet and Busenitz, 1997: 349): 
 
• Agency Theory. This represents an attempt to constructively influence a possible 
conflict of interest between the managers and the investors. The original structure 
of the deal conveys important information about joint expectations for the future 
and what may happen under specific scenarios. If the expectations are not met, 
the managers would be dismissed. The targets could be sales targets, profit 
targets and production targets. The managers are appointed as the agents of the 
investors to achieve certain targets. This theory is very much concentrated on the 
short- to medium-term. The investors are not expected to participate actively in 
the company’s management.  
 
• Power Theory. The investor can control the board of directors as a prerequisite 
to investment, which is used later as a tool to dismiss underperforming managers. 
One way to maintain power is to control access to information, which is 
obviously a very negative action. Such actions revolve around control, and are 
mostly at variance with the initial goal that the founders and investors aimed to 
reach together. 
 
• Board Diversity. The most frequent type of diversity is the distinction between 
inside and outside venture directors. Venture insiders are directors also on the 
management team, whilst the outsider is a venture director not on the 
management team. When a board is filled with outsiders they may well be more 
willing to dismiss managers than otherwise. 
 
• Procedural Justice Theory. Procedural justice theory suggests that because the 
managers expect to be treated fairly by the investors, the power of the investors is 
constrained. The investors are able to exercise power, but only in a fair way. The 
investors and the managers agree to work together to achieve their goals. The 
investors ensure that the managers stay focussed. If a dismissal needs to take 
place the dismissal will be accepted by both parties.  
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Dismissal is a very sensitive action that is always necessary wherever a business exists. 
Against this background the venture capitalist’s actions should be fair. Managers are 
appointed to achieve certain goals and they have to be committed and dedicated to 
achieve these goals. Dismissals should not be used as a tool to gain personal power, but 
as a necessity to achieve certain goals. Well-communicated dismissals could be positive 
if they are justifiable and in the company’s interest. The investor has an important role to 
rather fix what is wrong before any dismissal takes place. The investor has to weigh up 
the consequences of dismissal against the possibility of resolving the problem without 
dismissal. The pressures of a new venture are fierce enough and should not be cluttered 
by power struggles. 
 
2.6 Conclusion. 
 
This chapter concentrated on the ownership, company control and management aspects of 
a new venture. It was indicated what the role and influence of the venture capitalist/ 
investor are. There was some reference to the difference between the venture capitalist 
and the angel investor (private investor), but this aspect will be discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter. The venture capitalist has a very important role to ensure that the 
management structure is balanced and correct. The new venture needs to be in a position 
to succeed. The entrepreneur must realise his shortcomings and has to be open enough to 
allow external inputs into the venture. The quality of the management team of any 
venture is the most important aspect determining its success or failure. However, it would 
be unrealistic to expect all ventures to have a perfect and balanced management team in 
the early stages of investment. The cost of having a full management team in an early 
stage company may be detrimental to the venture's existence.  
 
The entrepreneur/founder should also realise that he would need all the management 
qualities, and during the earlier stages of development he should appoint external 
directors/ advisors to advise him and his team. Reinventing the wheel is not an option, 
and one should use existing knowledge and concentrate on the market before losing the 
competitive advantage. Venture capitalists tend to invest in ventures where the 
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management team has been established and where they would be able to take control of 
the board of directors because of their financial power. Many risks go hand in hand with 
the above approach. The investors may through his actions eliminate the entrepreneur’s 
drive, which may be detrimental to the company. It is in the investor and investee’s 
interest to ensure that all actions are taken to the benefit of all. The knowledge and skills 
of the investor is critical in any new venture and simply has to be utilised. The 
entrepreneur needs to be open enough to learn from the investor and the investor should 
make his knowledge and skills available to the entrepreneur and his team.  This implies 
that the investor with the knowledge and skills in his armour has to play a very important 
role in the success of the company. Commitment is equally expected from the investor as 
from the entrepreneur and the management team.  
 
In the next chapter the role of the venture capitalist and angel investor, as well as the 
entrepreneur, will be addressed. In assembling a management team and board of 
directors, the personalities and differences in skills of specifically the entrepreneur and 
the investor should be considered. The risk factor of venture investment requires that one 
has to look further than merely pure investment principles. The risk of venture capital 
investment should be understood and reduced to levels commensurate with return 
expectation. 
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CHAPTER 3 OVERVIEW OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ROLE 
PLAYERS INVOLVED IN VENTURE CAPITAL 
 
3.1 Introduction. 
 
 The previous chapter concentrated on the structure of the company’s ownership, non- 
executive directors, board of directors and the management team. In understanding the 
complexity of venture capital and angel investing better, one should also consider the 
differences between venture capitalists, angel investors and entrepreneurs, including their 
role in the investment process. Knowledge management is a critical element in the 
success of any venture. It needs to be managed properly and utilised to the fullest extent. 
With a view to addressing the reasons for success and failure, the personality differences 
and thinking preferences of the entrepreneur and the investor are important aspects to be 
borne in mind. The development in the venture capital investment market should be 
assessed and noted. An eagle’s view has to be taken of the investment process and the 
persons involved, understanding the importance of the transfer of knowledge and skills 
between the investor, the entrepreneur and his management team.  
 
3.2 The Relationship between the Entrepreneur, Venture Capitalist and Angel 
Investors. 
 
Entrepreneurs, angel investors and venture capitalists have specific roles to play and 
inputs should be given in the investment process and the success of the venture. The 
entrepreneur may well have a preference for a certain kind and type of investment and the 
role he expects the angel and venture capitalist to play. This role, however, should not be 
determined by the entrepreneur on his own, since he is not always a seasoned business 
person who would necessarily have been involved in building a successful venture in the 
past. The roles of the different role players, as explained in Figure 2.1 to 2.3 have 
changed over time. The initial role of the venture capitalist has been taken over by the 
angel investor, whilst the venture capitalist fulfils the role of fund manager today. Angel 
investors mostly invest their own money, whilst a venture capitalist invests investors' 
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money. A further difference between the two kinds of investment is that the angel 
investor normally invests smaller amounts and is mainly involved in the earlier stages of 
the venture development. Venture capitalists, on the other hand, are more involved in 
later stage investments that demand larger investments. The role of the venture capitalist 
is fund managing and he no longer has the entrepreneurial skills or previous experience to 
transfer knowledge and skills to the venture’s management team. The role of the 
entrepreneur has remained more or less constant as in the past.  
 
The angel investors and venture capitalists are briefly defined in the following two 
sections. 
 
3.2.1 Angel Investors. 
  
 The following aspects are addressed: 
 
• Definition. Angel investors are persons, partnerships, or corporations that use 
their own funds to invest in private companies, which are often early stage 
concerns, but not exclusively so. Their way of operating is in contrast to 
venture capital firms that raise money from institutions like pension funds and 
insurance companies as well as from wealthy individuals, and then invest that 
money on behalf of these limited partners primarily in later stage companies. 
Venture capitalists, therefore, tend to be more money managers than the 
hands-on angel investors, as defined above. (Hill and Power, 2002: 5) It is 
often found that the angel investors are people who have just completed the 
successful building of a venture and who have sold it. They would typically be 
searching for a new opportunity to invest their money, knowledge and skills.  
   
• Risk. The funding of early stage companies or ventures involves a high 
degree of perceived risk. Venture capital firms and the broad financial market 
often refer to early stage companies as risk-capital. The risk of these 
investments is increased by the venture capitalist being a fund manager who 
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may not be streetwise enough in the building phase of successful ventures in 
order to contribute to the success of these ventures.  The Afrikaans translation 
of venture capital investment is “waagkapitaal” (risk capital), which partially 
explains the reluctance on the part of the South African investment 
community to invest in these kinds of investments. (Clarke, 2006: s1) In 
labelling an investment process as a risk, without assessing the true value and 
risk of the investment channel, will be short-sighted. The investor has an 
important role to transfer his skills and knowledge to the entrepreneur and his 
management team and through this whole process to reduce the risk regarding 
the investment. The experience, knowledge and skills of the angel investor 
enable him to be the ideal partner to reduce the risks in the early stage 
investment. The risk factor would only be reduced if the investor transfers his 
knowledge and skills to the venture. Angel investors sometimes invest in a 
deal that may not even relate to a company as yet, but which has the potential. 
The potential is identified through their investigations and in the process of 
due diligence the angel investor has the opportunity to identify the vision of 
the entrepreneur and buy into it. These kinds of actions may increase the risk 
potential, but the business of venture capitalists and angel investors is the 
business of creating businesses. The angel investor is by nature an 
entrepreneur who has made a profit from previous ventures and because of his 
nature, he would be able to appreciate the potential of the venture (Hill and 
Power, 2002: 11). The potential return on investment in early stage 
investments is much higher but, in comparison to later stage investments, the 
commensurate risks are much higher. Knowledge and skills are often lacking 
and the need to be mentored is consequently so much higher.  In assessing the 
risk in a potential investment, all the different types of risks involved need to 
be studied and evaluated. (Hill and Power, 2002: 8 – 9), (Benjamin and 
Margulis, 2001: 55 – 67), (Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000: 36 – 60) as 
well as (Rea R.H, 1989: 154) The stage of investment and the concomitant 
risk involved may be represented as indicated by Figure 3.1, below.  
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Figure 3.1. Model of the Main Providers of External Finance through the 
Evolution of the Entrepreneurial Firm. 
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Source: Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000: 37. 
 
Assessing the risk is part of the due diligence process of the angel investor and the 
venture capitalist before investing, but it is important to analyse the different 
kinds of risk with which the investor will need to deal which are as follows 
(Benjamin and Margulis, 2001: 59): 
  
• Management Risk. The investor needs to ensure that the management 
team would be able to execute the business plan they presented to the 
investor.  All the aspects concerning management – as described in the 
previous chapter – are of importance here. Management risk is seen to 
be the most important risk to be assessed by the investor. As stated in 
Hill and Power, (2001: 50) a good management team with a less than 
perfect idea is better than a good idea and a bad management team. 
According to Bartlett, (1999: 72) the investor will back the right 
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jockey. The entrepreneur should also take note of the importance of a 
capable and well-equipped management team before presenting his 
venture to investors.  
 
• Product and Technology Risk. The investor has to ensure that know-
how plus the prototype equals a workable piece of technology that 
could be produced cost effectively. Protection of the product and 
technology through trademarks, copyright and exclusivity should be 
high on the priority list. The less protected the above is, the higher the 
risk of losing the relevant technology to competitors. 
  
• Marketing Risk. The investor should determine through the process 
of due diligence whether there is a demand for the product, or whether 
the product would depend on missionary sales.  Previous experience 
and knowledge of the specific market segment and customers are 
important factors in making an informed decision. 
 
• Operations. What is the company’s ability to meet its sales 
projections and is the company actually able to produce enough high 
quality products to meet customer expectations? It is not sufficient 
merely to have a good product that may be well-protected, dispose of a 
good management team and marketing plan, if one cannot adhere to 
the demand, or at least have a clear plan in hand on how to adhere to 
the increasing demand.  
 
• Money Needed. A major risk for any investor is that the amount of 
investment really needed may prove to be much more than initially 
anticipated. Many entrepreneurs do not have the ability to anticipate 
what their real needs are and they are frequently forced to solicit a 
certain investment merely to get them over the next, or current, hurdle. 
The lack of experience, knowledge and skills on the part of the 
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entrepreneur in assessing the real needs, as well as the long-term 
implications, is critical in any investment process. The investor has to 
be sure what the true financial needs of the venture are, before he 
should consider investing in such a venture.  
  
o Angel Investors versus Venture Capitalists. A comparison of the role of the 
venture capitalist and the angel investor indicates the importance and role of each 
one. These different kinds of investors complement each other, but 
simultaneously their roles also overlap, as may be seen in Figure 3.1 above. A 
chain is formed and the one without the other would distort the investment 
process. In summary the comparison between angel investors and venture 
capitalists is as follows (Hill and Power, 2002: 49 – 60), (Sorhiem. 2005: 179), 
(Benjamin and Margulis, 2001: 252 – 253) as well as (Van Osnabrugge and 
Robinson, 2000: 63 - 67) : 
  
• Venture capitalists advertise their location, whilst angels tend to hide it. 
Angel investors prefer referrals and do not want the entrepreneur merely 
to send his business plan to them. They would typically make their own 
assessment of the market, the entrepreneur, and the venture’s potential. 
Venture capitalists need to have an appetite for the kind of market in 
which the venture is, before they are presented with a business plan. 
  
• Venture capitalists have a definite focus on technology investments, whilst 
angel investors are attracted to technology investment but will consider 
many other types of investments too.  
 
• Venture capitalist have more financial, due diligence, valuation skills and 
are more formalised in each of these areas. The angel investor may decide 
to invest long before the due diligence process is completed on the basis of 
a “gut feeling” that a product or venture will be successful (Dubini P, 
1989: 131).  The risk of investing on this basis would subsequently 
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increase. The investor should be careful to invest in a venture where the 
entrepreneur has good marketing skills, but the venture is sub-standard.  
 
• Successful angel investors, who remain in investing for long periods of 
time, may even have more success in picking winning investments than 
many venture capitalists. Angel investors tend to have a more hands-on 
approach, by means of which they would be able to add more value to the 
venture, but would typically also have the experience to identify risks and 
problems long before the venture capitalist, who is ultimately a fund 
manager. 
 
• Angel investors invest much smaller amounts in an average deal than 
venture capitalists do. Angel investors invest their own money and do not 
join other investors, paying money into a venture or investment fund. 
Venture capitalists prefer to invest in later stage companies and also invest 
much larger amounts.  
 
• An angel investor's flexibility in terms of the size of the investments made   
increases the possibility that angel investors invest in early stage 
investments. The return on investment is also higher than in the later stage 
investments, as indicated by Table 3.1 below. 
 
Table 3.1. United States of America Private Equity Performance Index - 
Return on Investment. (PEPI) as on 31/12/2000.  
 
Year 1 Year 3 Year 5 Year 10 Year 20
Early stage/ Seed 51.20% 93.70% 65.50% 35.80% 23.80%
Later stage 19.90% 31.70% 31.10% 25.20% 18.30%  
  Source: Hill and Power, 2002: 10. 
 
• Venture capitalists like to think of themselves as professionals, having 
worked with presumably amateur angel investors.  
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• Angels and venture capitalists do not necessarily view each other 
positively, but each of them offers entrepreneurs with investments needed.  
 
3.2.2 Venture Capitalist.  
  
 The following aspects are important: 
 
o Definition. A venture capitalist was defined in chapter one as a person 
involved in Bartlett, (1988: 2):  
  
• New technology development, new marketing concepts, and new 
product application possibilities. 
• Significant, although not necessarily controlling, participation in the 
company’s management. 
• Investment in ventures staffed by people with outstanding competence 
and integrity. 
• Product processes that have passed at least through the early prototype 
stage and are adequately protected by patents, copyrights and trade 
secret agreements. 
• Situations which show promise to mature within a few years to the point 
of an initial public offering (IPO) or a sale of the entire company. 
• Opportunities in which a contribution beyond the capital amount of 
money invested could be made. 
 
The definition has changed over the years, but in principle remained 
remarkably stable. A definition by Benjamin and Margulis, (2001: 7) defines 
venture capital as “the business of building businesses”.  As a business 
changes over the course of time, the basics do not change, but the role players 
do so.  Such changes amongst the role players may also influence the areas in 
which the venture capitalist would like to become involved.    
 85
 
o Areas of Involvement.  
 
The entrepreneur and the venture capitalist have different needs and rate the 
importance of involvement and types of involvement differently.  A study 
conducted by Macmillan and Kulow, (1989: 27 to 41) and followed up with 
further research by De Noble, Ehrlich and Moore, (1994: 67 to 81) highlighted 
the activities with the most and the least venture capital involvement. Please 
see Table 3.2 below.  
 86
Table 3.2. Ranking and Comparison of Venture Capitalist and Angel Investor 
Involvement in Investment Activities. 
 
 Venture capital funded 
entrepreneurs 
Angel investment funded 
entrepreneurs 
Activities of greatest 
involvement 
  
Interface with investor group 1 1 
Obtain alternative equity 
finance 
2 6 
Monitor financial performance 3 2 
Sounding board 4 3 
Monitor operating 
performance 
5 5 
Formulate business strategy 6 4 
Activities of least 
involvement 
  
Develop production or service 
techniques 
20 19 
Select vendors and equipment 19 19 
Develop actual product or 
service 
18 17 
Testing or evaluating 
marketing plans 
17 17 
Replace management 
personnel 
16 15 
Develop professional support 
groups 
15 17 
Source: De Noble and Ehrlich and Moore, 1994: 75. 
 
The expectations of entrepreneurs and of angel investors related to their 
respective kinds of involvement differ substantially, although there are some 
similarities too. The six highest ranked involvement areas for angel investors 
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and venture capitalists are similar, although not ranked in the same order. The 
entrepreneur, in short, expects investors to (De Noble, Ehrlich and Moore, 
1994: 80): 
 
• Give advice on locating and attracting key management personnel to their 
firm. 
• Provide financial and staffing expertise. The entrepreneur per se expects 
the investor to transfer his/her knowledge and skills to the venture. 
 
It is clear from the above that the venture capitalist, the angel investor and the 
entrepreneur differ quite substantially in what they deem to be important and 
the roles that each play. Someone in the management team, normally the 
CEO, needs to have the ability to be a mediator in order to accommodate all 
the differences of opinion between the parties involved and to be able to let 
them work cohesively together. Differences may occur, but the company 
remains the most important and central element, together with the success of 
the investment. The parties involved need to overcome their differences and 
effectively work together in achieving their goals. If not, conflict will erupt, 
and the company would most probably be the loser. (Maier and David, 1987: 
209) 
 
o Conflict between the Entrepreneur and the Venture Capitalist.  
 
Conflict has broadly been defined as perceived incompatibilities, discrepant 
views, or interpersonal incompatibilities between two parties that may have 
more than one dimension. Conflict could be positive or negative, depending 
on how it is managed. Examples include cognitive conflict and effective 
conflict, where cognitive conflict relates to functional task orientated discord. 
Effective conflict refers to dysfunctional and emotional disagreements, such 
as disputes between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. It is important 
to experience cognitive conflict in the development of the venture and its 
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products. Too little cognitive conflict could lead to inactivity because of a 
lacking sense of urgency. Should everyone agree, the venture will lose the 
ability to tailor-make a product or marketing proposals. Each person on the 
management team should give his/her inputs freely regarding the matter under 
discussion. It may just be the specific question or reply that would make the 
product an achiever. The entrepreneur should always be challenged so that 
he/she may continually perform to the best of his/her ability. Conflict needs to 
be managed positively to realise every person’s potential without destroying 
the company. (Higashide and Birley, 2002: 62) Positive conflict is the 
unformulated way of transferring skills and knowledge. Tabling differences of 
opinion, followed by a discussion and acceptance of a specific adjusted route, 
will ensure that the management team would use the knowledge and skills 
available thus preventing them from repeating previous errors. 
 
Many reasons for conflict could be adduced, but the main reasons are (Hill 
and Power, 2001: 14) and (Higashide and Birley, 2002: 60):  
 
• Typically entrepreneurs do not want partners; they want money. 
• Frequently the ego of the entrepreneur and/or the investor is overly 
developed. 
• The so-called class distinction between investor and entrepreneur may also 
play a role in certain countries. 
• Greed. 
• Entrepreneurs may feel intimidated by venture capitalists. 
• The goals of the entrepreneur and venture capitalist start to diverge. 
• Policies adopted by the investee company are unacceptable to the investor. 
  
The relationship between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist should be 
one of trust and respect, and the entrepreneur should realise that the business 
concern is still his company, although shared. Conflict is essential in any 
company as long as it is healthy and executed with respect. Investors and 
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entrepreneurs should always understand that building a successful company 
requires a complex set of skills, experiences and personal traits. Foremost 
among these are the drive to succeed, integrity and vision. (Camp, 2002: 35) 
and (Hill and Power, 2002: 82) 
 
The complexity of the relationships between the entrepreneur, angel investor 
and the venture capitalist, as discussed in paragraph 3.1 above, forces the 
parties involved to ensure that they are able to work cohesively to achieve 
their goals. This is the ideal and many ventures may well fail because of the 
reasons mentioned above, of which greed and incompatibility is the most 
important traits of all. The investor has an important role to play in the 
transferring of skills and knowledge. The venture capitalist is not excluded 
from these tasks, although the entrepreneur should be prepared to accept the 
inputs made. The business related expertise of the venture capitalist is 
replaced by investment knowledge that may not necessarily contribute to an 
entrepreneur’s need of management and entrepreneurial knowledge and skills. 
Knowledge management is one of the most important resources needed by a 
company to gain a competitive advantage. These resources need to be 
managed and integrated to help the company and its management team to 
achieve their set goals and objectives (Widding, 2005: 595). Utilising the 
knowledge in the investment group, combined with the knowledge of the 
management team, should give a venture an advantage over competitors. 
  
3.3 Knowledge Management. 
 
Knowledge is not only what we learn from text books or in a classroom, but it is much 
more than that. Knowledge is defined by Dana, Korot and Tovstiga, (2005: 15) as "the 
integration of information, ideas, experience, intuition, skill and lessons learned that 
creates added value for a firm. Innovation is the process by which knowledge is 
transformed into new or significantly modified product and/ or services that establish the 
firm’s competitive edge." In order to gather knowledge a person should be prepared to 
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sweat it out, get a person’s hands dirty and experience the skills and knowledge that a 
person needs to build up a knowledge reservoir to become the core from where value can 
be added to other ventures. Entrepreneurs and new team managers need to be prepared to 
learn from investors who have more knowledge than they have. Investors ought to be 
prepared to transfer their knowledge and skills to the entrepreneurs and new team 
members. The value of adding knowledge to a person’s knowledge-tank could perhaps be 
best explained by filling a tank with water. If water is continued to be added, the tank will 
fill up more. However, if the water is let out, other tanks, linked to the one letting the 
water out, will be filled. Equally, once a person has some water (knowledge) in his/her 
tank, that person can start to share (transfer) it to others. The more a person shares, the 
sooner the new tank, (entrepreneur – new team member) will fill up. Interestingly the 
tank of knowledge will not be depleted the more it is shared, but it will actually fill up 
more as more knowledge is added to the tank. It stands to reason that to understand 
knowledge and the ability to share it, a person also needs to understand what it entails.  
  
3.3.1 Tacit and Explicit Knowledge.  
 
Explicit knowledge is gained from books, studies, manuals and reports. This is to fill the 
knowledge reservoir up by reading or studying without getting a person’s hands dirty. 
Although a person might be able to build a very good foundation, the ability to apply this 
knowledge gained in practice, will be lacking. Many students, entrepreneurs and 
investors are ignoring the fact that tacit knowledge is needed to apply the gained explicit 
knowledge effectively. In contrast tacit knowledge consists predominantly of intuition, 
feelings, perceptions and beliefs. In other words, previous experience, including explicit 
knowledge, enables evaluation and addressing of specific scenario or situation. This may 
be defined as a “gut feeling”.  The latter is not learnt, but it is gained through experience, 
hard work and applying the explicit knowledge learnt. Tacit knowledge could be seen as 
the essence of innovation. (Dana, Korot and Tovstiga, 2005: 10) Understanding the 
different knowledge categories will enable the entrepreneur to understand where he is 
lacking and will assist the investor to realise how important his/her knowledge is because 
of previous experience. It is quite possible that investors may lack this experience, 
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especially in the banking sector and venture capital market, because they are mainly 
expert fund managers. This lack of experience on the part of investors could be overcome 
by means of the use of external and non-executive directors who have the desired 
experience.    
 
3.3.2  Managing Knowledge and Innovation. 
 
Managing knowledge and innovation is a multidimensional challenge. It requires the 
understanding of the four interlinked domains of culture, content, process and 
infrastructure; all of which have a tacit and explicit dimension. (Dana, Korot and 
Tovstiga, 2005: 11 - 12) Figure 3.2 depicts the principle. The different components may 
be explained as follows: 
 
 Figure 3.2. Organisational Knowledge Domains. 
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• Knowledge Culture.   (Knowing who we are). It is the domain where 
values, beliefs and behavioural norms are played out. These are the deeply 
imprinted beliefs that guide an individual’s behaviour. 
  
• Knowledge Content. (Knowing what we know) Strategically relevant 
knowledge, both explicit and tacit, exists in the form of: 
 
 Experiential Knowledge. Highly tacit knowledge derived from 
previous experience. 
 
 Formal Knowledge. Refined, documented and highly explicit in 
nature. 
 
 Emerging Knowledge. Both explicit and tacit. It is the knowledge 
emerging from cross-disciplinary interactions in a venture. It 
occurs in the transfer of knowledge and skills by the different 
parties, mainly from the investor to the entrepreneur and the new 
management team. 
 
• Knowledge Infrastructure. (Knowing the how and the where). This 
domain encompasses all functional elements in a venture that support and 
facilitate the management of knowledge. Knowledge needs to be available 
so that everybody in a venture or company may access it.  
 
• Knowledge Process. (Knowing how we know) This relates to knowledge 
of how knowledge is created, converted, transferred, applied and ultimately 
discarded.     
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3.3.3 Entrepreneurial Knowledge Reservoirs. 
   
Knowledge, as stated above, is the most important resource in terms of a company 
gaining a competitive advantage over another company. Both start-up and early stage 
companies would most likely not dispose of the required resources in-house. These 
resources are found through strategic alliances, joint ventures, forums and clusters in 
order to access knowledge and capabilities unavailable internally. An entrepreneurship 
expert has formed and now manages the Toronto Entrepreneur Mastermind Groups, 
consisting of sets of small business owners who meet on a regular basis to collaborate, 
brainstorm and provide support for each other’s goals. The concept of mastermind groups 
has recently started to become more popular, but it is in fact not something new. 
Napoleon Hill first described the notion in his 1937 book, “Think and Grow Rich” 
(Carmichael, 2006: 1). A company’s development is determined by the availability of 
eight cornerstones. These cornerstones are (Widding, 2005: 598):  
• the business idea,  
• the product,  
• the market,  
• the organisation, 
• core group experience, 
• core group drive/motivation,  
• customer relations, and 
• other relationships. 
These cornerstones constitute the business platform. The risk of failure will increase 
drastically should any of these cornerstones be absent.   
 
The entrepreneur and the investor should realise that it is critical to utilise and access the 
existing pool of knowledge. It is a fact that nobody has complete knowledge needed to 
ensure that a venture will be successful.  Family and friends are the early contributors to a 
venture, but in most cases they are not important contributors when it comes to business 
knowledge. Widding, (2005: 602) stated that even angel investors are sometimes found 
lacking, because not all of the angels have the resources or experience to transfer skills 
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and knowledge to the venture. In some cases they only have the funds, but not the skills 
and knowledge required. Venture capitalists also fall in this category, especially if they 
are fund managers with little to no experience as entrepreneurs. For his part the 
entrepreneur, together with the whole venture team, needs to realise what is needed and 
should ensure that the skills and knowledge pool is acquired, internally or externally, so 
as to equip the venture with the best opportunity to succeed.   
 
3.4 Personality Analysis of the Investor and the Entrepreneur. 
 
In selecting board members, non-executive directors, CEOs and a management team, one 
of the main concerns is whether or not the team would be able to work together. The 
more cohesive the team is, the better the end result is likely to be. The entrepreneur and 
the investor are two persons who have to be able to work together. The entrepreneur 
needs to understand the fears and expectations of the investor, whilst the latter on the 
other hand, should understand the fears and expectations of the entrepreneur. Some 
studies revealed that an investor normally does add value, whilst other studies indicated 
the contrary, namely that the investor adds no, or only a little, value to the venture and the 
entrepreneur. (De Noble, Ehrlich and Moore, 1994: 71 and 80), (Murray and Wright, 
1996: 24) as well as (Higashide and Birley, 2002: 61) The intriguing question remains: 
why do some entrepreneurs rate the contribution of the investor highly and why is this 
contribution not rated equally highly by other entrepreneurs? The answer to this question 
may partly be found in the split brain theory of Roger Sperry.  
 
3.4.1 The Split Brain Theory.  
 
The split brain theory was developed by a neurosurgeon, Roger Sperry, who won the 
Nobel Prize by proving his theory of the controlling influence exerted by the split 
hemispheres of the human brain. This theory presents the two hemispheres as equal 
partners performing varied tasks to achieve a whole product. The left brain controls the 
linear, logical, and verbal abilities, while the right brain controls the visual, creative, and 
intuitive abilities, as shown in Table 3.3. 
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   Table 3.3 Control of Abilities. 
 
Abilities controlled by the left brain. Abilities controlled by the right brain. 
Seeks component parts, looking to discern 
features of the whole. 
Seeks the integration of component parts 
into a whole 
Analytical Pattern seeking 
Sequential Relational 
Temporal Spatial 
Verbal Visual 
Source: Randle, 2000: 260 – 261. 
 
The matter of brain preferences is important because it predisposes one to certain likes 
and dislikes, skills and failings. The ability to work as a team and to build a successful 
venture is dependent on the ability of the team to appreciate the differences between 
humans as well as the knowledge and skills available to be utilised. Dr Kobus Neethling 
developed this notion further into the Neethling Brain Instrument (NBI™) (Neethling 
2005: 3 – 5). This instrument will be discussed below in order to provide an insight into 
the instrument and the differences between the entrepreneur and the investor. Other 
instruments determining personality dominance or leadership abilities do exist. These 
instruments may also be used with positive effect. 
 
3.4.2 Neethling Brain Instrument (NBI™)  
 
• Development. 
 
The Neethling Brain Instrument was developed over many years by Neethling, 
who conducted research in the USA under Professor Paul Torrance (Neethling, 
2005: 3). The aim was to research the split brain theory of Roger Sperry. The 
theory was further developed and it was subsequently realised that humans 
actually have four brain quadrants. Each of the quadrates, as described by 
Neethling, performs a certain set of tasks or procedures pertaining to the 
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environment in which one prefers to work; how structured and unstructured a 
person would wish a job to be; preference in terms of working with specific types 
of information; how people-focused a person is, including many other differences. 
In Table 3.4 the different attributes of the quadrants are represented (Neethling, 
2000: 1 - 4).   
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 Table 3.4 Thinking Preferences within the Brain Quadrants. 
 
Left (L) front (1) = 
(L1) 
Left (L) rear (2) = 
(L2) 
Right (R) front (1) = 
(R1) 
Right (R) rear (2) = 
(R2) 
Accuracy 
Digging deeper into 
a problem. 
Precision. 
Exactness 
Focused approach. 
Factual reasoning. 
No nonsense 
approach. 
Objectivity. 
Information with no 
hidden meanings. 
Critical. 
Correctness. 
Goal orientated 
Real things 
Facts and rational 
information are of 
fundamental 
importance. 
Factual memory 
tends to get priority. 
Planning. 
Practical 
application. 
Organisation. 
Promptness. 
Discipline. 
Dedication. 
Step-by-step 
approach. 
Details. 
Operational. 
Tidiness. 
Tradition. 
Procedures. 
Routine. 
Rules and 
regulations. 
Structure. 
Orthodox. 
Prefers to follow 
guidelines. 
Search for 
alternatives. 
Prefers the big 
picture. 
Idea intuition. 
Strategy. 
Synthesis. 
Integration. 
Risk. 
Restless. 
Becomes bored 
quickly. 
Experimenting. 
Diversity. 
Comfortable with 
chaos. 
Fantasy. 
Surprise. 
Association. 
Feeling orientated. 
Empathy. 
Social liaison. 
People environment. 
Interaction. 
People-intuition. 
Co-operation 
seeking. 
Atmosphere of 
caring. 
Body language. 
Touch. 
Passion. 
Communication. 
Listening focus. 
Ambiance. 
 
Source: Neethling, 2000: 1 – 4 and Neethling, 2005: 4.  
 
Neethling found that when a person is engaged in an activity for which he/she has 
a natural preference over the long-term, then it is quite likely that a remarkable 
amount of motivation, passion and drive will remain in this direction.   
 98
• Four Quadrants. 
 
In an interview with Liesl Schoonwinkel, an accredited brain practitioner and 
member of the South African Foundation of Creativity, the quadrants and 
personality differences were further classified as follows: 
  
o Left (L) Front (1). 
 
Left (L) front (1) (hereafter L1) persons are fact-based, they are very 
analytical, and they like to reason and analyse matters. They argue and 
reason about things and continue analysing and digging deeper until they 
find the essence or what it is all about. They are also good at memorising 
facts because they are knowledge hungry individuals.  In terms of careers, 
they like to work with finances, not accounting, and excel in taking 
financial decisions in the financial management field. They may well also 
be technically and scientifically inclined, although they are not averse to 
work with instruments and in a technical or laboratory type of 
environment.  They are perfectionists by nature, and they can be 
authoritarian.  They like external control and do not impart complete 
accountability and control with delegating tasks, since they keep on 
monitoring, asking, and checking up. 
  
o Left (L) Rear (2). 
 
  The left (L) rear (2) (hereafter L2) persons have a predilection for systems 
and structure.  They perform tasks in a step by step manner, and like to 
plan ahead.  They are well organised and their environments are usually 
tidy and organised because of their categorised way of thinking.  The L2s 
are fond of detail and are able to handle an accumulation of detail 
simultaneously, whilst they plan step by step. They have a strong 
preference for being prepared for events.  They are strongly averse to 
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surprises and do not wish to be caught off-guard, and for this reason they 
are fairly change-resistant.  They like to continue doing something in the 
same way it has always been done, in other words they have a strong 
preference for tried-and-tested methods. 
    
o Right (R) Front (1). 
 
Right (R) front (1) (hereafter R1) persons deal with the big picture.  They 
shy away from any kind of detail.  In fact, they rapidly become bored with 
detail. One should not give them any repetitive or routine work. They have 
good imaginations and enjoy inventing or creating new matters and ideas.  
They would typically drift off and imagine that they are somewhere else 
when they become bored, which happens very easily. In combination with 
their good imaginations they have a need of variety to be permanently 
challenged by new tests, also since they are not fond of prescriptions and 
rigid structures. This  means that they are ideal for careers where a 
creative spirit is needed to create something completely new, where 
nothing may have existed until persons with this personality trait conjure 
up some novel idea, vision, plan and concept because there are no pre-
determining rules that restrict them.  They are able to do so because they 
think in big pictures, they can have wonderful visions and see the end-
result, but it should be added that they are not process-driven.  They 
visualise the plan and they can see themselves at the end of the project, 
however without attending to the detail to get there.   
   
o Right (R) Rear (2). 
 
  The right (R) rear (2) (hereafter R2) persons constitute the core of the 
people-quadrant.  These persons have a natural instinct of who people are, 
how to approach them, and what their points of view are. Moreover, they 
are tolerant of people and allow others to be different from them, but yet 
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they have an instinctive understanding of such differences. They excel in 
interpersonal relations, team building, reaching consensus, negotiations, 
and binding partners together, coming to some form of agreement, insight 
and understanding to a point where all are able to agree to actually accept 
a different point of view, although it may have been contrary to one's 
initial position.  They need to interact with people.  One needs to be aware 
that they experience conflict situations as very destructive for them as 
human beings.  R2s would be devastated as human beings should they 
have to live in conflict for prolonged periods. There needs to be a 
resolution and peace needs to return where we all may live happily 
together  
 
• The Investor and Entrepreneur. 
 
Against the above background, it is important being able to analyse the investor 
and the entrepreneur in understanding the differences in their respective thinking 
preferences and how each one experiences his/her specific situation. It is 
important to realise that nobody falls into one quadrant only, since personality 
traits are always manifested in combination with another dominant quadrant. Each 
entrepreneur and investor would, therefore, be a unique person, but would in 
broad terms appear as in the analysis below. The different brain preferences and 
the influence on a person’s personality should be fully understood by the investor, 
founder and the management team. Every person has at least two dominant 
quadrants, followed by the lesser quadrants. To utilise the strong points and the 
ability to combine the personalities into a team, may well ensure the success of a 
venture. The brain preference differences between the entrepreneur and the 
investor could easily lead to conflict that should be managed positively. One 
obvious way of managing this conflict is to understand the differences between 
the two parties, as explained below. 
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o The Investor. 
 
  The traditional banker, investor and fund manager is an L1 / L2 
combination.  The L1s are precise people who need to understand their 
economic environment and analyse what exactly their risk, their perceived 
opportunities and threats would be. Before they would consider investing 
their money, they perform an encompassing task of analysing what exactly 
they should invest in, what market segment they should be entering and 
exactly who the client or the customer should be,  They wish to retain 
control over their investments because L1s are external authority driven. 
They are completely clinical about this analysis, unless they have R2 
characteristics.  They will not analyse the other person involved or the 
person’s situation, dire straits or need for funding.  These are not 
considerations that they take into account when they analyse the 
possibility of their investment.  Ultimately it all revolves around money, 
economy, risk, and the opportunity cost of any risks. 
   
o The Entrepreneur. 
 
  An entrepreneur typically has R1-characteristics, which could in turn be 
combined with any other quadrant. Should an entrepreneur venture into 
training needs, then he/she may well be a R1/R2-combination.  If the 
entrepreneur ventures into a financial or a completely new engineering 
field, the best would be a R1/L1-combination. It is apparent that the R1- 
characteristics are always present in such an entrepreneur’s personality.  
This kind of entrepreneur deals in big pictures, with no risk aversion, in 
fact, the word "risk" is never considered and the opportunities in the 
market are automatically identified. They are solution finders, always 
searching for new challenges. This kind of entrepreneur wants to be 
permanently challenged.  Challenges are accompanied by trying 
something that has never been done before. R1s are averse to boundaries, 
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they are very happy to deviate completely from established entrenched 
systems and to do something that is in direct opposition to the way it was 
traditionally done before. This approach may seem like encompassing a 
huge risk. However, to be creative one should have a decided preference 
for operating outside the set boundaries.  R1s will go out and discover the 
world and try new things, opening up the universe to us in all possible 
fields.  They are typically the inventors, the creators, the discoverers, the 
entrepreneurs.  They establish new enterprises, new ideas in the market, 
new products, new services, and new ways of doing something that has 
not been done before.  They are innovative and are willing to take risks, 
they like to be challenged and they love the rush of adrenaline, the 
excitement of being involved in something that is entirely new. In brief it 
may be said that entrepreneurs are hunters, they are interested in the “kill” 
and not in the administration that has to be followed. The entrepreneur 
needs someone else to do follow-up work, maintain the systems, controls 
and structures. 
 
o Reasons for Conflict between Investor and Entrepreneur. 
  
The entrepreneur has a vision and a dream and runs with this dream or the 
vision at full pace, simultaneously working at a number of aspects that 
need to be in place.  He avoids paying attention to detail, systems or 
structures and does not necessarily perform tasks in sequence, since he has 
a clear vision of the end goal.  The investor, L1/L2, is a person who 
prefers not to do things at full pace, or galloping past all of the detail.  
Investors sit down and they analyse.  They structure and they sequence. 
They are the ones who would meticulously thrash out the plan in its 
entirety and then for each of the components of the plan they would have a 
step by step action plan of how to put that plan into practice.  When these 
two personalities are members of one team, they are very likely to face a 
head-on-collision without a mediator. The entrepreneur is passionate about 
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his venture.  He is thrilled, excited, and cannot wait to make something 
happen.  On the other hand the L2-person would look at the details and not 
be ready to proceed. The investor will not proceed before all the 
structures, plans, sequences and steps are meticulously laid out on paper 
knowing exactly what his first or next step is going to be. The differences 
in approach between the investor and entrepreneur may lead to frustration 
and conflict which needs to be managed for the benefit of the venture. The 
role of the CEO or mediator will be to manage the entrepreneur and the 
investor’s approaches and ideas into a workable plan where neither of the 
investor nor the entrepreneur will lose their drive or passion.  
 
o Resolving the Conflict between the Investor and the Entrepreneur. 
 
  The conflict between the entrepreneur and the investor is primarily vested 
in the personality differences as described above. The intensity of the 
conflict would obviously vary from venture to venture. The best manner to 
resolve such a possible conflict scenario is the intervention of a third 
party. This may be a person who is neutral and does not have a vested 
interest with either party. It may be a person who ideally would have an 
L1/R2 profile. The L1 would typically analyse the situation objectively 
and with little or no emotion decides what to do to resolve the conflict. 
The R2 quadrant gives persons the ability to be negotiators and to reach 
decisions by consensus. They are people focused and have the ability to 
tolerate others who have different profiles and preferences.  They would 
better understand both the investor and the entrepreneur and their needs, 
and would then devise the structure and the system within which both of 
these personality traits are able to contribute their unique strengths.  They 
would create a neutral arena for these divergent persons to meet and 
combine forces.  
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  Gladstone and Gladstone, (2004: 53) state that the venture capitalist most 
often invests with an entrepreneur who has a personality that is compatible 
with his own. Many good ventures will be discarded if the above policy is 
applied. Personality differences can be overcome by a mediator’s 
presence.  
 
The specific characteristics of an entrepreneur that normally contribute 
most to the success of a venture are discussed next.    
 
3.4.3 Characteristics of the Entrepreneur.  
   
Broader characteristics of the entrepreneur may be divided into two sets of 
characteristics, as described by Gladstone and Gladstone, (2004: 52 to 54). 
• Mental characteristics (need for achievement, need for power, risk preferences 
etc.) and 
• Behavioural characteristics (determination, resourcefulness, sense of 
urgency). 
 
The following characteristics have contributed most to the success of successive 
generations of entrepreneurs over the years (Gladstone and Gladstone, 2004: 52 to 54), 
(Camp, 2002: 36 to 38) as well as (Hill and Dee, 2002: 75 to 76): 
 
 
• Need for Achievement. Every study of entrepreneurial individuals has 
demonstrated that entrepreneurs have a specific need to achieve. They are 
very competitive and an urge to be first.  
  
• High Need for Autonomy and Power. Entrepreneurs need to be independent 
and autonomous, they want to dominate the situation and be in full control. As 
a result, some entrepreneurs may have poor interpersonal skills. 
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• High Degree of Self-Confidence.  Most entrepreneurs are very confident 
about what they are doing. They believe in themselves.  
 
• High Tolerance for Ambiguity. Entrepreneurs are non-conformists by nature 
and have no strong aversion to change as long as it suits their objectives. Most 
entrepreneurs are creative and interested in almost any subject matter. 
 
• Need to Assume Only Moderate Risk. Entrepreneurs are moderate risk 
takers as perceived by the entrepreneur. The investor may classify this risk as 
high, but according to the entrepreneur the risk is on a moderate level. 
 
• High Degree of Determination. Entrepreneurs are determined and have a 
strong desire to succeed.  
 
• High Degree of Resourcefulness. When problems occur, entrepreneurs are 
good at finding solutions.  
 
• Sense of Urgency. Entrepreneurs have a strong sense of urgency, always 
trying to beat the clock. They try to squeeze as many activities as possible into 
each hour of the day, as time is money.  
 
• Knowing what is Reality. The entrepreneur knows the need to stay level 
headed and to know how and to which situation to react to. 
 
• High Level of Energy. Successful entrepreneurs are typically energetic, 
which is a prerequisite for success. 
 
• Mental Stamina. Along with physical energy, most entrepreneurs have 
tremendous mental stamina. They are able to think about a problem and work 
hard for hours to attempt to resolve it. 
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• Strong Communication Skills. Entrepreneurs normally have good 
communications skills and have the ability to persuade and convince people. 
 
• High Degree of Integrity. Entrepreneurs are mostly honest in their approach 
to the world and will approach people in this way although there are 
entrepreneurs that will try to exploit people. 
 
It is evident that the entrepreneur and investor are both individuals with specific 
personalities and characteristics that should supplement each other in order for a venture 
to succeed. Both the entrepreneur and the investor need to appreciate that the other party 
shares his or her eventual aim in making the venture a success. They should throughout 
be aware of their differences and use the synergy that this creates to obtain a competitive 
advantage. The mediator may help to create a perfect balance and manage the transfer of 
knowledge and skills that is so critical. One can never ignore differences, but they should 
be used in a positive way for the benefit of the venture. Psychological assessment tests 
could assist the investor and the entrepreneur to be aware of their personality differences, 
including the strong and weak points of the whole management team. This analysis will 
assist the mediator to address differences before they become problems. Successful 
entrepreneurs and investors have the ability to see and appreciate the broader picture. 
    
3.5 Mentor Capitalist. 
  
The role of the mentor is a prerequisite for the success of a venture. Such a mentor could 
come from the ranks of the investor, non-executive director, director or CEO. In a study 
by Onset Ventures, Camp, (2002: 62), it is apparent that the major reason for the failure 
of early stage companies is the lack of a mentor.  Such companies are generally able to 
gain substantial value from a mentor, who is someone with experience. (Camp, 2002: 62) 
Value is not only added to early stage companies, but to any company if the management 
team and advisory board are constituted in a balanced fashion. The management team, 
advisory board, directors and non-executive directors have to be able to keep abreast with 
the needs of the company, whilst the shareholders and investors should be aware of this 
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aspect and they should bring about any changes as and when these may become 
necessary. The investors and shareholders should be progressive, thereby facilitating the 
process of affecting changes sooner rather than later.       
 
During the last few years, mentor capitalism and other forms of support groups for 
entrepreneurs became more pronounced in the USA. Investors would typically realise 
that their investment success rate could increase substantially, should they mentor the 
ventures in which they invest, thereby reducing the failure rate. Consequently, the 
investors increase the rate of return on funds invested and, therefore, increase their own 
rate of return.  
 
3.5.1 New Developments.  
  
• Corporate Venturing.  Angela Sormani reports in the European 
Venture Capital Journal of February 2006, (2006: 5 to 6) that corporate 
venturing is returning, but with a new approach that draws on the 
experience of traditional venture capitalists either in a formal or 
informal capacity. The technology giant IBM launched a venture 
capital advisory council constituted by venture capitalists from some 
of the world's leading venture capital firms. The aim of this council is 
to mentor their ventures. Many corporates are following suit, such as 
British Telecommunication, Dell, Intel and Motorola (Hill and Power, 
2002: 93). 
  
• Return of Seed Capital Investment.  At the end of the 1990s, the 
seed capital market raised billions of dollars in the United States but 
overall with limited success. In 2004, firms like Kleiner Perkins 
Caufield and Byers, Charles River Ventures and Battery Ventures, 
moved away from seeking billions and rather raised smaller amounts 
that led to a more hands-on approach and managing smaller portfolios. 
The outcome is that investors are becoming so involved in the venture 
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that increasing numbers are attending customer meetings to understand 
the market and the product. The Woodside Fund aims to introduce as 
many as three partners into a single deal to ensure that there is a hands-
on approach in all stages of the mentoring process, especially when it 
comes to recruiting executives. The Fund interviewed for example 22 
candidates for a CEO position in one of its portfolio companies. This 
intense involvement increases the venture’s changes of success. 
(Anonymous A, 2005: 40 - 43)  
 
• Mastermind Groups. An entrepreneurship expert has formed and 
runs the Toronto Entrepreneur Mastermind Groups, consisting of 
groups of small business owners who meet on a regular basis to 
collaborate, brainstorm and provide support for each other’s goals. The 
concept of mastermind groups is currently seeing a rise in popularity. 
It should be remembered that this phenomenon is not something new. 
Napoleon Hill first described the idea in his 1937 book, “Think and 
Grow Rich”. Andrew Carnegie, a self-made steel billionaire, 
commissioned Napoleon Hill to interview the most successful business 
people of the time and discover what their secrets were.  The answer 
lay in mastermind groups. One may also term this an expanded 
soundboard. (Carmichael, 2006: 1 - 2) 
 
• The Role of Intermediaries. In the USA the quality of proposed 
projects presented to the venture capital funds started to decrease, with 
a result that intermediaries started to form a conduit between the 
investor and the entrepreneur. The evaluation process by the 
intermediaries increased the quality of the proposed projects, including 
the competencies of the management team. Referrals from 
intermediaries have an acceptance rate of twice the rate of unsolicited 
deals. The effectiveness of the intermediary’s role as deal facilitator 
has important implications for the allocated investment efficiency of 
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the venture capital market.  The intermediaries render two distinct 
client services to the investor and entrepreneur, namely:  
 
• negotiating a purchase from the vendor, and 
• identifying and helping to select, with their management clients, the 
most attractive or appropriate venture capital partner. 
 
The number of ventures searching for funding in the United States of 
America is overwhelming since they allow intermediaries to pre-select 
ventures and presenting ventures to those venture capital funds with the 
appetite for the specific market that the venture wishes to explore. This 
decreases the time, and increases the effectiveness needed to raise funding. 
In 1992 a survey of 21 early stage investors showed that of the 1410 
applications they received 47% were referrals from intermediaries. 
(Murray and Wright, 1996: 14) 
 
• Education. External directors or non-executive directors are in a 
position to play an important role in the executive learning process. 
They are expected to bring experience, knowledge, discipline, help 
with strategic planning, contacts, and planning skills and many other 
intangible benefits to the venture company. It was found in research 
conducted by Argyris and Schon in 1978, (Deakins, O'Neill and 
Mileham, 2000: 319), that a company may not develop unless the 
entrepreneur is able to learn. The acquisition of knowledge includes 
the learning and transfer of tacit and explicit knowledge. The 
development of the entrepreneur will be higher if the interaction 
between the entrepreneur and the external director is good. Learning 
more from experience implies bringing knowledge, skills, values and 
attributes together to interact in the learning process (Deakins, O'Neill 
and Mileham, 2000: 319). China’s economic success in the past few 
years resulted from the release of the entrepreneurial potential inherent 
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in the business sector. China developed entrepreneurship education as 
a perceived and integral part of competence and capability building 
and introduced the modules, “corporate entrepreneurship” and 
“venture capital management” into their MBA studies. This resulted in 
an increased economic expansion, with a growth of 8 to 10 % per 
annum and development mainly in the small and medium enterprise 
market led by people trained in entrepreneurship and venture capital 
principles. (Li, Yuli and Matlay, 2003: 501) 
 
The venture capital and angel investing market is an evolutionary market, moving in the 
direction of mentor capitalism, and aimed at increasing the overall venture capital success 
rate. The developments in these markets indicate that it is important to have a hands-on 
approach to improve the opportunity for success. An Italian businessman, Carmelo 
Pistorio, operating in Singapore, is an angel investor with hands-on entrepreneurial 
experience to guide his seed companies. He stated that money is not the most difficult 
factor for a Singapore based start-up to access, but rather finding experienced 
entrepreneurs to guide it along the bumpy road from concept to becoming a company. 
Pistorio has a 90% success rate in the ventures in which he invested; far above the normal 
accepted average of about 20 to 40% (Anonymous D, 2004: 1 to 2). Mentor capitalism 
demands much more time and effort from the investor, but the rewards are 
commensurately much better. Further development in the venture and angel investing 
market will depend on the further development of the mentor capitalism approach, 
especially in those countries, such as South Africa, where venture capitalism and angel 
investing is not a well-established way of financing new ventures. 
 
3.6 Conclusions. 
  
The question posed in Chapter 2 was whether investor, venture capitalist, angel investor, 
family and friends and directors of a new venture have an important role to play 
regarding the success of the new venture. Why there is such a high rate of unsuccessful 
venture capital investments is another question to be answered. Venture capital 
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investment is a very important investment vehicle, highlighted by the fact that as many as 
70 % of all new job opportunities created in the USA in the 1980s came about through 
venture capital investments. (Bartlett, 1988: 11) (Venture capital investment refers to the 
market segment that includes private equity investment, venture capitalist, angel investors 
and other investors, such as family and friends). Investing in the venture capital market is 
a very sophisticated and involved action. The investor has to ensure that he knows what 
he is in for and that the investment is made with the right expectations. The entrepreneur, 
on the other hand, should also realise that, although it is his original idea, he may have to 
part to some extent from the venture in order to achieve his and the investors' objectives.  
 
The success of the venture depends on the inputs received from both the investor and the 
entrepreneur. The investor and the board of directors, as well as the management team, 
should be chosen and appointed with considerable care. It is a give-and-take situation 
where none of the parties involved should try to dominate the other. The difference in 
personalities and strengths creates the ideal platform for conflict, but is also the one 
aspect that may lay the basis for a strong combination. Many venture capitalists have 
realised that they cannot only be money managers and that they need additional expertise, 
knowledge and skills that would enhance the venture's chances of success. An angel 
investor, Carmelo Pistorio from Singapore, has realised this and increased his success 
rate to a 90 percent level. Many other initiatives have been implemented over the years, 
such as the concept of mastermind groups and the way corporates are becoming involved 
in this market. The relationship between the investor, shareholders, directors, non-
executive directors, the CEO, entrepreneur and the management team could be compared 
with the process of mixing concrete. One could add all the necessary ingredients into the 
concrete mixer, but without water the mixture will merely remain dry ingredients with no 
strength. Each ingredient may have wonderful qualities, but without the ability to be 
combined in concrete, such ingredients have no inherent strength. Each ingredient is 
important and is needed to achieve the goal. The management team and all other parties 
involved should have the ability to work cohesively in order to demonstrate their real 
strength. 
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All the influences, from the role of the investor, entrepreneur, director and many others, 
as reviewed in Chapter 2 and 3 determine the success of the venture. The influence of 
each one of these role players creates important building blocks, including the transfer of 
knowledge and skills by each role player, to build the ventures as foreseen by the 
entrepreneur and the investor.   
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 
EUROPE  
 
4.1 Introduction. 
 
The electronic age has simultaneously made gathering of information easier and also 
much more difficult. It might be easier to contact potential respondents electronically, but 
the respondents are much more reluctant to complete questionnaires than in the past. This 
phenomenon is mainly caused by the overflow of questionnaires reaching potential 
respondents. Some companies have adopted a policy not to complete questionnaires if 
they do not emanate from their association or university to which they subscribe.  The 
above is understandable if taken into consideration that a vast amount of information is 
gathered that could be used by other researchers, but which are included in questionnaires 
distributed by other researchers. Most of the researched information is published and may 
be used in other research reports. Consequently the areas not researched before regarding 
venture capital associations, angel capital associations and venture capital funds, now 
need to be identified and researched independently. The National Venture Capital 
Association (NVCA) yearbook compiled by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the NVCA, the 
European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) yearbook compiled by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and Thomson™ and KPMG and the South African Venture 
Capital and Private Equity Association (SAVCA) surveys compiled by KPMG and 
SAVCA are some of the published research papers that are used in this chapter to provide 
research answers emanating from the USA, Europe and to a lesser extent from South 
Africa.    
 
4.2 Selection. 
 
The process of selecting which specific countries to include in the international sample is 
important to ensure that the countries selected represent the majority of the funds raised 
and invested globally.   
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The private equity industry that includes venture capital funds, but excludes angel 
investments, is used as the basis for the selection of the countries to be included to 
provide an overall global overview of the current venture capital activities. Mathews and 
Fourie, (2007: 20) rank the top 20 countries per investment activities in table 4.1 and the 
fund raising activities in table 4.2. These rankings are supported by Anonymous F, (2007: 
17). Own calculations were used to determine the percentage investment of the total 
investment made or funds raised by the top ranked countries. A total of 83.72% of the 
investment made by the top 20 ranking countries are made by countries that include the 
USA and Europe.  
 
 Table 4.1. Top 20 Countries Ranked According to Investment Activities. 
 
 
Country  Investments (Rbn) 
Percentage of 
total 
investment in 
top 20 
countries
1 USA 268.50                   35.77%
2 UK 188.60                   25.12%
3 France 57.70                     7.69%
4 Japan 45.50                     6.06%
5 Sweden 23.70                     3.16%
6 Germany 21.30                     2.84%
7 Spain 21.10                     2.81%
8 Netherlands 18.50                     2.46%
9 Italy 17.30                     2.30%
10 Australia 14.00                     1.86%
11 China 13.30                     1.77%
12 Korea 10.10                     1.35%
13 India 8.60                      1.15%
14 Denmark 8.40                      1.12%
15 Singapore 8.30                      1.11%
16 Canada 7.70                      1.03%
17 South Africa 6.00                      0.80%
18 Malaysia 4.90                      0.65%
19 Israel 3.80                      0.51%
20 Norway 3.40                      0.45%  
   Source: Mathews and Fourie, 2007: 20 (and own calculation). 
 
The fund raising activity for the top 20 ranked countries in table 4.2 differs from table 4.1 
where 93.44% of funds raised are raised in Europe and the USA.  
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 Table 4.2. Top 20 Countries Ranked According to Fund Raising Activities. 
 
 
Country   Investments (Rbn) 
Percentage 
of total funds 
raised in top 
20 countries
1 USA 636.20                    49.36%
2 UK 361.20                    28.03%
3 France 90.60                      7.03%
4 Japan 35.70                      2.77%
5 Germany 22.70                      1.76%
6 Netherlands 19.30                      1.50%
7 Sweden 15.20                      1.18%
8 Australia 12.00                      0.93%
9 Switzerland 11.80                      0.92%
10 South Africa 11.20                      0.87%
11 Italy 10.60                      0.82%
12 CE Europe 10.20                      0.79%
13 Israel 8.20                        0.64%
14 Spain 8.10                        0.63%
15 Denmark 7.90                        0.61%
16 Canada 7.30                        0.57%
17 Singapore 5.90                        0.46%
18 Norway 5.40                        0.42%
19 Finland 5.00                        0.39%
20 India 4.30                        0.33%  
 Source: Mathews and Fourie, 2007: 20 (and own calculation). 
 
Before a final selection of which countries or group of countries to be included in the 
international sample was made, the size of the international private equity market was 
taken into account to confirm the calculations done in tables 4.1 and 4.2. Figure 4.1 gives 
a graphical display of the global equity markets as reflected by Mathews and Fourie, 
(2007: 19).  
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 Figure 4.1. Size of the International Private Equity Markets. 
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 Source: Mathews and Fourie, 2007: 19.  
The data were converted at the same exchange rate of $1 = R7.00 as per Mathews and Fourie, 
(2007: 19). 
 
The data in tables 4.1 and 4.2 and in figure 4.1 indicate that more than 80% of all global 
investment activities in the private equity market would be included if the USA and 
Europe are selected as the areas to be covered in this study. The impact of the other 
countries is not so significant and may, therefore, be excluded from this research. South 
Africa is included because of the relevance to the stated objectives of this study. 
 
4.3 Private Equity. 
 
Private equity can be defined as an asset class consisting of equity securities in operating 
companies that are not publicly traded on a stock exchange (Mathews and Fourie, 2007: 8 
- 9). Private equity has grown from a non-event in Europe with an investment value of 
$15 billion 15 years ago to a very popular asset class at present. In research by Metrick 
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and Yasuda, (2007: 2), it was found that private equity funds manage approximately $1 
trillion(USD) of investment capital. Private equity was seen to be a very risky 
investment, but in the 1990s European investors began to react favourably to this new 
asset class. Private equity was generating impressive returns and the investors wanted to 
be part of that trend (Echarri and Coller, 2007: 21). Private equity invests funds normally 
into unlisted companies that hold large benefits to the beneficiary companies beside the 
funds invested. As stated by Mathews and Fourie (2007: 8) private equity investors have 
a considerable impact on productivity, skills development, national competitiveness and 
job creation, as they include the transfer and exchange of know-how and not only the 
flow of capital. The transfer of skills and knowledge is, according to the above, a critical 
element of any private equity investment. Most of the private equity funds worldwide are 
organised as listed companies with large institutional investors and wealthy individuals 
providing the bulk of the capital to be invested (Metrick and Yasuda, 2007: 2). 
 
4.3.1 Investment Stages. 
 
The definition of private equity investment as defined in paragraph 4.3 above 
differs from that of venture capital investment mainly in that private equity 
includes venture capital as a sub-class without detailing angel investing as a 
possible sub-class. It should be mentioned that angel investments are mostly done 
by wealthy individuals and, therefore, are excluded from this classification. 
Private equity investment may broadly be classified into three sub-classes, namely 
(Mathews and Fourie, 2007: 8 - 9): 
 
• Venture capital funding, 
• development capital, and 
• buyout funding. 
 
Table 4.3 sets out the terminology as defined above. The differentiation between 
the sub-classes is important to ensure that there is no confusion when venture 
capital investment is addressed and discussed.  
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Table 4.3 Private Equity Investment Stages. 
 
Private equity 
category 
Stages of business 
development 
Typical application 
Venture capital Seed capital 
 
 
Start-up and early 
stage 
Funding for research, evaluation and 
development of a concept or business 
before the business starts trading 
Funding for new companies which 
have been in business for a short time. 
Development 
capital 
Expansion and 
development 
Funding for growth and expansion of 
a company which is breaking even or 
trading profitability. 
Buyout Leverage buyout or 
buy-in. 
 
Replacement 
capital 
Funding of a management or other 
leverage buyouts and buy-ins. 
 
Funding for the purchase of existing 
shares in a company from other 
shareholders. 
Source: Mathews and Fourie, 2007: 9.  
     
4.3.2 Venture Capital. 
 
Venture capital is defined in paragraph 1.1 by Benjamin and Margulis (2001: 7) 
as “the business of building businesses”. It is, therefore, an investment to create 
and grow new businesses. The NVCA (Anonymous E, 2007: 1) defines venture 
capital investment as: 
• Financing of new and rapidly growing companies. 
• Purchase of equity securities. 
• Assisting in the development of new products and services. 
• Adding value to the company through active participation. 
• Taking higher risks with the expectation of higher rewards. 
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• Having a long-term orientation. 
 
A buyout is strictly defined as a transaction in which the management acquires a 
business or company from the current shareholders with the support of private 
equity investors (Russel, 2005: 2). Although buyouts provide value to companies 
they cannot be regarded as a form of venture capital, because they do not create 
new or do not build growing businesses, since they merely replace current 
shareholders. This distinction has to be made because of the differences in 
approach in the USA and Europe. To draw a proper comparison between the USA 
and Europe, buyouts are excluded where possible in the rest of this chapter and 
venture capital will refer to the first two phases of investment as defined in table 
4.3. Angel investments are totally excluded in the quantification of the magnitude 
of these investment classes because of the lack of quantifiable information 
regarding this investment class. The USA is the most advanced in the 
development and formalising of this investment class and even there quantifiable 
information is lacking.  
  
4.3.3 Private Equity Investments. 
 
Private equity investment is a growing market dominated by the USA with 
66.63% ($692 billion) of all private equity investments globally raised between 
1998 and 2004, 24.46% ($254 billion) in Europe, 6.64% ($69 billion) in Asia 
Pacific, 1.25% ($13 billion) and 1.01% (10.5 billion) respectively in the Middle 
East, Africa and Central and South America (Mathews and Fourie, 2007: 11). 
Investment in the private equity investment class differs from country to country. 
The investment intensity of a country should not only be measured by the 
quantity, but also by the percentage of GDP invested. Figure 4.2 indicates the 
investment made during 2006 per country in private equity, as a percentage of 
GDP.  
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Figure 4.2. Private Equity Investment as a Percentage of GDP in 2006.  
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Private equity-backed companies support and boost economies globally. Over a 
five year period to 2005/06 in the United Kingdom, the sales per annum in private 
equity-backed companies rose on average by 9% compared with 7% of the FTSE 
100 and 5% of the FTSE mid-250 companies. Exports grew by 6% per annum 
compared with a national growth rate in the United Kingdom of 2%, whilst 
investment in private equity rose by 18% per annum compared with 1% 
nationally. (Selkirk, 2006: 3, 5)  
 
Private equity-backed companies view the contribution to their businesses by 
private equity investors as positive. In addition to providing funding, private 
equity investors are also an important source of guidance and advice for the 
companies in which they invest. Respondents in the UK felt that their private 
equity investors contributed in ways other than the provision of funding as seen in 
figure 4.3. Overall the respondents identified strategic direction (69%), financial 
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advice (67%) and help with contacts (63%) as being key ways in which their 
investors had helped with the development of their business. (Selkirk, 2006: 14) 
 
Figure 4.3 Non-Financial Contributions to Private-Backed Companies. 
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Source: Selkirk, 2006:14. 
 
The above results are supported by research by Rosenstein and Bruno, (1993: 
106) as shown in table 2.2 and Boussouara and Deakins, (2000: 325) as well as 
Deakins, O’Neill and Mileham, (2000: 215) as shown in table 2.4. 
 
4.4 Fundraising and Investment. 
  
4.4.1 Fundraising. 
 
Funds are raised from corporate investors, private individuals, government 
agencies, banks, pension funds, insurance corporations, fund of funds, academic 
institutions, capital markets and other sources. More than 50% of the private 
equity investment in the USA emanates from institutional public and private 
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pension funds with the rest coming from endowments, foundations, insurance 
companies, banks, individuals and other entities who seek to diversify their 
portfolio with this investment class. (Anonymous E, 2007: 1) 
 
The sources of funds in Europe for the 2006 year and the last five years are 
displayed in table 4.4 below.  
 
Table 4.4 Sources of Funds – Europe 
 
  2006 
5-year 
Total 
Corporate 
Investors 3.70% 4.90%
Private 
Individuals 8.90% 7.10%
Government 
Agencies 8.70% 8.90%
Banks 14.40% 17.90%
Pension Funds 27.10% 23.90%
Insurance 
Companies 10.10% 10.80%
Fund of Funds 18.20% 15.60%
Academic 
Institutions 3.60% 2.70%
Capital Markets 1.20% 1.10%
Other 4.10% 7.10%
 100.00% 100.00%
Source: Echarri and Coller, 2007:63. 
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Figure 4.4 Sources of Funds – Europe 2006 
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Source: Echarri and Coller, 2007:63. 
 
 Figure 4.5 Sources of Funds – Europe 5-Year Total. 
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Source: Echarri and Coller, 2007:63. 
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 Figure 4.6 Sources of Funds – South Africa 2006. 
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 Source: Mathews and Fourie, 2007: 23. 
 
Government agencies, banks, pension funds and insurance companies dominate 
the supply of investments.  The role that the public sector fulfils in the private 
equity market, combined with the role of corporate investors, indicate by 
implication that the source of funds dictate the contribution that will be made by 
the investors. The lack of practical business knowledge and experience of these 
investors may well contribute to the lack of success of any new venture. 
Institutional investors are fund managers and lack in most cases the practical 
experience (streetwise knowledge) and skills that contribute to the perceived high 
risk of venture capital investments.      
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4.4.2 Investment. 
 
The funds raised in the fundraising process described in section 4.4.1 are invested 
in private equity, venture capital and management buy-outs. The funds are 
distributed over different investment stages with specific investment preferences 
by the investment funds.  
 
• Venture Capital, Angel Investing and Private Equity. 
Buyouts do not form part of the creation of new businesses and, as stated 
previously, should be excluded or identified in the data under discussion. 
The value of angel investing in either of the USA, Europe or South Africa 
cannot be determined because of the lack of accurate information. The 
USA for one has a well-developed angel investing network where vast 
amounts of funds are invested that cannot be accounted for in the 
comparison illustrated in figure 4.6 below. The definition of private equity 
in South Africa and in Europe includes venture capital investment and 
management buy-outs. The United States of America exclude venture 
capital investment from the definition of private equity and treats venture 
capital as a separate way of investment. The difference in the private 
equity definition implies that a distinction should be made between private 
equity investment and venture capital investment, as referred to in table 
4.3. Figure 4.2 indicates the relationship between private equity 
investment and the GDP of the specific country, whilst figure 4.7 
compares venture capital with private equity investment in relation to the 
relevant countries' GDP. 
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Figure 4.7 Private Equity and Venture Capital as a Percentage of GDP. 
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Source: Echarri and Coller, 2007: 1 to 293 and own calculation. 
 
Venture capital relates at most to 30% of the private equity investment 
made in the UK, Sweden, USA, Netherlands and South Africa per year. 
Figure 4.7 shows the total private equity as opposed to venture capital 
investment.  A very small percentage of private equity investors and even 
venture capital investors would be actively involved in a venture. This has 
a direct implication on the success of the venture. Mr Pistorio, a very 
successful venture capitalist from Singapore, is actively involved in the 
ventures in which he invests. His success rate, because of the transfer of 
skills and knowledge, is on average about 90% whilst the market average 
is around 20%. (Anonymous D, 2004: 1)    
  
• Distribution of Investment Funds. 
 
Buyout and mezzanine financing compromise the largest percentage of 
private equity funds invested in the USA, Europe and South Africa, as 
displayed in figure 4.5. Figures 4.8 to 4.10 reveal the distribution of funds 
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over different investment stages for 2006 in the USA, Europe and South 
Africa. 
 
Figure 4.8 Distribution of Funds over Different Investment Stages in the 
USA for 2006. 
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Source: Broderick and Heesen, 2007: 23, 30. 
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Figure 4.9 Distribution of Funds over Different Investment Stages in 
Europe for 2006. 
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Source: Echarri and Coller, 2007: 70. 
 
Figure 4.10 Distribution of Funds over Different Investment Stages in 
South Africa for 2006.   
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The distribution of funds across investments stages indicates very clearly 
that the private equity investors prefer not to invest in the early stage of an 
enterprise’s development. The institutional investors, banks and insurance 
companies as the major source of funds, do not have the skills and 
knowledge to become involved in the early stages of investment. In this 
context the seed, start-up and, to a major extent, the expansion stages are 
deemed to be too risky. The changes that occurred, as indicated in figures 
2.1 to 2.3, are quite clear in figures 4.8 to 4.10 above. Figure 4.8 shows 
that the USA’s private equity investors do not prefer to invest in these 
early stages of a company’s development. This by implication creates a 
major problem in the development of any enterprise where the chain of 
investment is broken. The probability of creating new businesses is 
restricted and the entrepreneur would need to obtain finance for his 
company at banks and other traditional entities, such as finance houses and 
the like, as indicated in figures 4.4 to 4.6. This gap in the investment 
market needs to be filled, and this is done in the USA by angel investors, 
as indicated in figure 2.3. The angel investment market is fairly well-
organised in the USA and it fills the above gap in the market, as indicated 
by a survey done by the Angel Capital Association of the USA. The 
typical angel investor’s preferred investment stages are the seed/start-up 
and early stage of an enterprise. Figure 4.11 shows the angel investor’s 
preferred investment stages. 
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Figure 4.11 Angel Investors’ Preferred Investment Stage – 2007/2008 
  (Percentage of group of angels) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hudon, 2008: 6. 
 
Angel investors are normally investors with previous experience who 
invest in ventures where they are able to become actively involved and 
they transfer their skills and knowledge to the venture and its management 
team.  
 
Angel investors and venture capitalists both have an important role to 
fulfil in the existence of a venture. Angel investors also prefer to 
encourage other angel investors to become involved to spread the risk and 
get a bigger skills pool involved in the investments required. Figure 4.12 
and 4.13 shows in how many companies angel investors prefer to invest at 
any given time and whom they prefer to be their co-investors. 
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Figure 4.12 The Number of Companies in Which an Angel Investor Will 
Invest. (Percentage of group of angels) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hudson, (2008: 8) 
 
 
Source: Hudson, (2008:10). 
 
Figure 4.13 Angel’s Co-Investment/ Follow-On Preferences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hudson, 2008:10. 
 
Angel investors also prefer to invest in ventures geographically close to 
where they are situated so as to be actively involved. The relevant 
company should be easily reachable and accessible. 
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Figure 4.14 Geography – Where do Groups of Angels Invest? 
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Source: Hudson, 2008:6. 
 
The success of a venture is not only determined by the quality and 
uniqueness of a product alone, but the involvement of the investors in all 
the phases of investment as shown in figure 2.3 is important. Each type of 
investor fulfils an important role to ensure the success and risk reduction 
in a venture's lifespan.  
  
• Investment Preferences. 
 
High technology investments are currently receiving a significant portion of 
venture capital and angel investing. Venture capitalists and angel investors are 
traditionally interested in new exiting technology.  In the USA venture capital 
investment in 2006 by industry sector is shown in figure 4.15 below.  
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Figure 4.15 Venture Capital Investments in 2006 by Industry Sector. 
Computer software
19%
Semiconductors and electronics
11%
Biotechnology
18%
Healthcare related
12%
Industrial/ Energy
7%
Retailling and Media
9%
Business/ Financial
4%
Communications
14%
Computer hardware and 
Services
6%
Computer software Semiconductors and electronics Biotechnology
Healthcare related Industrial/ Energy Retailling and Media
Business/ Financial Communications Computer hardware and Services  
Source Broderick and Heesen, 2007: 12. 
 
The angel investor’s investment preferences correlate with the venture capital 
market’s preference. Figure 4.16 shows what the investment preference is of 
angel investors in the USA. The need for further finance will also have an 
effect on the angel investors' preference and they normally ensure that they 
invest in sectors that are of interest for other investors as well.  
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Figure 4.16 Angel Investors’ Investment Preference. 
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Source: Hudson, 2008: 4. 
  
•  Performance. 
 
Performance measurement may be very difficult because of various external 
factors influencing the performance of a venture at any given time. 
Performance per stage has to be measured and, therefore, the internal rate of 
return (IRR) method is used. This method measures the actual return and 
excludes all the external factors that could influence the performance. Figures 
4.17 and 4.18 reflect the performance of private equity funds in the USA and 
in the United Kingdom.  
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Figure 4.17 Performance of Private Equity Funds in the USA. 
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Figure 4.18 Performance of Private Equity Funds in the United Kingdom. 
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Figures 4.17 and 4.18 clearly indicate the perceived risk and low returns that 
may be expected from the venture capital market in the early stages of 
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investment. This assertion is, however, not totally true, because the role of 
angel investors and consequently the role of the investor in transferring skills 
and knowledge are excluded. The average IRR that angel investors achieve in 
these early stages is 27% as researched by Wiltbank and Boeker (2007: 3 to 
9). The effect of the transfer of knowledge and skills, proper due diligence, 
relationship of investor to industry and the involvement of venture capital 
investment combined with angel investing is shown in figures 4.19 to 4.23.  
 
Figure 4.19 Distribution of Returns by Venture Investments. 
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 Source: Wiltbank and Boeker, 2007: 3. 
 
The risk of venture investment will be reduced whilst the return expected 
would be increased by spending time and money on a thorough due diligence. 
The expected return on a low due diligence, or downscaled due diligence, is 
1.1 times, an internal rate of return of 6 to 8%, with an exit period of 3.4 
years. The multiples, which are defined as the multiple of the investment 
received on exit, imply that a certain internal rate of return, as per table 4.5, 
will be achieved over a specific period of time (Echarri and Coller, 2007: 1 
and Coller Capital, 2007). 
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 Table 4.5 Internal Rate of Return per Multiple. 
 
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN 
Multiple 0.5X 1.25X 1.5X 1.75X 2X 2.5X 3X 4X 5X 6X 7X 8X 10X
Year 2 -29 12 22 32 41 58 73 100 124 145 165 183 216
3 -21 8 14 21 26 36 44 59 71 82 91 100 115
4 -16 6 11 15 19 26 32 41 50 57 63 68 78
5 -13 5 8 12 15 20 25 32 38 43 48 52 58
6 -11 4 7 10 12 16 20 26 31 35 38 41 47
7 -9 3 6 8 10 14 17 22 26 29 32 35 39
8 -8 3 5 7 9 12 15 19 22 25 28 30 33
9 -7 3 5 6 8 11 13 17 20 22 24 26 29
10 -7 2 4 6 7 10 12 15 17 20 21 23 26
 
Source: Coller Capital, 2007.  
 
Should a thorough due diligence be done, spending more than 40 hours per 
due diligence, then the overall multiple will increase to 5.9 times in a 4.1 year 
period, with an IRR of 57%.  The execution of a thorough due diligence is a 
critical factor in reducing the risk of the investment. Figure 4.20 shows the 
effect of a thorough due diligence. (Wiltbank and Boeker, 2007: 5) 
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Figure 4.20 The Impact of Time in Due Diligence. 
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Source: Wiltbank and Boeker, 2007: 5.  
 
The investor’s participation through mentoring, coaching, financial 
monitoring and making connections after making the investment is 
significantly related to the venture’s outcome. The involvement measured is at 
a high at once to twice a month and on a low at once or twice a year, and the 
impact of the high and low participation is shown in figure 4.21 below. The 
impact of participation is not only restricted to angel investing, but follows 
through to later stage investment as well. Sharing the investor’s skills and 
knowledge with the venture and its management team will increase their 
average return from 1.3 times in a 3.6 year period, an IRR of 6%, to 3.7 times 
in a 4 year period, an IRR of about 41%. (Wiltbank and Boeker, 2007: 7)   
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Figure 4.21 The Impact of Participation (mentoring, board and financial 
monitoring). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Wiltbank and Boeker, 2007: 7. 
     
The angel investor and for any other investor who wishes to ensure the 
success of his investment will invest within the areas of industry of his or 
members of his group’s expertise. Focusing on a single industry or on a 
particular product will simplify their due diligence and also ensure that the 
investor would have the necessary knowledge to share. The investor would 
have the ability to execute a more insightful evaluation of the factors critical 
to the success of a new venture. Figure 4.22 shows the impact on the exit 
multiples should an investor invest in the industry he knows. The expected 
exit multiples will increase from 1.3 times, an IRR of 8%, if the investor has a 
low knowledge of the industry to 3.7 times in a 4 year period, an IRR of about 
41%, when the investor has a high degree of knowledge of the industry. 
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Figure 4.22 Relationship to Industry Expertise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Wiltbank and Boeker, 2007: 6.  
 
4.5 Recent Trends and Developments in the United States of America. 
 
Sohl and Rosenberg, 2003, researched the trends in the USA angel and venture capital 
markets after and before the 2000 investment bubble-burst. Their research started in the 
10 years prior to the burst and followed on thereafter. Their findings are critical in the 
evaluation of any angel and venture capital investment today, and the planning ahead. 
 
The venture capital markets, with the emerging hard drive market, became very hot with 
a growth from $49 million in 1976 to $4.6 billion in 1986. In the same period the angel 
investment market was estimated at $10 billion with close to 30 000 start-ups at the peak. 
The buoyant stock markets attracted even more investments and more venture capitalists 
and angel investors entered the market. The majority of angel investors and venture 
capitalists entering the market had little to no experience in either the industry or the 
investment market and could not add any value to their investments through the transfer 
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investment funds drove up valuations and subsequent deal prices to unrealistic levels. 
The high risk of the overvaluation and the increased size of investments encouraged the 
venture capital industry to seek safety in later stage and larger deals. The due diligence 
process that should have been done was downscaled with one aim and that was to get the 
funds invested. Angel investors provided the start-up capital needed by the new ventures 
and fulfilled the need in the market. Traditionally, however, angel investors were 
operating quietly as a relatively unknown entity until the seminal paper published in 1983 
by William Wentzel, who recognised their unique contributions to the financing of high 
growth entrepreneurial ventures. (Sohl and Rosenberg, 2003: 7 – 8) 
 
All the factors mentioned above led to the overheating of the market to the extent that 
ever increasing amounts of funds were needed to fund the needs of the ventures, whilst 
the returns on these investments decreased rapidly. Venture capital firms started to use 
their available funds to bridge portfolio companies' need for extra funding rather than 
adding new firms to their portfolio. The unsustainable trends of high returns eventually 
returned to normality in 2000 and 2001, but not before there were devastating effects in 
the market. In California, Silicon Valley experienced 4000 job losses per month. The 
local unemployment rate jumped from 1.3% to 6.6% in a year. (Sohl and Rosenberg, 
2003: 10 - 11). Many lessons were learned from the above experience during this period, 
and will be dealt with in section 4.5.1 
 
4.5.1 Lessons from the 2000 Market Collapse.  
 
The most important lessons learned, as researched by Sohl and Rosenberg (2003:16 - 18), 
regarding the 2000 market collapse are as follows: 
 
• The new VC funds started and the need for new fund managers added to a 
layer of inexperience in a market filled with uncertainty.  
 
• The new participants had no experience of downturns and did not realise 
that this could happen. 
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• Many of the new entrants had garnered their wealth from public equity 
deal making, rather than cutting their teeth in the private equity markets or 
the more traditional angel route of cashed-out entrepreneurs. Public sector 
experience does not fare well in the vagaries of the private equity market 
for the following reasons: 
o Illiquidity – funding gap; the venture always needs more 
money than anticipated. Please see figure 4.23. 
o Lack of financial data. A financial history, street wise 
knowledge, on which to base forecasts and the absence of 
audited financial data was a problem.  
 
Figure 4.23 The Funding Gap. 
 
 
Source: Sohl and Rosenberg, 2003: 11. 
 
• As more and more money flowed into venture capital funds, $100m deals 
became the norm. The following mistakes were consequently made: 
o The large investment funds lacked the “strike force” mentality 
to concentrate on the industry sector they knew best. 
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o There was pressure to invest funds in sectors of which the 
investors had little or no experience.  
o With the larger funds and the increase in the number of deals, 
the value added dimension became less prominent. Venture 
capitalists were stretched thinly across several portfolio 
companies. 
 
• As companies rushed to second rounds of private equity financing, the 
value added start-up business experience of angel investors became 
discounted. Research indicated that business experience provided by 
angels is considered by the majority of entrepreneurs just as important as 
the capital provided by the angels. The angel’s value added was 
diminished through the rapid influx of new investors, at precisely the time 
that the entrepreneur and the new management team needed this valuable 
advice. 
 
• Along with the shorter time scale between external equity rounds, the 
entire line from start-up to exit was abbreviated. The patience associated 
with the angel investment process disappeared. Companies were built up 
by the entrepreneurs, VC and angel investors for an exit, rather than 
continuing to build a solid company. Lacking a clear business model and a 
path to profitability, many of the brightest and well-educated MBAs 
brought into the venture as the management team, lacked the foresight to 
recognise the inherent flaws in the underlying business model. 
  
• The inherent high failure rate in high growth ventures was overlooked by 
many novice and experienced investors. The rule to only invest what one 
can afford to lose was replaced by the dreams of capital gain multiples 
never witnessed before.  
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• Venture capital firms are interested in high returns and left the 
development of innovation behind. Innovation is the core of venture 
capitalism and this was ignored for chasing the dream of high returns. 
(Sohl and Rosenberg, 2003: 8 to 13) and (Stuck and Weingarten, 2004: 1 
to 3) 
 
• The Funding Gap.  
The financial theory is predicated on the assumption of efficient capital 
markets with fully informed buyers and sellers and low transaction costs. 
The markets are not perfect and these market imperfections, prevalent in 
the informal venture capital market, lead to two types of market 
inefficiencies, collectively referred to as the funding gap.  
 
o Capital Gap. – This exists between the needs of early stage 
ventures and the suppliers of early stage capital. High growth 
ventures need patient, value added equity capital to fuel growth. In 
efficient markets the ventures receive all the capital needed and 
there are always funds available. This is not true of the real 
markets. The high tech market is littered with promising 
entrepreneurial ventures that do not receive the critical capital 
needed to move promising technology from the laboratory to the 
market place.  
 
o Information Gap – An efficient market implies an open and timely 
flow of reliable information concerning financing sources and 
investment opportunities. In the formal venture capital market, 
with the suppliers of capital seeking a degree of anonymity, there 
is often some conflict with the need to maintain quality deal flows, 
whilst information flows very inefficiently.  
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The capital and information inefficiency results in two substantial 
funding gaps in the private equity market (see figure 4.24). The first 
gap occurs primarily in the seed and start-up financing stage and is a 
result of both capital and information inefficiencies. Sohl and 
Rosenberg, (2003: 8 to 13) indicates that angel investors provide close 
to 80% of the seed and start-up capital for high tech entrepreneurial 
ventures in the USA. The role of angels is critical and proof is found in 
the lack of attention afforded to this seed and start-up stages by the 
venture capital industry. The second market gap occurs in the early 
stage of equity financing. As the venture capital industry progressed to 
larger and later stage financing, and the informal market remained 
active below US$2m, a capital gap in the US$2m to US$5m range had 
developed. Venture capital funds wish to invest large amounts, while 
angel investors concentrate on smaller amounts. Consequently nobody 
services the needs between the above two.  
 
Figure 4.24 Funding Gap and Secondary Funding Gap. 
 
 
  Source: Sohl and Rosenberg, 2003:14. 
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Entrepreneur’s search for capital and funding is time-consuming which 
indicate that many opportunities are missed by the entrepreneur. The 
capital and information gap could well cause the failure of ventures 
because of a lack of sufficient funding. (Sohl and Rosenberg, 2003:16 
to 18) 
 
4.6 Conclusion. 
 
The success of venture capital investment, including angel investment, depends on many 
factors. The investment market changed over the years as indicated in figures 2.1 to 2.3 
with a further change when private equity investing came about. Venture capital investors 
now prefer larger and later stage investments, whilst the angel investors supply the 
funding for the smaller and early stage investments. The angel investors are normally 
wealthy individuals who used to be involved in entrepreneurial companies and now want 
to invest not only their own money, but also their knowledge and skills in newly formed 
companies. Venture capital investors are normally wary of becoming involved with 
newly formed companies and prefer later stage companies because they are typically fund 
managers with little or no experience as entrepreneurs. The role of angel investors is only 
officially recognised in the USA. The lack of recognition of angel investors in the United 
Kingdom and South Africa creates an investment gap in the market leading to an 
increasingly high risk of venture investment.    
 
Private equity companies, including venture capital funded companies, are responsible 
for higher economic growth in the relevant countries described earlier, compared to other 
companies in the economy. Over a period of five years up to 2006 the annual sales in 
private equity companies rose by 9% compared with 7% of the FTSE100 and 5% of the 
FTSE Mid-250 companies. The venture capital backed companies in the USA employed 
over 10.4 million American workers and generated US$2.3 trillion in revenue in 2006. 
The total revenue of venture financed companies comprised 17.6% of the national GDP 
and 9.1% of the USA’s private employment in 2006. Employment grew by an average of 
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5.4% in these companies in Europe while the average employment growth in the 
European Union was 0.7% over a period between 2000 and 2004.  
 
The transfer of skills and knowledge is important to the investees and they rate 
marketing, management recruitment, help with contracts, financial advice and strategic 
direction as the most important contributing terrains. The findings are supported by 
research and are displayed in tables 2.2, 2.4 and figure 4.3. The knowledge and skills of 
the investors vary from the type of investor involved. Angel investors normally dispose 
of a sizeable amount of practical knowledge, whilst the typical venture capitalist is in 
almost all the events a fund manager with virtually no experience and knowledge of 
practically managing and developing a business. The venture success rate can vary 
between 90%, where knowledgeable angel investors and venture capitalists are involved, 
to as low as 20% in the absence of the above knowledge and skills and the presence of 
vulture capitalists. Many factors contribute to an increased success rate of an investment 
of which the most telling factors are a proper due diligence, the funding gap and investing 
in the industry known to the investor. Knowledge and skills of the industry help the 
investor to give the investee a competitive edge over other role players in the same 
industry and to ensure that the new venture would have sufficient funds available to fund 
the venture. Figures 4.20 to 4.22 are graphical presentations of all the factors contributing 
to the success of a venture and the risks involved in the absence thereof.  
 
The lessons learned during the 2000/2001 market burst, with the contributing factors to 
the burst, provide a clear indication that angel investors are a critical part in the 
investment process where knowledge and skills are transferred to the new venture. The 
involvement of the investor with the investee, proper due diligences, industry related 
investment, knowledge of the investment market and funding of the funding gap are 
important lessons learned during this process. The lessons learned were put to use and 
most venture investments are now done in the following manner:  
 
(1)  Realistic projections and deal prices are thoroughly analysed. 
(2)  Angel investors' core values are now implemented. 
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(3)  Angel investors began to assert their role as value added patient investors in 
entrepreneurial ventures. 
(4)  Angel investors continue to invest close to home in order to be close enough to 
render an input.  
(5)  Both entrepreneurs and investors are striving to build companies with real value 
and sustainable growth. 
(6)  Investors concentrate on an excellent management team and not such excellent 
ideas, rather than the reverse. 
(7)  Investments are used to develop high risk technologies with a reasonable chance 
of success. 
(8)  Cash flow is now the key to success.  
(9)  The role of government in the private equity market is now as important as ever.  
(Sohl and Rosenberg, 2003:18)    
 
The survey of recent international research as discussed in chapter 4, specifically done in 
the USA and Europe, is shown in the table below. The results address some of the 
question of the South African survey which is indicated likewise. The question number of 
the South African survey to which the results refer to is indicated on the left hand side of 
the table below. 
 
Tabel 4.6 USA and Europe Survey Results. 
 
Questions Description 
Paragraph 
Addressed Result 
5 
 
 
 
Market segments. 
 
 
 
Par 4.3.2, 
Figure 
4.15 
and4.16 
The most popular sectors to invest in 
are computer software, 
semiconductors and electronics, 
healthcare and communication. 
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6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investment stages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Par 4.3.2, 
Figure 4.8 
- 4.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The majority of investments are 
made in the later stages of 
development of an enterprise. The 
earlier stages of development pose a 
higher risk and are avoided. The lack 
of knowledge and skills from the 
investor and the quantity of funds to 
invest create this situation. Contrary 
to the above, Angel investor prefer to 
invest in the earlier stages. 
9 
 
 
Number of 
investments made. 
 
Par 4.3.2, 
Figure 
4.12 
The majority of funds made between 
3 -5 investments per year.  
 
11 
 
 
 
Source of funds. 
 
 
 
Par 4.3.1, 
Figure 4.4 
- 4.6 
 
Majority of the investments originate 
from government agencies, banks, 
pension funds, insurance companies 
and fund of funds. 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Success rate of 
investments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Par 4.3.2, 
Figure 
4.17 - 4.20
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Angel investors experience a much 
higher return on investment in the 
first ten year than private equity and 
venture capital investments. Private 
equity on their turn experiences a 
much higher return in later stage 
investments.  The success rate 
increases if a proper due diligence is 
done. The creation of jobs increased 
in Europe and the USA due to 
venture capital investment. 
18 – 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investor’s 
involvement in 
investee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Par 4.3.2, 
Figure 
4.11 and 
4.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Small percentage investors are 
involved in the matters of the 
portfolio company. Active 
involvement by the investors has a 
positive effect on the success of the 
investment. Private equity investors 
prefer not to involve in the earlier 
stages of investment whilst the angel 
investors prefer to be involved in 
those earlier stages. Low 
involvement by the investor 
increases the risk of failure by the 
investee. 
24 
 
 
Investment in known 
industries. 
 
Par 4.3.2 
and 4.4 
 
Investing in industries known to the 
investor increases the success rate 
of the portfolio companies.  
30 
 
 
 
 
 
Value adding 
activities. 
 
 
 
 
Par 4.2.3, 
Figure 4.3.
 
 
 
 
The most important value adding 
activities from the investor to the 
portfolio company are found to be 
strategic directions, financial advice, 
contracts, management recruitment 
and marketing. 
31 
 
 
 
External director's 
involvement. 
 
 
Par 4.3.2, 
Figure 
4.21  
 
The participation of external directors 
does have a positive effect over the 
long run, on the internal rate of return 
of the portfolio company. 
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32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Excellent idea versus 
complete 
management team. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Par 4.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An investor will rather invest in a 
complete management team and not 
such a excellent idea than in an 
excellent idea and an incomplete 
management team. The risk that an 
incomplete management team poses 
for the investor is just to high. This is 
mainly true for private equity 
investors where their involvement in 
the portfolio companies is restricted. 
45 
 
 
 
 
 
Investing to maximise 
return. 
 
 
 
 
Par 4.4.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Investor normally expects the highest 
possible return on the investments 
made. This policy has a negative 
effect in that development can be 
ignored due to its low return with the 
consequential effects thereof. 
Own composition. 
 
The detail discussion of the results combined with the survey results done in South Africa 
will be discussed in chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
5.1 Introduction. 
 
This chapter briefly sets out the design of the research. A South African survey of 
companies in the venture capital and private equity environment is included in the survey 
done.  
 
5.2 Research Population. 
 
The research population consists of all the companies that are actively involved in private 
equity, venture capital and angel investing in South Africa and that are registered 
members of the Southern African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association. 
 
5.3 Research Sample. 
 
The survey was based on the complete population of the venture capital firms registered 
as members with the Southern African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association 
(SAVCA) as found in the “Private Equity and Venture Capital in SA – 2007 industry 
review”,  compiled by SAVCA (Lünsche, 2007: 42 -121). 
 
5.4 Data Collection. 
 
The data is collected from a survey questionnaire sent to the research sample as described 
in section 5.3 above. An electronic questionnaire was send electronically via e-mail to the 
identified respondents, followed up with another e-mail 14 days after the first e-mail, 
where after the respondents were telephonically asked to complete the questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was completed telephonically in three instances.  
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5.5 Data Interpretation. 
 
The data collected in the survey were compiled in different sub-sectors and interpreted 
and collusions were made. The interpretation of the information gathered was measured 
against the objectives of the study.  
 
5.6 The Survey. 
 
The descriptive survey method is used to gather the information needed. The aim of the 
survey is to determine the importance of the following factors in the transfer of 
knowledge and skills in the investments process, as well as the effect on the success of 
the venture in the South African market. The factors included in the questionnaire are; 
 
• ownership, 
• executive, non executive and external directors, 
• board of directors, 
• CEO, 
• management team, 
• entrepreneur, 
• mentor and mediator, 
• physiological and brain preference tests, and 
• knowledge management. 
 
5.6.1 The Survey Questionnaire. 
  
• The Composition of the Survey Questionnaire. 
 
The survey questionnaire is composed of all the factors excluding production, 
marketing and product development that exert an effect on the success of a venture 
as listed in figure 7.1. The mentioned factors have an indirect or in some instance 
 153
a direct influence on the success of venture capital investment. The questions in 
the questionnaire cover the mentioned important factors and are use to obtain an 
indication from the respondents of their importance in the venture capital process. 
The detail of the composition and operation of the questionnaire will be dealt with 
later in this chapter. The questionnaire (Annexure A) includes: 
 
o The geographic information about the respondent in order to identify the 
respondent, his/her age and whether the respondent would wish to receive 
any feedback. It was also determined whether the respondent is a private 
equity investor, venture capitalist, angel investor or an entrepreneur. 
o An investor’s part with questions regarding the factors mentioned in 
section 5.6 above. The questions cover the venture capital process in line 
with literature survey and the objectives of the study. 
 
• Electronic Questionnaire and Database. 
 
The questionnaire was made available electronically to the respondents. The 
respondents were required to complete the questionnaire online via the Internet. 
On completion and submission of the questionnaire the information was stored 
electronically in a Microsoft Access Database. 
 
An e-mail letter (Annexure B) was sent out to all respondents. The letter 
contained a link to the questionnaire. Submission of the questionnaire was only 
possible if all questions were answered. E-mail addresses were recorded and used 
to ensure that respondents did not submit a response more than once. 
 
• Pre-Testing of the Survey Questionnaire. 
 
The questionnaire was pre-tested and adjusted before it was used in the main 
survey. The respondents were asked to comment on: 
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o The length of the questionnaires, 
o The layout of the questionnaires, 
o Whether the questions are clear and  unambiguous and addresses the 
important issues, 
o Whether the process to submit is easy enough. 
   
5.7 Summary. 
 
The results of the South African electronic survey questionnaire, sent to all the members 
of the Southern African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (SAVCA) as 
described in this chapter, is discussed in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6 DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
6.1 Introduction. 
 
New business development is critical for the growth and development of any economy in 
the world including the South African economy. The involvement of the angel investors, 
venture capitalists and private equity investors determines the success of the investment 
in new business development. The survey was send to all the registered members of the 
Southern African Venture Capital and Private Equity association in order to get the best 
representation of the South African new business investment. Economical growth and job 
creation is dependant on the development of new ventures that imply higher risk. The 
survey concentrated on aspects that determines and influence the success of the venture 
which will consequently reduce the risk of the investment.  
 
6.2 Results of the Survey. 
 
The South African survey was send electronically to 54 registered members of SAVCA 
of which three indicated that they are neither a private equity nor a venture capital 
company. One of the companies is in liquidation and is excluded from the survey. Out of 
the 50 potential respondents, 31, which represents 62%, completed and submitted the 
questionnaire successfully.  In terms of rand value, this represents quantitatively more 
than 60% of the value of the specific investments made in South Africa. One of the 
respondents, Business Partners, contributed 69% of the total number of investments made 
in 2007 (Watkins and Fourie, 2008: 27). The South African private equity and venture 
capital investors concentrate mainly on later stage investments whilst the seed and start-
up companies are only addressed by a few investors as will be indicated later in this 
chapter.  
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6.3 Data Analysis.   
  
The data gathered is analysed and the results are presented in graphs that are compared 
and interpreted in the paragraphs that follow.   
 
6.3.1 Respondents/ Investors. 
 
The respondents to the questionnaire are divided into venture capital and private equity 
investors. The distinction between the two categories are made mainly because it is 
expected that the venture capitalist will concentrate on earlier and later stage ventures 
whilst the private equity investors will concentrate on later stage ventures. The areas that 
the private equity investors normally concentrate on are management buy-outs, mergers 
and acquisitions and leverage buy-outs.  The division is shown in figure 6.1 below. 
 
Figure 6.1 Responses: Private Equity as Opposed to Venture Capital             
Investments. 
71%
29%
Private Equity Investors Venture Capital Investors  
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Of the respondents, 71% is private equity investors as opposed to 29% which is venture 
capitalists. Value that can be added by the investor through the transfer of knowledge and 
skills to the venture and its management team depends on the investors own knowledge 
and skills gathered in the involvement in previous ventures. Many venture capitalists and 
private equity investors have previous entrepreneurial experience as can be seen in figure 
6.2 and 6.3. About 48% of the investors have no previous entrepreneurial experience. The 
possible transfer of knowledge and skills becomes restricted in these cases. 
Entrepreneurial experience is gathered through practical experience where valuable 
knowledge and skills are added to the skills pool of the investor. The years of experience 
indicated in figure 6.3 are mainly investment experience that can not be seen as 
“streetwise” entrepreneurial value adding experience that can add value to the venture 
and its management team.     
 
 Figure 6.2 Previous Entrepreneurial Experiences of Investor. 
52%
48%
Entrepreneurial experience No entrepreneurial experience   
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 Figure 6.3 Investor’s Experience in Years of Involvement. 
0 - 5 years
39%
6 - 10 years
26%
11+ years
35%
 
A further success determining factor in the commitment of an investor to a venture is 
when the investor is prepared to invest his own funds in a venture. About 42% of the 
investors can be seen as fund managers and do not invest their own funds while 58% 
invest some of their own funds in the ventures they invest in, see figure 6.4.   
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 Figure 6.4 Investment of Own Funds. 
58%
42%
Own funds Managed funds
 
The investor must be a campaigned entrepreneur and investor with experience, tacit 
knowledge and commitment, to contribute maximal value to the newly found or 
established venture. At least half the investors have previous experience as an 
entrepreneur, more than 60% as investor for a period longer than five years of which 58% 
are prepared to invest their own funds in the venture in question.   
 
6.3.2 Distribution of Funds over Different Investment Stages. 
 
The investor’s involvement in the different investment stages namely seed, start-up, early 
growth, established and later stage are determined by the type of investor, that is, an 
angel, venture capitalist or private equity investor. The investor’s choice of investment 
stage is determined by the perceived risk, complimented with the knowledge and skills of 
the investor, that the investor is prepared to take. The respondent’s distribution can be 
seen in figure 6.5.  
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Figure 6.5 Distribution of Funds over Different Investment Stages. 
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The respondents who consists mainly of private equity investors and which make up 71% 
of the population as can be seen in figure 6.1, prefer to invest in later stage ventures. 
Figure 6.6 illustrates the distribution of funds between venture capitalists and private 
equity investors.  
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Figure 6.6 Distribution of Funds between Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Investors. 
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Venture capitalists prefer to invest in the early growth and later stages of a venture’s 
development whilst private equity investors prefer established and later stage 
involvement. Angel investors tend to concentrate on the seed and early stages, the 
venture capitalist on the start-up to early growth stages and the private equity investors on 
the established to later stages of a ventures development. Each one of these investor 
groups has a specific role to play in the development of the venture and contributes to the 
success of the venture. The angel investors group is not formalised in South Africa and in 
Europe whilst they are well established in the USA. The absence of the angel investors as 
a formalised investment group gives rise to the slower development of new ventures in 
South Africa and in Europe. The development of new ventures depend totally on own 
funding and funding from family and friends that believe in the entrepreneur and his new 
venture. The importance of all the role players as indicated in figure 2.3 has been 
confirmed and is shown in figure 6.7. The perceived role that each investor group has to 
play is clear in figure 6.7 with the commercial banks that is seen to be less important in 
the development of a venture. The commercial banks are very reluctant to support seed 
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and early stage venture development and if it is supported the commercial banks cover 
their risk through security over tangible assets. The merchant banker’s role is also limited 
to the involvement of leverage or management buy-outs and listing on the stock 
exchange. Venture capital investment is seen in South Africa as a very high risk 
investment that is only done by the brave.  
 
 Figure 6.7 The Importance of Different Investor Groups. 
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The providers of external finance to a venture as seen in figure 6.7 correlate with the 
findings in figure 3.1. Each investor group are prepared to take a different level of risk in 
a venture. Family and friends as well as angel investors are the investor groups that 
believe strongly in the entrepreneur, the jockey, and back the jockey whilst they form part 
of the venture’s development in the founding stages.  
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6.3.3 Investor’s Involvement in the Portfolio Company. 
 
Investors are involved in the portfolio companies on different aspects in the company 
depending on their expertise and the role they accept to play. The main areas of 
involvement that have been included in the survey, are; investor/ shareholder, director of 
the company, non-executive director, external director, appointment of the CEO and 
members of the management team. The role that an investor plays is determined by the 
risk assessment made and the expertise of the investor. In figure 6.8 it is clear that not all 
the investors are actively involved as a shareholder in the ventures they invest in. The 
lack of involvement at the shareholder level indicates that some of the investors are only 
fund managers and operate in the same way as commercial banks where their 
involvement is purely as the provider of finance and not the development of their 
portfolio companies. Investors also prefer to be involved as non-executive directors as 
opposed to directors which allow the investor to have an active knowledge of the venture 
without being involved in the day to day activities of the venture. Venture capitalist 
investors and private equity investors have the same investment strategy as can be seen in 
figure 6.9. The differences between the venture capitalist and the private equity investor 
involvement are mainly at shareholder level, non-executive director and involvement as 
CEO of the company. The venture capitalists tend to be more involved as CEO of the 
venture as opposed to private equity investors, while the private equity investors tend to 
be more involved as investor/shareholder and non executive directors. The private equity 
investors tend to be more involved in the management team of the venture as the venture 
capitalists, which is a clear indication that the private equity investors invest in ventures 
together with a complete management team.  
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 Figure 6.8 Stage of Investor’s Involvement in a Venture. 
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Figure 6.9 Venture Capital versus Private Equity Investor Involvement. 
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The investor’s appointment as a non-executive director exists in 52% of all investments 
made as can be seen in figure 6.8, whilst 39% of the investors always appoint a non-
executive director to represent them, as can be seen in figure 6.10. The non-executive 
director transfers knowledge and skills to the venture’s management team and capacitate 
them. The findings correlate with the findings in figure 2.4. 
 
 Figure 6.10 Appointment of Non-Executive Directors. 
Never, 0%
In some instances, 29%
From time to time, 23%Often, 10%
Always, 39%
 
The appointment of a non-executive director is always considered to a certain extent 
when an investor invests in a venture as can be seen in figure 6.10. Investors reduce their 
risk through their involvement in the selection of the board of directors, CEO and the 
management team as can be seen in figure 6.11. Ensuring that the management team (the 
jockey that must run the company) has the skills, knowledge, track record and the 
experience to run a venture effectively, reduce the investor’s risk. Neither the venture 
capitalist nor the private equity investor will invest in a company with an incomplete 
management team. A later stage venture with an incomplete management team entails a 
high risk.  
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Figure 6.11 Investor’s Involvement in Selections and Appointments of the Board 
of Directors, CEO and the Management team. 
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The investor’s involvement differs from stage to stage of investment as can be seen in 
figures 6.12 to 6.15. Investors are quite actively involved in the day to day and monthly 
activities of a venture in the seed and start up phases. The investor’s involvement 
regarding the operational and management level tend to shift from actively involved on a 
daily and monthly basis to quarterly, six monthly and annual involvements mainly on 
directors’ level and shareholding meetings as can be seen in figure 6.12 to 6.15.  
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 Figure 6.12 Investor’s Involvement in the Seed Phase. 
14% 14%
0%
14% 14%
0%0% 0%
29%
0%
14% 14%
29%
43%
0% 0%
14%
29%
57%
43%
0%
14%
29% 29%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Never Once a year Six monthly Quaterly Monthly Daily
Investor's involvement
Shareholders meetings Directors level Management level Operational level
 
 
 Figure 6.13 Investor’s Involvement in the Start-Up Phase. 
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 Figure 6.14 Investor’s Involvement in the Early Growth Phase.    
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 Figure 6.15 Investor’s Involvement in the Later Stage Phase.   
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The role of the board of directors is seen by 68% of the respondents as a service role (see 
figure 6.16), where advice and expertise are provided to the management team. The 
investor become part of the venture and become the mentor of the venture’s management 
team. In 29% of the instances, investors take control of the venture’s management team 
on behalf of the investors, especially in larger ventures where an established management 
team exist and the control is needed to serve the best interest of the investors. Only 3% of 
the investors tend to be passively involved and allow the venture’s management team to 
proceed as it did before the investment was made. The involvement of these investors is 
merely to fulfil the legal requirements with no input at board level directors and at the 
management level.  
 
 Figure 6.16 The Investor’s Role in the Board of Directors. 
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6.3.4 Management Team. 
 
The quality of the management team of a venture is a determining factor for investment 
in a venture as stated in paragraph 2.5.2. Investors prefer to invest in a venture with a 
complete management team although some investors will invest in a venture with an 
excellent idea and an incomplete management team as can be seen in figure 6.17. Fund 
managers will always prefer to invest in a venture with a complete management team 
while the venture capitalist and the angel investor are prepared to get involved in an 
incomplete management team. The findings correlate with the findings of the research in 
the USA and Europe, see paragraph 4.5, that the risk of an incomplete management team 
poses just too much risk for the later stage investor to accept. The angel investor’s role is 
crucial in the development, management development included, of a venture to the level 
where it will be acceptable for the venture capital, private equity and later stage investors. 
 
Figure 6.17 Investment in an Excellent Idea and an Incomplete Management 
Team. 
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A complete management team is not sufficient if the management team does not have the 
required characteristics. In figure 6.18 the most important characteristic that a 
management team must have is seen to be integrity, followed by motivation, intellectual 
honesty and leadership ability. The comparison of the importance of the different 
characteristics as researched by Hill and Power (2001: 118) and the results of this study 
can be seen in table 2.6 are shown in table 6.1.  
 
 Figure 6.18 Important Characteristics of a Management Team. 
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Table 6.1 Important Characteristics of a Management Team.  
 
MANAGEMENT 
CHARACTERISTICS 
IMPORTANCE 
(Hill and 
Power) 
IMPORTANCE 
(this study) 
Integrity 2 1 
Dedication, 
commitment, passion  
and energy 3 2 
Intellectual honesty Not researched 3 
Leadership ability 7 4 
Vision and ability to 
articulate vision 4 5 
Ability to build a team 7 6 
People smart Not researched 7 
Knowledge, skill 
level, intelligence 5 8 
 
A clear correlation exists between the findings of Hill and Power (2001: 118) and this 
study as indicated in table 6.1. The importance of the knowledge and skills level deviate 
the most and is not seen to be that important in South Africa which is a clear indication 
that the investor is either directly involved in the venture or that the investors are fund 
managers, providers of needed funding, and not necessarily skilled and knowledgeable. 
The investors are usually directly involved in the selection of the management team 
although they rarely replace the management team as indicated in figure 6.19. Replacing 
the management team must only happen in the situation where the team is under-
performing and introduces additional risk that may impact negatively on the success of 
the venture and the investment. Dismissing a team or team member does not necessarily 
increase performance. To the contrary, it might even have a negative effect on the 
performance of the venture, as stated in paragraph 2.5.3. 
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 Figure 6.19 Change of the Management Team by the Investor. 
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In the selection of the management team, the investor and the other shareholders will 
have to consider the possibility of appointing a team member with more tacit knowledge 
than explicit (book) knowledge. Although the specific situation will dictate to the 
shareholders, it is found that in 29% of the cases the investors will never prefer somebody 
with explicit knowledge above somebody with tacit knowledge, and in 52% of the cases 
will only do the former in specific instances (see figure 6.20). It is clear in figure 6.20 
that investors prefer someone that is “streetwise” and believe that such a team member 
will add much more value to the venture than a member with only explicit knowledge.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 174
Figure 6.20 Appointment of a Management Team Member with Explicit as 
Opposed to Tacit Knowledge. 
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The success of the management team is determined by the characteristics mentioned in 
figure 6.18 but also in the ability to work as a team, cohesively achieving the stated goals. 
In figure 6.21, 97% of the respondents valued the ability to work cohesively as an 
important to extremely important ability of the management team. Cohesiveness can only 
be achieved if the personalities of the members of the management team are compatible. 
However, in figure 6.22 16% of the respondents did not deem compatibility to be 
important or of minor importance. Leadership and the ability of the CEO to manage the 
different personalities can be enhanced by the use of brain preference or psychometric 
test. The use of these tests is not common in South Africa as can be seen in figure 6.23. 
The results shown in figure 6.23 contradict the importance of working cohesively and the 
compatibility of personalities as seen in figure 6.21 and 6.22.  
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 Figure 6.21 Importance of Working Cohesively. 
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Figure 6.22 Importance of Personality Compatibility. 
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Figure 6.23 Importance of Psychometric and Brain Preference Tests. 
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The cohesiveness between members of the management team can further be enhanced by 
the use of a mediator. The respondents do not agree with this statement and only 3% use 
mediators on a regular basis while a further 26% use it from time to time as can be seen 
in figure 6.24. The respondents appreciate the role that a mentor can sometimes play in a 
venture to enhance cohesiveness and capacitate the management team with the transfer of 
knowledge and skills (see figure 6.25). The respondents are mainly investors in later 
stage ventures as can be seen in figure 6.5, with complete management teams, where the 
need for mediators and mentor are not that eminent. 
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 Figure 6.24 Need for a Mediator. 
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 Figure 6.25 Need for a Mentor.     
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6.3.5 Investment.   
 
The investment process does not only consist out of the provision of funding but involve 
important value adding activities which determine the success of the venture. The ranking 
of the findings in the South African research differs from the research done by De Noble, 
Ehrlich and Moore (1994:75) as can be seen in table 3.2. Monitoring financial 
performance, acting as a sounding board and monitoring operating performances are the 
most important activities in the South African research (see figure 6.2.6) whilst the 
interface with the investor group, obtaining alternative equity finance and monitoring 
financial performances, in this order, is seen to be the most important value adding 
activities for venture capitalist in the USA (see table 3.2). Obtaining alternative equity 
finance is seen as the least important value adding activity in South Africa while it is seen 
by the venture capitalist in the USA as the second most and by the angel investors in the 
USA as the sixth most important value adding activity. The South African investors 
market concentrate much more on the control and monitoring activities than their 
counterparts in the USA.  
 
 Figure 6.26 Importance of Value Adding Activities. 
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Table 6.2 Importance of Value Adding Activities. 
 
  
Ranking of value adding activities (1 = most 
important,     7 = least important) 
Value adding 
activities 
Venture capital 
funded 
entrepreneurs - 
USA 
Angel 
investment 
funded 
entrepreneurs - 
USA 
Value adding 
activities in 
South Africa 
Monitor financial 
performance 3 2 1 
Sounding board 4 3 2 
Monitor operating 
performance 5 5 3 
Formulate business 
strategy 6 4 4 
Assistance in short 
term problems Not researched Not researched 5 
Interface with 
investor groups 1 1 6 
Providing contacts 
with key customers 
and prospects Not 
researched Not researched 7 
 
The importance of the monitoring and controlling activities is a clear indication that the 
investors in South Africa are more private equity investors than true venture capitalist 
and angel investors. The majority of the investments made are large investments 
exceeding R10 million while only 19% of the investments made are less than R2 million 
as can be seen in figure 6.27. The larger investments support the above statement 
regarding the nature of the investments made. 
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 Figure 6.27 Average Amount Invested per Investor in a Portfolio Company. 
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  Figure 6.28 illustrates that the majority of the investors prefer to invest in less than 5 
investments per year, while a small percentage are prepared to invest in 6 to 15 ventures 
per year and an even smaller percentage is prepared to invest in more than 30. The same 
tendency as in South Africa is to be found in the USA and Europe as can be seen in 
figure 4.12.  
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 Figure 6.28 Number of Investments Made per Investor per Year. 
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Investments have a curing period that is normally expected to be 5 years and longer. The 
investment needs time to reach its optimum value before an investor should part with his 
investment. The majority of South African investors want to exit their investment before 
the end of year five, see figure 6.29, of which 6% part with their investments in a venture 
before the end of year three. The return on the investment increases the longer an 
investment is maintained as can be seen in figure 4.17 – 4.19. 
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 Figure 6.29 Average Time before Exit. 
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A very high rate of successful ventures is maintained in South Africa. More than 60% of 
the investments made have an 80% and above success rate, as can be seen in figure 6.30. 
The high success rate is a factor of good control, see table 6.2 and the preference of 
investors are to invest in the industry known to them, see figure 6.31. The research done 
in the USA support this finding as can be seen in figure 4.22. Investment in the industry 
known to the investor enhances the returns achieved due to the fact that the investor is 
capable of and can be actively involved in the transfer of knowledge and skills to the 
management team. The high success rate is due to the nature of investment and 
investment stages that the investors are prepared to invest in.  
 
The high South African success rate is not a true reflection of the total venture capital 
market due to the fact that the investors are mainly later stage investors where success is 
almost guaranteed. New venture investment rarely happens whilst the investors cover 
their risk through tangible securities taken. The results are therefore cluttered and the true 
success rate is disguised.     
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 Figure 6.30 Success Rate per Investment Made. 
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 Figure 6.31 Investment in Industry Known to the Investor. 
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Investors tend to decline investments if the investment amount is too small or smaller 
than what they prefer to invest in (see figure 6.32). Opportunities are lost in this process 
and a good venture with a lower funding need can be ignored whilst it might be the best 
investment opportunity available. It is important to determine the value of the venture 
through the due diligence process and not only through the funding needed. Investors 
may also sometimes decline an investment if he/she can not get control of the board or 
get at least managing control through a 51% shareholding stake. The absolute need for 
control is not only a protection or a way to transfer risk, but may ultimately be labled as 
“vulture capitalism” where the investor wants to control at all cost due to the financial 
powers available to him/her. The equity stake taken up by the investor should be a 
function of the expected return, within which the risk is factored in. This principle is 
normally ignored in the South African market as can be seen in figure 6.33.  
 
 Figure 6.32 Declining an Investment. 
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 Figure 6.33 Equity Stake as a Function of Expected Return. 
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6.3 Conclusion. 
 
The research population consists mainly out of private equity investors due to the under 
developed angel investor and venture capital markets in South Africa. Private equity 
investors as well as venture capitalists are predominately fund managers which is visible 
in the results of the survey done. A summary of the results of the South African survey is 
shown in table 6.3. Chapter seven will deal with the conclusion of the findings in chapter 
6 after which recommendations for further studies will be made. 
 
Table 6.3 Summary of the South African Survey Results. 
 
Questions Description 
Paragraph 
Addressed Result 
4 
 
Respondents. 
                                             
Par 6.2.1, 
Figure 6.1 
Private equity investors - 71%, venture 
capitalists 29%. 
6 
 
 
 
Investment stages. 
 
 
 
Par 6.2.2, 
Figure 6.5 
and 6.6. 
 
The majority of the investments are made in 
the later stages of development of the venture. 
The earlier stages are not popular due to the 
perceived risk involve. 
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7 
 
 
 
Investor's involvement. 
 
 
 
Par 6.2.3, 
Figure 6.8 
and 6.9 
 
The two most important areas of involvement 
that the investor has is the role of 
investor/shareholder and non-executive 
director. 
8 
 
 
Average invested per 
investor in a portfolio 
company. 
Par 6.2.5, 
Figure 
6.27 
The majority of the investments are large 
investments common to private equity and 
later stage investors. 
9 
 
 
Number of investments 
per investor per year. 
 
Par 6.2.5, 
Figure 
6.28 
The majority of the investors to restrict their 
investment to less than five investments per 
year. 
10 
 
Own successful venture. 
 
Par 6.2.1, 
Figure 6.2 
Own successful venture 52%, no 
entrepreneurial experience 48%. 
11 
 
Source of funds. 
 
Par 6.2.1, 
Figure 6.4 
58% of the investors invest some of their own 
funds in the ventures being invested in. 
12 
 
 
Average time before exit. 
 
 
Par 6.2.5, 
Figure 
6.29 
Investors are prepared to wait for the 
investment to cure although 6% of the 
investors want to exit in a period of 3 years. 
13 
 
 
Success rate of 
investments made. 
 
Par 6.2.5, 
Figure 
6.30 
A very high success rate is maintained in 
South Africa. More than 50% of investments 
made have a better than 80% success rate. 
14 
 
Experience as investor. 
 
Par 6.2.1, 
Figure 6.3 
0 to 5 years 39%, 6 to 10 years 26%, 11+ 
years 35%. 
16 
 
 
Equity stake as a function 
of expected return. 
 
Par 6.2.5, 
Figure 
6.33 
The equity stake is in most cases not a 
function of the expected return.  
 
18 – 21 
 
 
 
 
 
Investor's involvement in 
the venture.  
 
 
 
 
Par 6.2.3, 
Figure 
6.12 - 6.15
 
 
 
Investors tend to be more directly involved in 
the day to day activities of a venture in the 
seed, start-up and early stages of the 
venture’s development than in the later stages. 
The investor’s contribution in the earlier stages 
is critical for the success of the venture. 
21 
 
 
 
Investor's involvement in 
the selection of directors, 
CEO and management 
team. 
Par 6.2.3, 
Figure 
6.11 
 
Investors reduce their risk through their 
involvement in the selection process, in order 
to ensure that capable people are appointed.  
 
23 
 
 
Investor's role in the board 
of directors. 
 
Par 6.2.3, 
Figure 
6.16 
Investors prefer to be actively involved in the 
board of directors where the board renders a 
supportive role to the management team. 
24 
 
 
 
Investment in industry 
known to investor. 
 
 
Par 6.2.5, 
Figure 
6.31 
 
Investors prefer to invest in industries known 
to them. The investor's ability to contribute to a 
venture is also higher if the investment is in the 
industry known to them. 
27 
 
 
 
 
 
Declining an investment. 
 
 
 
 
 
Par 6.2.5, 
Figure 
6.32 
 
 
 
Investment will often be declined because the 
investment amount is too small, while an 
investment will in lesser cases be declined 
because the investor can not get at least 51% 
shareholding control or control of the board of 
directors. 
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28 
 
 
 
External and non-
executive directors. 
 
 
Par 6.2.3, 
Figure 
6.10 
 
The non-executive director is seen to 
contribute valuable support to the venture and 
its management team, and is always 
appointed in 39% of the cases. 
30 
 
 
Value adding activities. 
 
 
Par 6.2.5, 
Figure 
6.26  
Monitoring financial performance, acting as a 
sounding board and monitoring operating 
performances are the most important activities.  
32 
 
 
Excellent idea versus 
complete management 
team. 
Par 6.2.4, 
Figure 
6.17 
The risk of an incomplete management team 
poses just too much risk for the later stage 
investor.  
33 
 
 
Brain preference / 
psychometric tests. 
 
Par 6.2.4, 
Figure 
6.23 
The use of these test as an indication in the 
appointment of a management team member 
are rarely used. 
35 
 
 
 
Importance of a 
management team 
member’s personality 
compatibility. 
Par 6.2.4, 
Figure 
6.22 
 
The importance of personality compatibility is 
not seen to be important. 
 
 
36 
 
 
Importance of working 
cohesively. 
 
Par 6.2.4, 
Figure 
6.22 
The success of a management team is 
determined by the team's ability to work 
cohesively. 
37 
 
 
Replacement of the 
management team. 
 
Par 6.2.4, 
Figure 
6.19 
Investors are involved in the selection of the 
management team but rarely replace the 
management team in full. 
38 
 
 
Need for a mediator. 
 
 
Par 6.2.4, 
Figure 
6.24 
The use of a mediator is not seen to be that 
important in a management team scenario. 
  
39 
 
 
Need for a mentor. 
 
 
Par 6.2.4, 
Figure 
6.25 
The role of a mentor enhances the ventures 
ability to be successful. 
 
40 
 
 
 
Important characteristics 
of a management team. 
 
 
Par 6.2.4, 
Figure 
6.18 
 
The most important characteristic that a 
management team must have is integrity 
followed by motivation, intellectual honesty 
and leadership ability. 
43 
 
 
Management team 
member's knowledge 
levels. 
Par 6.2.4, 
Figure 
6.20 
Investors and shareholders will rather appoint 
a management team member with tacit than 
explicit knowledge. 
44 
 
 
Importance of different 
investment groups. 
 
Par 6.2.2, 
Figure 6.7 
 
All the investment groups have a role to play in 
the development of the venture with the 
venture capital group as the most important 
 
The South African venture capital market is mainly a later stage investment market that 
discounts their risk through tangible securities taken in the investment process. 
Investments made are large amounts in well-established ventures with complete 
management teams where the investor’s involvement is restricted to control and ensuring 
that the venture complies too the expectation of the providers of the funds. Most of the 
investors prefer to take control of the venture through shareholding and directorships with 
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the main intention to maximise their return. The South African market concentrates much 
more on control and monitoring as their counterpart in the USA. The USA market is a 
matured market where the investors will not be as involved in the day to day management 
of the venture as is the case in South Africa. The USA investors concentrate much more 
on the strategic management and assistance of a venture than the direct control thereof.   
 
Venture capital is defined by Benjamin and Margus (2001: 7) as the business of building 
business, an aspect that is neglected in South Africa. The investors are mainly later stage 
investors that are not interested in the seed, start-up and early stage development of 
ventures. The creation of new ventures and the financing of such ventures as well as other 
SME’s are neglected and in most cases ignored. Economic growth and job creation are 
neglected in the process.  
 
Angel investors that prefer to be involved in the earlier stages of the development of a 
venture is not formalised in South Africa and exist only on an informal basis. The 
absence, or near absence, of angel investors restrict new business development, and 
therefore economical growth, in South Africa.  
 
The investors in South Africa are mainly fund managers with little, if any, previous 
entrepreneurial or private sector experience that restricts the investors to transfer 
knowledge and skills to the venture invested in. The investor’s main interest is the return 
on his investment.  
 
In conclusion it can be said that the South African venture capital market as defined by 
Barlett (1988: 2) and Benjamin as well as Margus (2001: 7) is still an incomplete 
investment market that concentrates mainly on later stage investments through fund 
managers.  
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CHAPTER 7  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
STUDY. 
 
7.1 Introduction. 
 
New business development is one of the most important contributors to economic 
growth, job creation and economic prosperity of any country. The successful creation of 
new ventures is a difficult process with many risks involved. The reward of a successful 
venture is such that many investors are prepared to accept a certain level of risk in the 
hope of achieving high returns on their capital invested. Many different aspects 
contributing to the success of a new venture and specifically the importance of the 
transfer of knowledge and skills in the investment process, was researched. Venture 
capital investment in the broader term, including angel investing, venture capital and 
private equity investment, is important contributors to economical growth and prosperity. 
Venture capital is seen to be a very risky way of investment where the risk can be 
reduced through the active involvement of the investor in the transferring of knowledge 
and skills during the investment process. The investor is not only a provider of funds but 
also the provider of knowledge and skills to assist the venture to become successful.    
 
7.2 Conclusion 
 
The main objective of this study was to determine the impact of the transfer of 
knowledge and skills by the investor to the investee on the success of the angel and 
venture capital investments, internationally and in South Africa. The venture capital and 
private equity market is a very young investment market in South Africa whiles the angel 
investors market, although it exists, is not formalised. Internationally and especially in 
the USA these markets are well developed and clearly illustrates the success rate of 
ventures in this country. The rest of the world followed in the footsteps of the venture 
capital markets in the USA, with the USA being the leader in this field. Venture capital is 
not a new way of the investment, not even in South Africa seeing that companies like 
ABSA Bank, Sanlam and Liberty Life was formed and funded in a true venture capital 
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manner. Research done determining the reason for success of investments in new 
ventures normally concentrate on financial aspects, product related aspects and 
marketing. The non-financial aspects determining the success of the ventures are seen by 
the investors to be important but are normally left to the management team to resolve.  
 
The main objective is achieved and the research done supports the objective that the 
success of a venture is achieved through non-financial aspects that can be contributed to 
the transfer of knowledge and skills during the investment process. The literature 
research indicated that the investor’s role entail much more than just providing funding 
where the transfer of  knowledge and skills, “streetwise” knowledge, is determined in the 
success of any venture. Figure 7.1 summarised the important aspects that determine the 
success of the investments made. 
 
Figure 7.1 The Successful Investment Process. 
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The venture development process requires that the entrepreneur at first begins his new 
venture through the help of family and friends that believe in his project after which the 
angel investors, venture capitalists/private equity investors, commercial banks and 
merchant bankers get involved. Each one of these investors have a specific contribution 
to make in the development of a venture, lacking will lead to a higher probability of 
failure of the venture.  The angel investors market is formalised in the USA but are 
lacking in the rest of the world.  
 
The entrepreneurial knowledge of the investor and the involvement of investment funds, 
identifying the high returns in the angel and venture capital markets as a target, force the 
investor to invest in later stage investments rather than early or seed phases. The venture 
capital and later stage investors prefer to make less but bigger investments, later stage 
investments give the investor the opportunity to be involved as a shareholder/investor and 
as a non-executive director without being directly involved in other matters of the 
venture. The venture capitalist in the USA concentrates more on the support of the 
venture through their interface with the investment group, obtaining of equity finance, 
monitoring of financial performances acting as a sounding board, monitoring operating 
performances and formulation of the business strategy, while the South African investors 
concentrate more on the control of the venture than on the support functions. The high 
emphasis on control is a clear indication that most of the South African respondents are 
fund managers and not seasoned entrepreneurs. The investment risk increases as some of 
the important role players, as indicated in figure 7.1, are omitted from the investment 
process. The attractiveness of an investment is then based purely on the availability of an 
opportunity. The absence of the different role players creates a lack of knowledge and 
skills in the venture which could be detrimental for the venture. Figure 7.2 indicates the 
expected investment process when the investor and the entrepreneur do not appreciate the 
importance of transferring knowledge and skills to the new venture.   
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Figure 7.2 The High Risk Investment Process. 
 
 
The ability of investors to transfer knowledge and skills is enhanced through the 
preference to invest in industries known to the investors. Previous knowledge of the 
industry helps the investor to make prompt, correct decisions and add value to the 
venture’s management team.    
 
A complete management team is preferred by all investors although many opportunities 
will go astray if the investor ignores the opportunity and only concentrates on the 
management team. The investor’s ability to identify shortcomings in the management 
structure is an important value adding activity. The quality and ability of the management 
team can further be enhanced by ensuring that the management’s personalities are 
compatible. Strong leadership and a mediator will enhance cohesiveness and the 
implementation of psychometric/ brain preference tests in order to use the managers in 
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the correct portfolios. The tendency in South Africa to get control of the venture leans to 
vulture capitalism that will lead to the entrepreneur losing interest and initiative. 
Shareholding should be divided according to equitable expectations. 
 
The main objective was achieved and supported by the research done in the USA and 
South Africa. The effect of the transfer of knowledge and skills is further supported by 
the effect on the long term return. The transfer of knowledge and skills and active 
participation increases the expected IRR.  The findings are also supported by the 
literature research done in chapter 2 and 3 indicating important elements needed to 
enhance the venture’s chances of success. Transfer of knowledge and skills do increase 
the success of ventures as found by an Italian businessman, Carmelo Pistorio, operating 
in Singapore, who is an angel investor with hands-on entrepreneurial experience to guide 
his seed companies. Pistorio has a 90% success rate in the ventures in which he invested; 
far above the normal accepted average of about 20 to 40%. 
 
Information was gathered through literature review and supported by recent research 
done in the USA and Europe. The information gathered in this study was evaluated and 
used in the formalisation of the factors determining the success of a venture. The 
gathering of the information and eventual evaluation confirms that the transfer of 
knowledge and skills are important factors determining the success of a venture.  
 
The investor’s role is not only one of funding, but also one of providing knowledge and 
skills to the venture and its management team. The marginalisation of the investor’s role 
enhances the risk of investment in new ventures which has a detrimental economical 
growth effect in any country in the world. Especially for South Africa as an emerging 
economy, successful ventures are a prerequisite for sustainable economic growth and job 
creation. 
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7.3 Recommendations for Further Research. 
  
The following recommendations from the research done in this study may briefly be 
outlined as follows: 
 
Further research may be undertaken to formalise the angel investor/angel investing 
process for South Africa. The process needs to be researched and a model for the angel 
investment process must be established. In addition to this, guidelines for the transfer of 
knowledge in the investment process may also contribute to the success rate of new 
ventures. 
 
Further research may include a survey of successful small to medium enterprises to 
determine the factors that made them successful. As an emerging economy South Africa 
needs new business and the success of establishing a new business must compete with 
developed countries such as America.  
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SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE:  
IMPORTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS TRANSFER IN THE VENTURE 
CAPITAL AND ANGEL INVESTING PROCESS 
THIS PAGE ALLOWS ACCESS TO THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE:  
  
It will take about 5 to 7 minutes to complete the questionnaire. 
  
After completing the questionnaire please submit by clicking on the SUBMIT button.  
   
   
• Private Equity, Venture 
Capital and Angel 
Investing Process 
  
  
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME! 
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SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE: IMPORTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS 
TRANSFER IN THE PRIVATE EQUITY, VENTURE CAPITAL AND ANGEL 
INVESTING PROCESS 
 
  
Personal details: 
1       Company name:
    Respondent name:
     Age: 
    Address line 1:
    Address line 2:
  Address line 3:
  Area code:
  E-mail address:
  Telephone numbers:
2 Do you want a summary of the survey results:
3 May we contact you if we have further questions:
  
Question 4:    How will you classify yourself or your company? 
  
 
  
Question 5:    In which of the following market segments do you operate? 
Communication (Telecommunication) Information technology Electronics
Biotechnology and medicine Energy Agriculture
Consumer related products Transportation Industrial products
Chemicals and materials Industrial automation Professional services
Other:  
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Question 6:    In which stage of investment are you involved? 
Seed 
capital Start up 
Early 
growth Established 
Later 
stage 
  
  
Question 7:    What is your role in portfolio companies? 
Investor/shareholder Director
Non executive director External director
Chief executive officer Member of the management team
Other  
  
Question 8:    What is the average amount (in Rand) that you would spend in a portfolio 
company? 
 
  
Question 9:    What number of investments do you make in a calendar year? 
 
  
Question 10:    Have you had your own successful venture before? 
 
  
Question 11:    Do you invest your own funds? 
 
  
Question 12:    What is the average time before you exit? 
 
  
Question 13:    What is the average success rate of investments made by your company? 
 
  
Question 14:    How long have you, as an investor been involved in venture capital or private 
equity investment? 
 
  
Question 15:    What is the average percentage shareholding taken up by your firm? 
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Question 16:    Do you determine the percentage the percentage shareholding as a function of 
expected return on investment?  
 
  
Question 17:     What is the percentage shareholding that the founder/entrepreneur is normally 
left with? 
Seed: 
Start-up: 
Early growth: 
Established: 
  
Question 18:     How involved is your company in the matters of your portfolio companies during 
the seed phase? 
Shareholders meetings: 
 
Directors level: 
 
Management level: 
 
Operational level: 
 
  
Question 19:      How involved is your company in the matters of your portfolio companies during 
the start-up? 
Shareholders meetings: 
 
Directors level: 
 
Management level: 
 
Operational level: 
 
  
Question 20:    How involved is your company in the matters of your portfolio companies during 
the early growth? 
Shareholders meetings: 
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Directors level: 
 
Management level: 
 
Operational level: 
 
  
Question 21:    How involved is your company in the matters of your portfolio companies during 
the established phase?   
Shareholders meetings: 
Directors level: 
Management level: 
Operational level: 
  
Question 22:    Are you or your company actively involved in the selection and appointment of: 
Board of directors: 
The CEO: 
The management team: 
  
Question 23:    What is the role of the board of directors in the portfolio companies that you get 
involved with?  
 
  
Question 24:    Do you prefer to invest in companies that operate in the industry that you are 
familiar with? 
 
  
Question 27:    Will your company decline an investment if 
the investment needed a relatively small amount: 
if you cannot get control of the board of directors: 
if you do not get at least 51% of the portfolio company's 
shares: 
  
Question 28:    Do you appoint external or non executive directors on the board of directors in 
your portfolio companies? 
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Question 29:    How important is the role of the external and non executive directors? 
>  
  
Question 30:    Rank each of the following value adding activities of the board of directors in order 
of importance with 10 = the most important and 1 = the least important for your company. 
1 
Serving as a sounding board to the 
entrepreneurial team: 
2 Interfacing with investor group: 
3 Monitoring operating performance: 
4 Monitoring financial performance: 
5 
Recruitment and/or replacement of CEO: 
6 
Assistance on short term crisis/problems: 
7 
Providing contacts with key customers and 
prospects: 
8 
Development of new strategy to meet changing 
circumstances: 
9 Obtaining sources of debt financing: 
10 
Obtaining sources of equity financing beside 
venture capital: 
  
Question 31:    How important is the role of the external director in the role of mentor and 
sounding board? 
 
  
Question 32:    Will you invest in a venture with an excellent idea/concept/product and an 
incomplete management team?  
 
  
Question 33:    Do you do physiological and brain preference tests on the CEO and the 
management team before appointment? 
 
  
Question 34:    Do you appoint the CEO and management team according to the result of the 
above tests? 
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Question 35:    How important is it that the investor, entrepreneur and the management team’s 
personalities are compatible? 
 
  
Question 36:    How important is it that the investor, entrepreneur and management team work 
cohesively?  
 
  
Question 37:    How often do you change the management team that are presented to you by the 
entrepreneur? 
 
  
Question 38:    Is there a need for a mediator, to ease differences and combine different 
personalities, in the portfolio company? 
 
  
Question 39:    Is there a need for a mentor to guide the management team in the portfolio 
companies? 
 
  
Question 40:    Rank the importance of the characteristics determining the quality of the 
management team.  
1 Integrity: 
2 Intellectual honesty: 
3 Intellectual brilliance: 
4 People smart: 
5 Leadership ability: 
6 Ability to build a team: 
7 Real entrepreneurs: 
8 Good business judgement: 
9 Knowledge, skill level and intelligence: 
10 Motivation: 
  
Question 43:    Would you rather appoint someone in your management team that is a new 
graduate (explicit knowledge) than someone with experience (tacit knowledge) that is 
academically not well qualified? 
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Question 44:    Rank the following sectors that play a role in the development of new ventures 
from the most (5) important to the least (1) important. 
1 
Family and friends: 
2 
Angel investors: 
3 
Venture capitalists: 
4 
Commercial 
banks: 
5 
Merchant bankers: 
  
Question 45:    Are you investing in ventures to: 
 
  
General comments: 
 
  
Click SUBMIT to store(save) the informartion 
Submit
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Universiteit van Stellenbosch                                               
 
University of Stellenbosch 
Departement Ondernemingsbestuur 
Department of Business Management 
 
 
Dear respondent, 
 
RESEARCH SURVEY 
  
The success of private equity investment, where venture capital and angel investing is included, 
is determined by many internal and external factors.  Research is required to maximise the 
success factor of these investments. Private equity investments are potentially a large contributor 
to economic and job opportunity growth in South Africa. The United States of America and to a 
lesser extend Europe is optimising this investment resource to maximise their economic and job 
opportunity growth. The South African government has identified these investment markets as 
important investment areas with the proposed tax relieves for venture capital investment and their 
involvement in the venture capital and private equity markets.  
 
This survey is carried out as part of a masters research dissertation and has the support of the 
University of Stellenbosch (www.sun.ac.za, supervisor is Professor Johan van 
Rooyen (jvrooyen@sun.ac.za) and JP Fourie South - African Venture Capital Association 
(SAVCA).  
 
The objective of the research is to contribute to the success of private equity (venture capital, 
including angel investing) in an emerging economy such as that of South Africa. 
 
The following areas are covered in the research; 
            1.         Ownership 
            2.         Directorship (Internal and external) 
            3.         Management. 
            4.         The role of a mentor and mediator in the company. 
            5.         The importance of a proper due diligence on the success of the venture. 
            6.         Evaluation of the USA and European markets in the specific markets. 
           7.         Evaluation of the South African market, compared to the USA and European              
markets. 
            8.         The current development in the investment market in South Africa. 
 
A summary or details of the survey results will be made available to you, should you require it.  
Please clearly indicate, in the questionnaire, whether you are interested in the information. 
 
Please support the survey by giving me your valuable input. This survey can not be 
completed without your help! 
 
Please click on the link below to access the survey questionnaires: 
 
(Please be sure to click the SUBMIT button after completing the questionnaire otherwise 
the information will not be stored in the data base.) 
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Access to Survey questionnaire 
 
Thank you for your time and effort. 
  
Best regards, 
  
Schalk Cadle 
Tel: 027 218 546731 
Fax: 027 218 546743 
Mobile: 027 0836250150 
Email: cadle@pixie.co.za 
